A . I . R . 1948 Patna . 60 ( DB )

ဆရာကြီးဦးမြသင်ကြားပို့ချချက်များ

1995 B. L. R. 151( F. B. )(ဦးရွှေမိုးပါ၃ နှင့် ဦးအိုက်ဖုန်းပါ၂)အမှုမှာလို၊ပစ္စည်းလွှဲပြောင်းခြင်းအက်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၅၂နဲ့စာချုပ်စာတမ်းမှတ်ပုံတင်ခြင်းအက်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၄၇တို့စပ်ဟပ်တဲ့စီရင်ထုံးဟာ၊ A. I. R. 1948 Patna 60( D. B. )အမှုမှာပေါ်ပေါက်ခဲ့ပါတယ်။

A ကအခင်းဖြစ်ပစ္စည်းကို၊ B ထံမှာရောင်းချဖို့(၅-၁၂-၁၉၂၇)နေ့မှာသဘောတူခဲ့ပြီးနောက်၊ဒီပစ္စည်းကိုပဲ C ထံမှာရောင်းချဖို့(၂၀-၆-၁၉၃၀)နေ့မှာထပ်မံသဘောတူခဲ့ပါတယ်။

နောက်(၁၆-၇-၁၉၃၀)နေ့မှာစာချုပ်ချုပ်ဆိုပြီးလက်ရောက်ပေးအပ်ရောင်းချလိုက်တဲ့အတွက် C အမည်ပေါက်သွားပါတယ်။

C နဲ့အရောင်းအဝယ်စာချုပ်ချုပ်ဆိုတဲ့(၁၆-၇-၁၉၃၀)နေ့မှာပဲ၊ B က A အပေါ်(၅-၁၂-၁၉၂၇)နေ့စွဲပါအရောင်းအဝယ်ပဋိညာဉ်အတိုင်းဆောင်ရွက်ပေးစေဖို့တရားစွဲဆိုရာမှာ၊ C ကိုအမှုသည်အဖြစ်မထည့်ပါဘူး။

အမှုမှာသက်သေခံရာမှာတော့အမှုစွဲဆိုတဲ့နေ့က၊ A အနေနဲ့ C ကိုပစ္စည်းရောင်းချတဲ့စာချုပ်ချုပ်ဆိုတာသိတဲ့အကြောင်းဝန်ခံထွက်ဆိုပါတယ်။

B အမှုစွဲဆိုပြီးနောက်သုံးရက်အကြာ(၁၉-၇-၁၉၃၀)နေ့မှာ၊ A နှင့် C တို့ချုပ်ဆိုတဲ့အရောင်းအဝယ်စာချုပ်ကိုမှတ်ပုံတင်ပေးခဲ့ပါတယ်။

B အနေနဲ့တရားစွဲဆိုတဲ့(၁၆-၇-၁၉၃၀)နေ့မှာ၊ A နဲ့ C တို့ချုပ်ဆိုတဲ့စာချုပ်ကိုမှတ်ပုံမတင်ရသေးတော့၊သီးခြားသက်သာခွင့်အက်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၂၇(ခ)အရ၊ C ကိုအမှုသည်အဖြစ်ထည့်ခွင့်ရှိနိုင်ပါ့မလားလို့မေးစရာရှိပါတယ်။

ပစ္စည်းလက်ရှိဖြစ်တဲ့အတွက်၊ C ကိုတရားမကျင့်ထုံးဥပဒေအမိန့်၁၊နည်း၃အရတရားစွဲနိုင်တယ်လို့၊ A. I. R. 1943 Bombay.37စီရင်ထုံးမှာပြဆိုပါတယ်။

ပုဒ်မ၂၇(ခ)မှာတော့အကျုံးမဝင်ပါဘူး။

အမှုအတောအတွင်းမှာ၊ C ကိုရောင်းတဲ့စာချုပ်ကိုမှတ်ပုံတင်လိုက်တဲ့အတွက်၊ C ကိုအမှုသည်အဖြစ်မထည့်နိုင်ဘူးလားလို့စောဒကတက်စရာရှိပါတယ်။

A. I. R. 1943 Bombay. 37 စီရင်ထုံးအရထည့်နိုင်ပါတယ်။

ပုဒ်မ၂၇(ခ)မှာအကျုံးဝင်သွားပါတယ်။

ဒါပေမဲ့မထည့်ခဲ့ဘူး။

( ဦးရွှေမိုးပါ၃ နှင့် ဦးအိုက်ဖုန်းပါ၂ )အမှုမှာ၊တတိယပုဂ္ဂိုလ်(ဦးသိန်းမောင်)ကို၊ဦးရွှေမိုးတို့ကအခင်းဖြစ်ပစ္စည်းရောင်းချတဲ့စာချုပ်ကိုမှတ်ပုံတင်မပေးစေဖို့၊ဦးအိုက်ဖုန်းတို့ကယာယီတားဝရမ်းထုတ်ဆင့်ပေးဖို့လျှောက်ထားပေမဲ့မအောင်မြင်လို့အမှုအတောအတွင်းမှာပဲမှတ်ပုံတင်ဖြစ်ခဲ့ပါတယ်။

