ပဋိညာဉ်ပျက်သုဉ်းခြင်း[ Part Six ]

 ဆရာကြီးဦးမြသင်ကြားပို့ချချက်များ

ပဋိညာဉ်ပျက်သုဉ်းခြင်း[ Part Six ]

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Raja Dhruv Dev Chand 

               vs 

Harmohinder Singh & An 

on 1 March, 1968

Equivalent citations: 1968 AIR 1024, 1968 SCR (3) 339, AIR 1968 SUPREME COURT 1024

Author: J.C. Shah

Bench: J.C. Shah, V. Ramaswami, G.K. Mitter

အမှု၌အိန္ဒိယနိုင်ငံတရားလွှတ်တော်ချုပ်ကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

[ Under the English common law the earlier asess laid down the rule of "absolute contract" that when a duty was cast upon a person who bound himself by contract absolutely to do a thing, he could not escape liability for damages for breach by proof that as events turned out performance was futile or even impossible: see Paradin v.

Jane(1). (1647) Aleyn, 26.

This rule was later mitigated by an exception that if further fulfilment of the contract is brought to an abrupt stop by some irresistible and extraneous cause for which neither party is responsible, the contract shall terminate forthwith and the parties be discharged: see Denny, Mott and Dickson Ltd. v. James B. Fraser & Co. Ltd. (2). [1944] A.C. 265.

The rationale of the doctrine of frustration under the English common law need not be considered, for in India by the provisions of the Indian Contract Act have turned a limited exception under the English common law into a positive general rule in s. 56 of the Indian Contract Act. 

Section 56, insofar as it is material provides An agreement to do an act impossible in itself is void.

A contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, becomes impossible, or, by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful.

Under s. 56, where an event which could not reasonably have been in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made renders performance impossible or unlawful, the contract is rendered void, and the parties are excused from performance of their respective obligations. 

Therefore where performance is rendered by intervention of law invalid, or the subject matter assumed by the parties to continue to exist is destroyed or a state of thing assumed to be the foundation of the contract fails, or does not happen, or where the performance is to be rendered personally and the person dies or is disabled, the contract stands discharged.

It has 'been held by this Court that the rule in s. 56 exhaustively deals with the doctrine of frustration of contracts, and it, cannot be extended by analogies borrowed from the English common law. 

In Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co. and A nr. (1), 1954] S.C.R. 310. Mukherjea, J., observed at p. 3 19 :

"....... the doctrine of frustration is really an aspect or part of the law of discharge of contract by reason of supervening impossibility or illegality of the act agreed to be done and hence comes within the purview of section 56 of the Indian Contract Act. It would be incorrect to say that section 56 of the Contract Act applies only to cases of physical impossibility and that where this section is not applicable, recourse can be had to the principles of English law on the subject of frustration. It must be held also that to the extent that the Indian Contract Act deals with a particular subject, it is exhaustive upon the same and it is not permissible to import the principles of English law dehors these statutory provisions."

No useful purpose will be served by referring to the judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States of America and the Court of Session in Scotland to which our attention was invited. 

Section 56 of the Contract Act lays down a positive rule relating to frustration of contracts and the Courts cannot travel outside the terms of that section. 

The view expressed by the East Punjab High Court in Parshotam Das Shankar Das v. Municipal Committee, Batala(2), A.I.R. 1949 B.P. 301. that s. 56 of the Contract Act is not exhaustive of the law relating to frustration of contracts in India must be deemed not to be good law to that extent. 

We are unable to agree with counsel for the appellant in the present case that the relation between the appellant and the respondents rested in a contract. 

It is true that the Court of Wards had accepted the tender of the appellant and had granted him a lease on agreed terms of lands of Dada Siba Estate. 

But the rights of the parties did not after the lease was granted rest in contract. 

By S. 4 of the Transfer of Property Act the chapters and sections of the Transfer of Property Act which relate to contracts are to be taken as part of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. 

That section however does not enact and cannot be read as enacting that the provisions of the Contract Act are to be read into the Transfer of Property Act. 

There is a clear distinction between a completed conveyance and an executory contract, and events which discharge a contract do not invalidate a concluded transfer.

