1958 BLR ( H C ) 470 နှင့် 3 LBR 62 စီရင်ထုံး

ဆရာကြီးဦးမြသင်ကြားပို့ချချက်များ

ဒီကရီမိတ္တူကိုအချိန်မီလျောက်ထားမိဖို့လိုသည်။

ဆောလျင်စွာရ၊မရမှာအမှုသည်နှင့်မဆိုင်။

မိတ္တူကူးရာတွင်ကြန့်ကြာသည်နှင့်အမျှအယူခံရက်မှာတိုးချဲ့သွားမည်သာဖြစ်သည်။

သတိချပ်ရန်မှာဒီကရီမရေးဆွဲရသေးဟုဆို၍မိတ္တူလျောက်ထားရန်မလိုသေးဟုသဘောပိုက်ရန်မဟုတ်။

စီရင်ချက်ချပြီးလျင်၊ဒီကရီမိတ္တူလျောက်ထားခွင့်ရရှိသည်။

မိတ္တူရလျင်အယူခံရုံးတွင်အစောဆုံးတင်ပြရန်လည်းလိုသည်။

ပေါ့လျော့မှုကြောင့်စည်းကမ်းသတ်ကျော်လွန်၍၊အယူခံမှုပလပ်ခံရခြင်းသည်ဖြစ်ကောင်းသောကိစ္စမဟုတ်ချေ။

ယခင်ဗဟိုတရားရုံးတွင်၊ဒုတိယအယူခံဝင်ရောက်လာသောအမှုတမှု၌၊ပထမအယူခံရုံးကဒီကရီရေးဆွဲခြင်းမပြု၍ဒီကရီမိတ္တူတင်သွင်းခြင်းမပြုနိုင်ခြင်းဖြစ်ကြောင်းတွေ့ရသဖြင့်၊ဗဟိုတရားရုံးကတိုင်းတရားရုံးအားဒီကရီရေးဆွဲစေသည်။

တိုင်းတရားရုံးကဒီကရီရေးဆွဲပြီးအမှုတွဲပြန်လည်တင်ပြလာ၍အယူခံကိုကြားနာရန်ချိန်းဆိုသောအခါထိုနေ့အထိအယူခံတရားလိုဘက်မှတိုင်းတရားရုံး၏ဒီကရီမိတ္တူကိုကူး၍တင်ပြရန်ပျက်ကွက်သည့်ပြင်၊မည်သူမျှမလာ၍ပလပ်ခြင်းခံရသည်။

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ဒီကရီမိတ္တူမပါဘဲတင်သွင်းသည့်အယူခံသည်တရားဝင်အယူခံမဟုတ်ချေ။

သို့သော်ဒီကရီမိတ္တူကိုနောက်ပိုင်း၌စည်းကမ်းသတ်ကာလအတွင်းတင်သွင်းလျင်၊စတင်တင်သွင်းသည့်နေ့ကစ၍၊အယူခံကိုတရားဝင်တင်သွင်းစေရာရောက်သည်။

1958 BLR ( H C ) 470 

DAW MA GAUK (APPLICANT)

                         V.

U AH YAUNG (RESPONDENT). *

Before U Aung Khine, J.

အမှုတွင်၊တရားလွှတ်တော်တရားဝန်ကြီးဦးအောင်ခိုင်ကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

“Civil Procedure Code, 0. 43-APteals from orders-0. 41, R. 1-Not complied with-Copy of  order appealed from filed subscquently, but with in time-Appeal in order.

Where a memorandum of appeal was filed without complying with the provisions nf Order 41, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code by omitting to file a certified copy of the order appealed from.

Held: That there was no proper presentation of the appeal.

But where the certified copy of the order appealed from was filed subsequently within the period of limitation.

Held: That the filing of the certified copy of the order appealed from, though belated, had the effect of validating the appeal as from the date it was filed.”

စီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ၄၇၁နှင့်၄၇၂တွင်၊တရားဝန်ကြီးဦးအောင်ခိုင်ကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်သည်-

A preliminary objection was taken by the applicant in the District Court that the appeal before it was incompetent, invalid and not legally maintainable inasmuch as no copy or copies of the orders appealed from accompanied the memorandum of appeal. The only question that came up for decision then was as to whether the appeal before the District Court was valid or not.

Order XLIII, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly lays down that the rules of Order XLI shall apply so far as may be, to appeals from orders.

Order XLI, Rule 1 reads:

“Every appeal shall be preferied in the form of a memorandum signed by the appellant or his pleader and presented to the Court or to such officer as it appoints in this behalf. The memorandum shall be accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed from and (unless the appellate Court dispenses therewith) of the judgment on which it is founded.”

Therefore, it is clear that the memorandum of appeal presented before the District Court should have been accompanied by a copy of the order or orders appealed from.

However, in this case no formal order or decree had been drawn up and therefore strictly speaking, no copy of the decree appealed from as contemplated in Rule 1 of Order XLI could have been filed by the appellant. 

But when an objection was raised by the applicant in the District Court, the respondent U Ah Yaung did realize that at least a copy or copies of the orders appealed from should have been filed together with the memorandum of appeal.

This mistake was rectified by him by the filing of the copy of the order within the period of limitation.

The filing of the certified copy of the order appealed from, though belated, had the effect of validating the appeal as from the date it was filed.

The position would have been otherwise if this copy was produced after the expiration of the period of limitation.”