ဒါပေမဲ့ဝယ်သူဦးသိန်းမောင်တို့ကိုအမှုသည်အဖြစ်မထည့်ခဲ့ဘူး။

အထူးအယူခံမှာဝယ်သူဦးသိန်းမောင်တို့ကအမှုသည်များအဖြစ်ထည့်ဖို့လျှောက်ခဲ့တာမအောင်မြင်ပါဘူး။

အမှုမှာဝယ်သူဦးသိန်းမောင်တို့ကိုအမှုသည်အဖြစ်မထည့်တာဟာ၊ဘယ်သူ့ကိုအကျိုးယုတ်စေသလဲလို့စဉ်းစားစရာရှိပါတယ်။

ဦးသိန်းမောင်တို့အမှုသည်အဖြစ်ပါမှ၊တရားလိုဦးအိုက်ဖုန်းတို့အနိုင်ရတဲ့ဒီကရီဟာ၊ဦးသိန်းမောင်တို့အပေါ်မီးသေမှာ၊အတည်ဖြစ်မှာပါ။

ဦးသိန်းမောင်တို့ဟာရောင်းသူဦးရွှေမိုးတို့ရဲ့အခွင့်အရေးတွေကိုဆက်ခံရရှိတဲ့အတွက်၊မီးသေတဲ့ဥပဒေဟာ၊ဦးသိန်းမောင်တို့အပေါ်ပါမီးခိုးတောက်လျှောက်မလိုက်ဘူးလားလို့မေးစရာရှိပါတယ်။

အမှုစွဲဆိုပြီးတရားပြိုင်ထံမှအခင်းဖြစ်ပစ္စည်းကိုလွှဲပြောင်းရရှိသူတွေအပေါ်မှာသာဒီကရီကအကျိုးသက်ရောက်ပါတယ်။

အမှုမစွဲခင်လွှဲပြောင်းရရှိသူအပေါ်အကျိုးသက်ရောက်ခြင်းမရှိပါဘူး။

(1899) 4 C. W. N. 283စီရင်ထုံးကိုကြည့်ပါ။

1995 B. L. R. 151( F. B. )အမှုမှာ၊ဝယ်သူဦးသိန်းမောင်တို့ကဘာကြောင့်အမှုသည်အဖြစ်ပါချင်ရတာလဲဆိုတာနားမလည်ပါဘူး။

အိုးကမပူ၊စလောင်းကပူဆိုတာမျိုးလို့ဆိုရမလား။

အထူးအယူခံမှုမှာ၊ရောင်းသူဦးရွှေမိုးတို့အနေနဲ့လည်း၊ဝယ်သူဦးသိန်းမောင်တို့ပြောချင်တဲ့စကားကိုပြောဆိုနိုင်ပါတယ်။

တရားလိုဦးအိုက်ဖုန်းတို့နဲ့တရားပြိုင်ဦးရွှေမိုးတို့ပူးပေါင်းဖန်တီးတဲ့အမှုဆိုရင်တော့တမျိုးဖြစ်ပါလိမ့်မယ်။

———————————-

စာဖတ်သူဥပဒေပညာရှင်များအလွယ်တကူဖတ်ရှုလေ့လာနိုင်ရန်အတွက်၊ A. I. R. 1948 Patna 60( D. B. )စီရင်ထုံးအား၊အင်တာနက်မှရှာဖွေကူးယူဖော်ပြလိုက်ပါသည်။

A. I. R. (35) 1948 Patna 60 [C N. 22.)

BENNETT AND BEEVOR JJ.

Sadei Sahu - Defendant - Appellant.

                   V.

Chandramani Dei and another — Plaintiff and Defendant -Respondents.

——————————

SADEI SAHU V. CHANDRAMANI DEI

Patna High Court

Feb 17, 1947

CASE NO. Appeal No. 9 of 1940

JUDGES Bennett & Beevor, JJ.