By its express terms s. 56 of the Contract Act does not apply to cases in which there is a completed transfer. 

The second paragraph of s. 56 which is the only paragraph material to cases of this nature has a limited application to covenants under a lease. 

A covenant under a lease to do an act which after the contract is made becomes impossible or by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent unlawful, becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful. 

But on that account the transfer of property resulting from the lease granted by the lessor to the lessee is not declared void. ]

အိန္ဒိယနိုင်ငံတရားလွှတ်တော်ချုပ်ကထိုပြဿနာကိုအပြတ်ဆုံးဖြတ်လိုက်ပြီဖြစ်ရာအငြင်းပွါးမှုထပ်မံပေါ်ရန်အကြောင်းမရှိတော့ချေ။

အငှါးချထားခြင်းဟူသည်အငှါးချထားသည့်ပစ္စည်း၏အကျိုးခံစားခွင့်ကိုအပြီးအစီးလွှဲပြောင်းပေးခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။

ပဋိညာဉ်အက်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ ၅၆ ပါပြဌာန်းချက်များအရပဋိညာဉ်ပျက်သုဉ်းခြင်းသည်ယင်းသို့ပြီးစီးသောလွှဲပြောင်းမှုနှင့်မသက်ဆိုင်နိုင်။

အငှါးချထားခြင်းသည်ပဋိညာဉ်သက်သက်မဟုတ်။

ငှါးရမ်းသောပစ္စည်းပျက်စီးသွားခြင်းမရှိလျှင်ဖြစ်စေ၊အရေးပါသည့်ကိစ္စများအတွက်အမြဲအသုံးမဝင်မဖြစ်လျှင်ဖြစ်စေ၊ငှါးရမ်းခြင်း၏ရည်ရွယ်ရင်းကိစ္စအတွက်ငှါးရမ်းသူကငှါးရမ်းသောပစ္စည်းကိုအသုံးမပြုစေကာမူသို့မဟုတ်အသုံးမပြုနိုင်စေကာမူငှါးရမ်းခြင်းကိုမဖျက်သိမ်းနိုင်။

ငှါးရမ်းပြီးနောက်ကာယကံရှင်တို့၏အခွင့်အရေးတို့သည်ပဋိညာဉ်အပေါ်မူမတည်ချေ။

ပစ္စည်းလွှဲပြောင်းခြင်းအက်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ ၄ တွင်ပဋိညာဉ်အက်ဥပဒေပါပြဌာန်းချက်များကိုပစ္စည်းလွှဲပြောင်းခြင်းအက်ဥပဒေ၌ထည့်သွင်းဖတ်ရှုရမည်ဟုပြဌာန်းထားခြင်းမရှိချေ။

ဤပုဒ်မ၏ဒုတိယအပိုဒ်သည်အငှါးစာချုပ်ပါစည်းကမ်းချက်တရပ်ကိုဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းနှင့်သက်ဆိုင်နိုင်သည်။

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ပဋိညာဉ်ဖွဲ့ပြီးနောက်အငှါးစာချုပ်ပါစည်းကမ်းချက်တရပ်အရဆောင်ရွက်ရန်ဖြစ်သောပြုလုပ်မှုတခုကိုပြုလုပ်ရန််မဖြစ်နိုင်ခြင်းကြောင့်ဖြစ်စေ၊ယင်းပြုလုပ်မှုမှာဥပဒေနှင့်ဆန့်ကျင်ခြင်းကြောင့်ဖြစ်စေ၊အငှါးစာချုပ်အရပေါ်ပေါက်သောပစ္စည်းလွှဲပြောင်းမှုပျက်ပြယ်သည်ကြေငြာခြင်းမပြုဟုတရားလွှတ်တော်ချုပ်ကအကြောင်းပြထားသည်ကိုပညာရှင် SIR DINSHAW FARDUNJI MULLA ပြုစုသော The Indian Contract Act [ 15th Edition ] စာမျက်နှာ ၁၈၆ တွင်အောက်ပါအတိုင်းဖော်ပြထားသည်ကိုတွေ့ရပါသည်-

[ 186                         S. 56

Chapter IV-Of the Performance of Contracts

Frustration does not apply to:

( 1 ) a lease because it is completed conveyance or transfer of interest in the land.