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III LBR 62 

MAUNG KIN  v. MAUNG SA.

Before thi Hon' ble Mr. Hurvey Adamson, C.S.l., Chief Judge, Mr. Justice Fox and Mr. Justice Birks.

အမှုတွင်၊အယူခံတရားလိုသည်ဒီကရီမိတ္တူကိုလျောက်ထားရာ၌၊ဒီကရီမရေးဆွဲရသေး၍မရသေးလျင်၊မိတ္တူကူးရာ၌ကြာသောအချိန်ကိုထုတ်ပယ်ရမည်ဖြစ်ရာဒီကရီမိတ္တူမပါဘဲတင်သွင်းသောအယူခံသည်တရားမဝင်ဟုမဆိုသာကြောင်း၊အောက်မြန်မာပြည်စုံညီခုံရုံးကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

“Limitation--appeal--decree signed after date of judgment--time requisite for obtaining copies- Indian Limitation Act, 1877, s. 12, Schedule II, Article 136.

Under section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree begins only when a step has been taken to obtain the copy.

À party may apply for a copy of a decree before it is drawn up and signed.

If at the time  when an application for a copy is made the decree is not ready, a party appealing is entitled to allowance of the time during which the decrer remains unsigned, but so long as he has made no application for a copy, the non-signature of the decree can have no effect on him, and the period between the date of judgment and the date on which the decree was actually signed cannot be claimed by him.”

စီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ၆၃တွင်၊တရားသူကြီးချုပ် Adamson ၏သုံးသပ်ချက်ကိုအောက်ပါအတိုင်းဖော်ပြသည်-

“Adamson, C. J. -The question referred is-

Was this appeal presented after the time allowed by the Limitation Act for an appeal to a High Court?

The decree is dated 30th  April 1904. 

It was actually signed on 18th May 1904.

Application for a copy was made on 6th May 1904.

The copy was ready for delivery and was actually delivered on 20th

May 1904.

The appeal was presented on 18th August 1904.

If the period between 30th April and 6th May be excluded the appeal is not time barred.

If that period be included the appeal is time barred.

The question is whether the appellant is entitled to deduct the time between the delivery of judgment  and the signing of the decree in computing the time taken in presenting his appeal.”

စီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ၆၄နှင့်၆၅တွင်တရားသူကြီးချုပ်က၎င်း၏အမြင်ကိုအောက်ပါအတိုင်းဖော်ပြ၍အဆုံးအဖြတ်ပေးသည်-

“In my opinion the question has been exhaustively argued in the decisions of the Allahabad and Bombay Courts which have been quoted.

The Limitation Act prescribes that the time for presenting an appeal shall run from the date of the decree appealed against. In accordance with the provisions of section 205 of the Civil Procedure Code, the date of the decree must be taken to be the date on which the judgment was pronounced.

I think that the words "time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree " in section 12 of the Limitation Act, must bear the construction that has been put on them by the Allahabad and Bombay High Courts. 

The time begins only when a step has been taken in order to obtain a copy. 

I am unable to agree with the argument of the learned advocate for appellant that an application cannot be made for a copy of a decree that is not actually in existence.

A party is at liberty to ask for a copy whether the decree is signed or not. 

Knowing, as he does, that under the law the decree must bear date the day on which the judgment was pronounced, it is necessary that he should time his application for copy on the assumption that the date of the judgment is the date of the decree..

If at the time when the application for copy is made, the decree is not ready, he will of course be entitled to. the allowance of the time during which the decree remains unsigned, but so long as he has made no application, the non-signature of the decree can have no effect upon him.

On these grounds I would answer the question referred in the affirmative.

I may add that in the arguments something was said as to the effect of section 5 A of the Limitation Act on the present case.

That appears to me to be a question for the consideration of the Judge who will pass final orders in the matter, which is not included in the reference.

အခြားတရားသူကြီးတဦး ( Birks J. )က၊၎င်း၏အမြင်ကိုစီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ၆၅တွင်အောက်ပါအတိုင်းဖော်ပြသည်-

“Birks J. I concur with the learned Chief Judge in thinking the question must be answered in the afflrmative.”

တတိယတရားသူကြီး ( Fox, J. )က၎င်း၏အမြင်သုံးသပ်ချက်ကိုစီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ၆၅နှင့်၆၆တွင်အောက်ပါအတိုင်းဖော်ပြသည်-

“Fox, J.- But for the judgment of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Bani Madhub Mitter V. Matungini Dassi (1) I should have thought that the question referred was free from doubt.

With all respect to the learned Judges who composed the Bench, it seems to me that their decision made law rather than declared it.

The provisions of Limitation Act are to my mind clear.

The period of ninety days allowed for an appeal to a High Court is to be reckoned from the date of the decree.

That date must under the Civil Procedure Code be the same as the date on which judgment was delivered.

Section 12 of Limitation Act allows an appellant a further period of time taken in obtaining copies of the judgment and decree.

In calculating what that time amounts to, it appears to me that all that can be considered is when was an effetive application for copies made, and when were they ready for delivery.

There is nothing to prevent a party from appyling for a copy of a decree immediately after judgment has been delivered. He knows that a decree must follow upon a final judgment in the suit as a matter of course, and that it may possibly be drawn up and signed on the day on which judgment has been delivered.

He has only himself to blame if he does not  take the precaution of applying at once for a copy in case he may wish to appeal. 

I concur in answering the question referred in the affirmative.”