ACTS

SECTION 54 A PROVINCIAL INSOLVENCY ACT 1920

provision of the earlier Registration Acts of 1864, 1866, 1871 and 1877

SECTION 123 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT 1882

Article 113 of sch. 1 to the Limitation Act, 1908,

SECTION 52 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT 1882

SECTION 54 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT 1882

SECTION 47 REGISTRATION ACT 1908

Section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act,

SECTION 10 LIMITATION ACT 1908

SECTION 91 TRUSTS ACT 1882

—————————————

SADEI SAHU V. CHANDRAMANI DEI

Bennett, J.:— This is an appeal from a decision of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Cuttack, reversing the judgment of the Munsif of the 1st Court, Cuttack, in a suit instituted by the respondent under O. 21, R. 103 of the CPC, for a declaration that the decree obtained by the appellant in original Suit No. 242 of 1930 of the latter Court is not binding upon her and for a permanent injunction against the appellant restraining him from taking delivery of possession of the disputed property in execution of the said decree.

2. The facts of the case are as follows. On 5-12-1927, one Alekh Sahu agreed to sell the disputed property to the appellant. 

On 20-6-1930, Alekh Sahu entered into a second agreement under which he contracted to sell the disputed property to the respondent and on 16-7-1930, he executed a deed of sale thereof to the respondent who thereafter entered into possession and her name appears in the Current Settlement Record of Rights.

3. There are concurrent findings of fact of the two Courts below, which were not disputed before us, that the respondent at the date of her purchase had notice of the prior sale to the appellant. 

On the same day, 16-7-1930, but subsequent to the actual execution of the above-mentioned deed of sale to the respondent, the appellant instituted O.S No. 242 of 1930 against Alekh Sahu claiming specific performance of the contract of sale of 5-12-1927. 

In his evidence the appellant as D.W 3, admitted that on 16-7-1930, when he instituted O.S No. 242 of 1930, he was aware of the prior execution on that day of the deed of sale to the respondent. 

He did not, however, see fit to implead the respondent in that suit. 

On 19-7-1930, three days after the institution by the appellant of O.S No. 242 of 1930, the deed of sale to the respondent was duly registered. 

The appellant's claim in O.S No. 242 of 1930 against Alekh Sahu for specific performance of the agreement of 5-12-1927, was duly decreed and a registered kebala was duly executed in his favour by the Munsif of the 1st Court. 

On his application for delivery of possession, the respondent intervened under Section 151 of the CPC, and prayed that delivery of possession be refused. 

His claim was dismissed on the ground that the deed of sale to him of 16-7-1930, was executed pendente lite. 

He therefore commenced the present suit.

4. The first point taken by Mr. B.K Pal on behalf of the appellant was that the sale to the respondent was pendente lite in that the deed of sale was not registered until three days after the institution of suit No. 242 of 1930. 

He argued that since Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, provides that a sale of tangible immovable property can only be made by a registered instrument, it follows as of course that the date of the transfer for the purposes of S. 52 of that Act, which enunciates the doctrine of lis pendens, must be the date of registration. 

This argument however entirely ignores Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, which itself repeats the corresponding provision of the earlier Registration Acts of 1864, 1866, 1871 and 1877 and which provides as follows:

“A registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration.”

5. This section can only be read together with Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, on the basis that the transfer by registered instrument under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, once effected, relates back to the date of execution or other conventional date. 

That this is so, is, in my opinion, clear from the decision of the Judicial Committee in 8 P.L.T 327( 1 )and from the application of that decision made by a Division Bench of this Court in 19 P.L.T 383.( 2 )

In the case in the Privy Council, it was held that where a Hindu governed by the Mitakshara School executed a deed of gift and made it over to the donee, who accepted the gift, but prior to registration the donor adopted a son, the adoption did not render the gift inoperative, although the gift had not been registered before adoption. 

The ratio decidendi of their Lordships' decision was stated by Lord Salvesen as follows:

[They (their Lordships) are unable to see how the provisions of Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, can be reconciled with Section 47 of the Registration Act, except upon the view that, while registration is a necessary solemnity in order to the enforcement of a gift of immovable property, it does not suspend the gift until registration actually takes place. 

When the instrument of gift hag been handed by the donor to the donee and accepted by him, the former has done everything in his power to complete the donation and to make it effective. 

Registration does not depend upon his consent, but is the act of an officer appointed by law for the purpose, who, if the deed is executed by or on behalf of the donor and is attested by at least two witnesses, must register it if it is presented by a person having the necessary interest within the prescribed period. 

Neither death nor the express revocation by the donor, is a ground for refusing registration, if the other conditions are complied with.]

6. The provisions of Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which govern the mode of a valid transfer of immovable property by way of gift, are as categorical and mandatory in their terms as are those of S. 54 of that Act and I am of opinion that they cannot be distinguished in their relation to Section 47 of the Registration Act. 

That this is so, follows clearly from the decision of this Court above referred to in 19 P.L.T 383 where in reliance upon the decision of the Judicial Committee above quoted, it was held that where a deed relating to certain properties requiring registration was executed and before it could be registered the properties were attached, the attachment did not prevail against the deed or prevent registration thereof and that when registered the deed took effect from the date of its execution.