47 Raja Dhruv Dev v. Raja Harmohinder Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1024 : (1968) 3 SCR 339; Ganga Retreat & Towers Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 12 SCC 91, 106.

By express terms of S.56 of the Act, frustration cannot apply to cases in which there is a completed transfer.

48 Raja Dhruv Dev v. Raja Harmohinder Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1024 : (1968) 3 SCR 339; Ganga Retreat & Towers Lid. v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 12 SCC 91, 106.

Lease is not a mere contract. 

Where the property leased is not destroyed or rendered substantially and permanently unfit.

49 See S. 108, Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

the lessee cannot avoid the lease because he does not or is unable to use the land for purposes for which it is let to him. 

Rights of parties do not, after the lease is granted, rest in contract. 

Section 4 of the Transfer of Property Act does not enact that the provisions of the contract Act are to be read into the Transfer of Property Act.

50 Raja Dhruv Dev v. Raja Harmohinder Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1024 : (1968) 3 SCR 339; Ganga Retreat & Towers Lid. v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 12 SCC 91, 106.

It may be that para two of this section may apply to performance of a covenant in a lease. 

A covenant under a lease to do an act, which after the contract is made, becomes impossible or unlawful. 

But on that account the transfer of property resulting from the lease is not declared void;

51 Raja Dhruv Dev v. Raja Harmohinder Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1024 : (1968) 3 SCR 339; Ganga Retreat & Towers Lid. v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 12 SCC 91, 106. ]

အိန္ဒိယနိုင်ငံတွင်တရားသူကြီးအများစုကအငှါးချထားခြင်းသည်ပဋိညာဉ်ပြုလုပ်သည့်အဆင့်ထက်ကျော်လွန်သည်ဖြစ်၍ပဋိညာဉ်အတိုင်းမဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ခြင်းကြောင့်ပဋိညာဉ်ပျက်သုဉ်းသည့်သဘောတရားအရငှါးရမ်းခြင်းပျက်ပြယ်ခြင်းမပြုဟုကောက်ယူကြသည်။

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1947 RANGOON LAW REPORTS 423 ( 472 )

ORIGINAL CIVIL.

Before Mr. Justice Thein Maung on the Original Side

Before Sir Ernest Goodman Roberts, Kt., Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Sharpe and Mr. Justice Blagden on Appeal.

K. M. MODI (PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT)

                       v.

MOHAMED SIDDIQUE AND ONE (DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT).

Civil Regular Suit No. 53 of 1946 and Civil 1st Appeal No. 22 of 1947 of the High Court of Judicature at Rangoon.

1947 Mar 7. Dec, 24.

အမှုတွင်အယူခံမှုကိုဆုံးဖြတ်သောတရားသူကြီးတဦး[ BLAGDEN ]ကငှါးရမ်းခြင်း၏သဘောသဘာဝအရဆိုလျှင်ဆောင်ရွက်၍မရနိုင်ခြင်းကြောင့်ငှါးရမ်းခြင်းပျက်သုဉ်းသည့်အမှုမျိုးကိုစိတ်ကူး၍မရနိုင်ကြောင်း၊ငှါးရမ်းထားသောဥပစာကိုပင်လယ်ရေပြင်လွှမ်းသွားသည့်တိုင်အောင်ငှါးရမ်းသူတွင်ထိုဥပစာကိုဖုံးလွှမ်းလျက်ရှိသောရေပြင်တွင်မိမိတဦးတည်းငါးဖမ်းယူခွင့်ကိုကျင့်သုံးနိုင်သေးကြောင်းအဆုံးစွန်သောဥပမာကိုပြဆိုထားကြောင်းစီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ ၄၇၀ တွင်အောက်ပါအတိုင်းတွေ့မြင်နိုင်သည်-

[  On the difficult question whether a lease can be frustrated I find myself also in agreement with my brother Thein Maung.

Such is the nature of a lease that it is admittedly difficult to imagine a case of its frustration by impossibility of performance. 

Even in the case of a subsidence of the earth, resulting in the demised premises being completely inundated by the sea, the tenant, during the remainder of his term, might, presumably, insist on the exclusive right of  fishing in the area of water covering his tenement, for what that right might be worth. ]

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အငှါးပဋိညာဉ်ပျက်သုဉ်းနိုင်၊မနိုင်ပြဿနာနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ [1945] AC 221, [1945] 1 All ER 252. Cricklewood Property and Investment Trust Ltd v Leighton's Investment Trust Ltd အမှုတွင်အင်္ဂလန်နိုင်ငံအထက်လွှတ်တော်၏အဆုံးအဖြတ်မှာပြတ်ပြတ်သားသားမရှိကြောင်းဖော်ပြပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။

၁၉၈၁ ခုနှစ်တွင်ထိုပြဿနာကိုအထက်လွှတ်တော်က [1981] 1 AlI ER 161. National Carriers Ltd v Panalpina (Northern) Ltd အမှုတွင်ယတိပြတ်ဆုံးဖြတ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။

အလျဉ်းသင့်၍ဖော်ပြရလျှင်၊အင်တာနက်မှရှာဖွေတွေ့ရှိသော MARK PAWLOWSKI and JAMES BROWN တို့ပြုစုသည့် THE TERMINATION OF REAL PROPERTY INTERESTS BY FRUSTRATION UNDER ENGLISH LAW စာတမ်း၌ (a) Fixed term tenancies ခေါင်းစဉ်အောက်တွင်အောက်ပါအတိုင်းဖော်ပြသည်-

[ It was in the leading case of National Carriers Ltd v Panalpina (Northern) Ltd [ 22[1981| AC 675(HL). In the carlier case of Leighton's Investment Trust Ltd v. Cricklewood Property and Investment Trust that a lease could be frustrated (Viscount Simon LC and Lord Wright), two saying it could not (Lord Russell and Lord Goddard) with the fifth expressing no opinion. ]that the House of Lords was presented with the first real opportunity to consider whether the doctrine of frustration could apply so as to determine a lease. 

In this case, a warehouse was let to the tenant for a term of 10 years from January 1974. 

The tenant covenanted, inter alia, not to use the property otherwise than for the purpose of a warehouse. 

The only vehicular access to the property was by a street which the local authority closed in May 1979 because of the dangerous condition of a derelict Victorian warehouse which was situated nearby. 

The closure lasted for about 20 months, during which time the tenant's warehouse was rendered useless. 

In an action by the landlord for recovery of unpaid rent, the tenant claimed that the lease had been frustrated by the closure of the street. 

The House of Lords held, by a majority, that the doctrine of frustration was, in principle, applicable to leases [ 23 In National Carriers, the term of the lease was for a period of 10 years. It may, however, be artificial to regard the tenant's rights as governed by executory promises in cases where those rights are, as a matter of substance, more properly viewed by reference to their character as an estate in land with a root of title in the executed demise( i.e., a 99 year lease of land on payment of a premium and with no, or only a normal rent). Here, the lease takes on the character of a conveyance of land and, hence, purely a vehicle of estate ownership. In this situation, the contract is largely executed with minimal outstanding obligations on either party still to be performed. For this reason, an executed freehold conveyance may be beyond the scope of the doctrine. ] but, in view of the fact that the lease still had several years to run after the interruption had ceased, the lease was not frustrated. 

In reality, the tenants had lost less than two years of use of their warehouse and the lease would still have nearly three years left to run after the interruption had ceased. 

Essentially, the closure of the street was not serious enough as to go to the whole foundation of the lease rendering the leasehold estate worthless or useless. 

It is likely, therefore, that the outcome would have been different if the interruption of access had been lengthier. ]

 

(b) What events will frustrate the lease? ခေါင်းစဉ်အောက်တွင်အောက်ပါအတိုင်းဖော်ပြသည်-

[ It has been suggested that if "some vast convulsion of nature" swallowed up the demised property altogether (or buried it in the sea, this would give rise to a frustrating event. 34 See, Cricklewood Property and Investment Trust Ltd v Leighton's Investment Trust Ltd 11945] AC 221, at 229, per Viscount Simon LC.