7. Mr. B.K Pal argued strenuously that Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, operated only as between the parties to the deed and did not affect the rights of third parties and he referred to the decisions in A.I.R 1936 Cal. 17,( 3 )A.I.R 1941 Cal. 78( 4 )and A.I.R 1934 Rang. 216.( 5 )

In so far as those decisions turn upon the wording of some other statutory provisions, such as Section 54 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, and s. 26F, Ben. Ten. Amendment Act, 1938, they are no guide to the present question, but in so far as they purport to interpret Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, they appear to me, if I may say so respectfully, to be inconsistent with the decision of the Privy Council in 8 P.L.T 327 and of this Court in 19 P.L.T 383, above referred to. 

In both these cases the effect of S. 47 upon the right of a third party was directly in issue and the immediate subject of the decision.

8. Mr. B.K Pal next contended that he was entitled to rely upon Section 91 of the Trusts Act, 1882, and that thereunder the respondent must be deemed to hold the property in dispute in trust for the appellant. 

In so far as this contention, in the circumstances of this case, can be said to aid the appellant, it must mean that by virtue of Section 91 of the Trusts Act, 1882, a person to whom the owner has contracted to sell immovable property is entitled to sue a subsequent transferee thereof with notice for possession of the immovable property without claiming or first obtaining a decree for specific performance of the contract, but that proposition refutes itself. 

Under Section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act, the vendor of immovable property is just as much a trustee for the person with whom he contracts for the sale thereof as is a subsequent purchaser thereof under Section 91 of the Trusts Act, 1882, but, as the decision of the Judicial Committee in 45 Mad. 641( 6 )makes abundantly apparent, the only remedy of such a person against a vendor is a suit for specific performance. 

By purchasing with notice of the prior agreement, the subsequent purchaser assumed all the obligations of the vendor, but he does not assume any greater obligation. 

The words ‘to the extent necessary to give effect to the contract’ in Section 91 of the Trusts Act, 1882, mean, therefore, to the extent necessary to give effect to the only means that exist of enforcing the contract, namely, a suit for specific performance. 

The trust created by Section 91 of the Trusts Act, 1882, arises by operation of law and, as the decision of the Judicial Committee in 10 Pat. 851( 7 )shows, is not a trust for a specific purpose within the meaning of Section 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908. 

Once, therefore, the remedy by way of specific performance is barred under Article 113 of sch. 1 to the Limitation Act, 1908, the person to whom the vendor first contracted to sell the property has no further or other remedy. 

Mr. B.K Pal sought to distinguish the case where such a person has obtained a decree for specific performance against the vendor and cited the dictum of Mookerjee, J. in 34 C.L.J 79,( 8 )where that very learned Judge appears to have laid down a general proposition of law to the effect that when a suit for specific performance is ended by a final decree transferring the title, that title dates back to the date of the agreement on which the suit is based and that the Court will not permit its decree to be rendered nugatory by intermediate conveyances. 

It is to be remarked that if that proposition is accepted at its face value, it renders Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, largely, and Section 91 of the Trusts Act, 1882, entirely redundant, since it extends the doctrine of lis pendens in such a case beyond the actual pendency of the suit to the period between the date of the agreement on which a suit for specific performance is based and the date of the institution of the suit. 

It is only by some such extension of the doctrine of lis pendens that the suggested distinction can be maintained, because the suit and decree for specific performance against the vendor is res alios inter acta qua the subsequent purchaser and cannot otherwise affect his rights, but, the doctrine never has and, within the ordinary meaning of the expression lis pendens, never could be so extended. 

Both in the law of India as set out in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and in the law of England, upon which the section is based, as enunciated by Turner L.J, in (1857) 1 De. G. &, J. 566,( 9 )the operation of the doctrine is restricted to the period of the lis. 

Nor can it be suggested that having obtained the decree for specific performance against the vendor, the purchaser under the decree in instituting a suit for possession against the original subsequent purchaser on the basis of the decree is doing no more than enforcing his original contract for the enforcement of which the subsequent purchaser holds the property in trust. 

The original con-tract with the vendor has merged in the decree and in such a suit it is not his original contract which the purchaser under the decree is seeking to enforce but the decree itself which he has obtained in a suit to which the subsequent transferee was not a party. 

The point is really elemental and looking at the actual decision in 34 C.L.J 79 

I am very doubtful if Mookerjee, J. really intended to do more than enunciate the ordinary doctrine of lis pendens, because it was not necessary for the purposes of that case in any way to extend the doctrine, the subsequent purchase there in question being clearly effected after the date of the suit for specific performance, as was also the case in 17 C.L.J 427( 10 )on which the learned Judge specifically relied for the proposition he enunciated.

9. For the above reasons, I would dismiss the appeal with costs.

Beevor, J.:— I agree.

D.H

10. Appeal dismissed.