This was also recognised by Lord Russell (in his dissenting speech in National Carriers) where he opined that a physical destruction of a flying leasehold and the total disappearance of the site comprised in the lease into the sea (so that it no longer existed in the form of a piece of land and could not be the subject of forfeiture could amount to a frustrating event. 

In this latter circumstance, "the obligation to pay rent, which issues

out of the land, could not survive its substitution by the waves of the North Sea." 35 [1981] AC 675, at 709, per Lord Russell.

On this reasoning, where the subject-matter of the lease comprises a structure only without land (for example, a lease of a flat or office in a block) and the structure is destroyed, it is submitted that the lease would be frustrated because the physical subject-matter of it would cease to be capable of definition. Viscount Simon LC in Cricklewood Property and Investment Trust Ltd v Leighton's Investment Trust Ltd 36 [1945] AC 221, (HL) also gave the example of a lease expressed to be for the specific purpose of building which is rendered impossible because of government legislation which permanently prohibits private building in the area in question.37 In Rom Securities Ltd v. Rogers (Holdings) Ltd (1967) 205 EG 427, an agreement for a lease was held to be frustrated by the refusal of planning permission for the proposed development of the property. In the Scottish case of The Tay Salmon Fisheries Company Ltd v Speedie (1929) SC 593, (Court of Session), a lease of 19 salmon fishing seasons was held to be abandoned by the tenant as a result of bye-laws which converted the greater part of the fishing area into a danger zone for the purposes of aerial gunnery and bombing practice. The decision, however, is not based on frustration but on the principle that the bye-laws caused a total eviction of the tenant from the fishing areas. Government expropriation has also been held to frustrate a lease: see, BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v. Hunt (No 2) [1983] 2 AC 352, (HL).

It seems also that a lease would become frustrated if it provided for the use by the tenant of the demised premises for a single purpose which subsequently became illegal.

However, a temporary restriction on building works merely suspending the tenant's ability to build in accordance with its obligations under a long lease would not amount to frustration. 38 See the facts in Cricklewood Property and Investment Trust Ltd v Leighton's Investment Trust Ltd [1945] AC 221, (HL).

That said, it has long been established that, although the whole lease

may not be frustrated, it may be that a particular covenant in it may be temporarily suspended until it becomes possible to perform it.39 See, Cricklewood Property and Investment Trust Ltd'v Leighton's Investment Trust Ltd 1945] AC 221, at 233-234, pe ord Russell; John Lewis Properties plc v Viscount Chelsea [1993| 34 EG 116 and Baily y De Crespigny (1869) LR 4 QB 180. ]

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ပဋိညာဉ်ပျက်သုဉ်းခြင်းဆိုင်ရာဥပဒေသသည်အငှါးပဋိညာဉ်နှင့်သက်ဆိုင်နိုင်ကြောင်း၊သို့ရာတွင်အငှါးပဋိညာဉ်ပျက်သုဉ်းသည့်အမှုမျိုးရှားပါးနိုင်ကြောင်းရှင်းပြပါသည်။

ထိုကိစ္စနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍-

Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston's LAW OF CONTRACT[ 16TH EDITION ]

Discharge Under the Doctrine of Frustration 1 

C Controversy whether doctrine of frustration applies to a lease

ခေါင်းစဉ်အောက်တွင်အောက်ပါအတိုင်းဖော်ပြပါရှိပါသည်-

[ It has been a controversial question whether the doctrine of frustration can be applied to a lease of land. 

If, for instance, land which has been let for building purposes for ninety-nine years is, within five years from the beginning of the tenancy, completely submerged in the sea or zoned as a permanent open space, can it be said that the fundamental purpose of the contract has been frustrated and that the term itself must automatically cease? 75 Yahuda 'Frustration and the Chattel Interest'

It is, indeed, well settled by a number of decisions that if, during the continuance of the lease, the premises are requisitioned by the government 76 Whitehall Court Ltd v Ettlinger [19201 1 KB 680.

or destroyed by fire? 77 Matthey v Curling [1922] 2 AC 180. Cane Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and the Law pp 380-1, points out that it is normal practice for landlords to insure against such loss.

or by enemy action, 78 See Redmond v Dainton [1920] 2 KB 256.

the tenant remains liable on his covenants to pay rent and to repair the property. 

But these decisions, which assume that individual covenants by a landlord or tenant are absolute, do not preclude the possibility that an event may be regarded as frustrating the fundamental purpose of the contract and therefore as terminating the lease altogether. 

For many years the view was taken in the lower courts that leases are outside the doctrine of frustration. 

This is based on the argument that (p. 730) a lease creates not merely a contract, but also an estate. 

Thus, in London and Northern Estates Co v Schlesinger, 79 [1916] 1 KB 20.

it was held that the lease of a flat was not terminated by the fact that the tenant had become an alien enemy and was therefore prohibited from residing on the premises. Lush J said:

It is not correct to speak of this tenancy agreement as a contract and nothing more. 

A term of years was created by it and vested in the appellant, and I can see no reason for saying that, because this order disqualified him from personally residing in the flat, it affected the chattel interest which was vested in him by virtue of the agreement.80 Ibid at 24. This statement was approved by the Court of Appeal in Whitehall Court Ltd v Ettlinger [1920] 1 KB 680 at 686, 687, which decision was approved by Lord Atkinson in Matthey v Curling [1922] 2 AC 180 at 237.

Conflicting opinions were expressed in Cricklewood Property and Investment Trust Ltd v Leighton's Investment Trust Ltd: 81  [1945] AC 221, [1945] 1 All ER 252.

In May 1936, a building lease was made to the lessees for a term of ninety-nine years.

Before any buildings had been erected the war of 1939 broke out and restrictions imposed by the government made it impossible for the lessees to erect the shops that they had covenanted to erect. 

In an action brought against them for the recovery of rent they pleaded that the lease was frustrated.

Page 14 of 34

Discharge Under the Doctrine of Frustration 1

It was held unanimously by the House of Lords that the doctrine of frustration, even if it were capable of application to a lease, did not apply in the instant circumstances. 

The compulsory suspension of building did not strike at the root of the transaction, for when it was imposed the lease still had more than ninety years to run, and therefore the interruption in performance was likely to last only for a small fraction of the term.

Lord Russell and Lord Goddard LCJ expressed the opinion that the doctrine of frustration cannot apply to a demise of real property while Lord Simon and Lord Wright took the opposite view. 

Lord Porter expressed no opinion on the question.

In the ninth edition of this work it was submitted however that if the question should come before the House of Lords, the view that a lease is capable of being frustrated should be preferred. 

It is no doubt true that in many cases the object of the parties is in fact to transfer an estate but it surely goes too far to say that this is so as a matter of law. 

In many cases the parties may contemplate that the risk of unforeseen disasters will pass to the lessee on the execution of the lease just as surely as if he had taken a conveyance of the fee simple but this will not always be so. 

If the lease is for a specific purpose which becomes impossible of achievement, there may be a strong case for holding the lease frustrated. 

Similar arguments may apply if the lease is of short duration and here it is relevant to observe that a contractual licence to use land is certainly capable of frustration, 82 Taylor v Caldwell (1863) 3 B & s 826; Krell v Henry [1903] 2 KB 740.

and that the distinction between leases and licences is notoriously hard to draw 83 Cheshire and Burn's Modern Real Property pp 654-5.

These views derive considerable support from the decision of the (p. 731) Supreme Court of Canada in Highway Properties Ltd v Kelly, Douglas & Co,84 (1971) 17 DR (3d) 710. See p 689, above.

that for the purpose of applying the rules about breach 'it is no longer sensible to pretend that a commercial lease...is simply a conveyance and not also a contract. 85  lbid at 721, per Laskin

This is in fact the position that was adopted by the House of Lords in the decision in National Carriers Ltd v Panalpina (Northern) Ltd.86  [1981] 1 AlI ER 161.

The facts of this case need not be recounted since the House of Lords were unanimously of the view that there was no arguable case of frustration on the merits but they clearly held (Lord Russell dubitante) that the doctrine of frustration could apply to a lease. 

The decisive argument was the essential unity of the law of contract and the belief that no type of contract should as a matter of law be excluded from the doctrine. 

On the other hand it was agreed that it would be relatively rare for the doctrine to be applied in practice. 

The difference was neatly put as being between 'never' and 'hardly ever'.

This reasoning must of necessity carry with it the cases of an agreement for a lease 87 See Rom Securities Ltd v Rogers (Holdings) Ltd (1967) 205 Estates Gazette 427.

and a contract for the sale of freehold land. 88 See Hillingdon Estates Co v Stonefield Estates Ltd [1952] Ch 627, [1952] 1 AlI ER 853.

Both must be capable of frustration, though the nature of the contracts may well be such as to fix on one party or the other the risk of many disasters.

For instance in a straightforward contract of house purchase, it is normally understood that the risk of the house being destroyed by fire passes at the moment of exchange of contracts and prudent purchasers insure on this basis. ]

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အိန္ဒိယနိုင်ငံတရားလွှတ်တော်ချုပ်နှင့်အင်္ဂလန်နိုင်ငံအထက်လွှတ်တော်တို့အမြင်ချင်းမတူသည်မှာအားမရဘွယ်ဖြစ်သည်။

အထက်လွှတ်တော်ကအငှါးပဋိညာဉ်ပျက်သုဉ်းနိုင်သည်ဟုသုံးသပ်သော်လည်းထိုအမှုမျိုးပေါ်ပေါက်ခဲပေလိမ့်မည်ဟုမြင်သည်။

ဘယ်တော့မျှမပေါ်ပေါက်နိုင်ဟုမဆို။

အငှါးပဋိညာဉ်သည်လည်းပဋိညာဉ်တမျိုးဖြစ်သည်အားလျော်စွာပျက်သုဉ်းနိုင်သည်ဟုဆိုသည်။

အင်္ဂလန်နိုင်ငံတွင်ရိုးရာဥပဒေ[ common law ]ကိုကျင့်သုံးသည်။

အိန္ဒိယနိုင်ငံတွင်မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကဲ့သို့ပြဌာန်းဥပဒေကိုကျင့်သုံးသည်။

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၁၉၅၈ ခုနှစ်၊အထူးတရားမအယူခံမှုအမှတ် ၃

မောင်ကျော်ညိန်း နှင့် မောင်ကျော်ကျော်

အမှုတွင်ခုံရုံးကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းသတိပေးဘူးသည်-

[ We have taken pain to reproduce the various opinions of the learned Judges of the late High Court of Judicature with a view to demonstrate that we would ever be treating on dangerous grounds when we try to apply the doctrine of frustration under the common law of England to leases. ]

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ပြဌာန်းဥပဒေအရဆုံးဖြတ်ရသောမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်ရှိတရားရုံးများသည်အင်္ဂလိပ်ရုံးများ၏ဥပဒေအပေါ်အခြေခံ၍ဆုံးဖြတ်သင့်၊မသင့်အလေးအနက်စဉ်းစားသင့်ပါသည်။

မူအားဖြင့်သာအငှါးပဋိညာဉ်ပျက်သုဉ်းနိုင်သည်ဆိုခြင်းဖြစ်သည်တို့ကိုလည်းသတိမူသင့်ပါသည်။

ပစ္စည်းလွှဲပြောင်းခြင်းအက်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ ၄ တွင်ပဋိညာဉ်နှင့်စပ်လျဉ်းသည့်ယင်းဥပဒေပါအခန်းနှင့်ပုဒ်မများသည်ပဋိညာဉ်၏တစိတ်တဒေသဖြစ်သည်ဟုပြဌာန်းရာမှပဋိညာဉ်အက်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ ၅၆ နှင့်ပစ္စည်းလွှဲပြောင်းခြင်းအက်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ ၁၀၈( င )တို့ထိပ်တိုက်တိုးကာပြဿနာပေါ်လာရခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။

အကောင်းဆုံးမှာပြဌာန်းဥပဒေကိုပြင်ဆင်ခြင်းဖြင့်သံသယပွါးမှုကိုအဆုံးသတ်သင့်ပေသည်။

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