AIR 1970 SC 1778,( State Of West Bengal vs The Dalhousie Institute Society)

 ဆရာကြီးဦးမြသင်ကြားပို့ချချက်များ

ကာလစည်းကမ်းသတ်အက်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၃တွင်၊ဆိုင်ရာအမှုအတွက်သတ်မှတ်ထားသောစည်းကမ်းသတ်ကာလကုန်လွန်မှစွဲဆိုသောအမှုများကိုပလပ်ရမည်ဟုပြဌာန်းထားသည်။

ကာလစည်းကမ်းသတ်အက်ဥပဒေဇယား၁တွင်ရည်ညွှန်းထားသောအမှုများအတွက်၊သတ်မှတ်ထားသောစည်းကမ်းသတ်ကာလကုန်ဆုံးသွားလျင်၊အဆိုပါအမှုများတွင်တောင်းဆိုနိုင်သောသက်သာခွင့်ကိုအရေးဆိုခွင့်မရှိတော့။

ထို့ကြောင့်ကာလစည်းကမ်းသတ်ဥပဒေသည်၊တရားရုံးတွင်ရလိုသောသက်သာခွင့်တောင်းဆိုခြင်းကိုပိတ်ပင်သောဥပဒေဖြစ်သည်ဟုဆိုနိုင်သည်။

နောက်တဆင့်တက်ပြီးစောဒကတက်နိုင်သောအချက်မှာ၊ကာလစည်းကမ်းသတ်ဥပဒေအရ၊အချင်းဖြစ်ပစ္စည်းပေါ်တွင်ပိုင်ဆိုင်ခွင့်သည်လည်းတပါတည်းပျောက်ပျက်သွားသလားဆိုသောအချက်ဖြစ်သည်။

ကာလစည်းကမ်းသတ်အက်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၂၈တွင်၊မရွှေ့မပြောင်းနိုင်သောပစ္စည်းလက်ရောက်တောင်းခွင့်သည်၊ကာလစည်းကမ်းသတ်ကျော်လွန်သွားလျင်ပိုင်ဆိုင်ခွင့်သည်လည်းကုန်ဆုံးပြတ်စဲစေရမည်ဟုပြဌာန်းထားသဖြင့်၊အခြားပစ္စည်း(ရပိုင်ခွင့်)များနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ကုန်ဆုံးပြတ်စဲခြင်း၊ဆိတ်သုဉ်းခြင်းမရှိကြောင်းမြင်သာသည်။

ထိုသို့ဆိုလျင်၊မရွှေ့မပြောင်းနိုင်သောပစ္စည်းလက်ရောက်တောင်းခွင့်ကာလကုန်ဆုံးသွားသဖြင့်၊ပစ္စည်းပိုင်ရှင်၏ပိုင်ဆိုင်ခွင့်သည်ပျောက်ပျက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သောကြောင့်ပိုင်ဆိုင်ခွင့်သည်မည်သူ့ထံသို့ရောက်သွားမည်နည်းဟုစောဒကတက်စရာပေါ်လာပါသည်။

အဆိုပါစောဒကအတွက်အဖြေမှာ၊ပစ္စည်းပိုင်ဆိုင်ခွင့်သည်အစိုးရထံသို့ရောက်ရှိနိုင်သည့်နည်းတူ၊ပစ္စည်းလက်ရှိဖြစ်သူထံသို့လည်းရောက်ရှိသွားနိုင်ပါသည်။

အိန္ဒိယနိုင်ငံစီရင်ထုံးများအရဆိုလျင်၊ပစ္စည်းကိုဆန့်ကျင်လက်ရှိထားသူသည်၊၁၂နှစ်ကြာလျင်ပိုင်ရှင်ဖြစ်သွားသည်။

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ကာလစည်းကမ်းသတ်အက်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၂၈တွင်”ပစ္စည်းလက်ရောက်ရလိုကြောင်းတရားစွဲဆိုခြင်းအတွက်၊အက်ဥပဒေအရကန့်သတ်ထားသည့်ကာလအပိုင်းအခြားကုန်ဆုံးသောအခါတွင်၊ထိုပစ္စည်းပိုင်ဆိုင်ခွင့်သည်လည်းကုန်ဆုံးပြတ်စဲစေရမည်။”ဟုပြဌာန်းထားသည်။

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အိန္ဒိယနိုင်ငံတရားလွှတ်တော်ချုပ်က၊ AIR 1970 SC 1778 (State Of West Bengal vs The Dalhousie Institute Society)အမှုတွင်၊ပိုင်ရှင်မှန်၏အခွင့်အရေးသည်ထာဝရကုန်ဆုံးပြတ်စဲသွား၍၊လက်ရှိဖြစ်သူသည်ခိုင်မာသောပိုင်ဆိုင်ခွင့်ရရှိကြောင်းပြဆိုသည်။

Supreme Court of India

State Of West Bengal vs The Dalhousie Institute Society 

on 5 August, 1970

Equivalent citations: AIR 1970 SC 1778, 

                                           (1970) 3 SCC 802

Author: C Vaidialingam

Bench: C.A.Vaidialingam, J Shelat

JUDGMENT C.A. Vaidialingam, J.

အမှုတွင်၊စီရင်ချက်စာမျက်နှာ၁၊အပိုဒ်၂၌၊ဆုံးဖြတ်ရန်ဥပဒေပြဿနာကိုအောက်ပါအတိုင်းဖော်ပြသည်-

“2. The dispute between the parties in 'this appeal relates to the title to the compensation amount awarded in the land acquisition proceedings to the site of Dalhousie Institute building, premises No.34 Dalhousie Square There is no dispute about the amount of Rs. 7,45,640/- awarded as compensation for the land. 

The appellant claimed the entire amount as being payable to it whereas, on the, other hand, the respondent Dalhousie Institute Society (hereinafter to be referred as the Institutes claimed the amount for itself. 

Therefore, the question of title to the land which is in controversy between the appellant and the respondent has to be decided and on that will depend the right of the party entitled to the compensation amount.”

စီရင်ချက်စာမျက်နှာ၁၊အပိုဒ်၄တွင်၊ The Special Land Acquisition Judge ၏သုံးသပ်ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ကိုရည်ညွှန်းဖော်ပြသည်-

“4. The Special Land Acquisition Judge by his judgment dated July 28, 1953 held that the site 34 Dalhousie Square on which the Dalhousie Institute had been constructed was intended to be given as a grant to the respondent by the Government and that it was given as such for the purpose of putting up the Dalhousie Memorial Hall and Institute. 

The Special Land Acquisition Judge further held that although the grant was an invalid one, the respondent has been in possession adverse to the Government for over 60 years and in consequence the Institute has perfected its title by such adverse possession. 

In this view the Special Land Acquisition Judge held that the compensation money in respect of the site belongs to the Institute and not to the Government. 

The Special Land Acquisition Judge further held that as the intention of the Government while granting the land to the respondent was to provide a site solely for the purpose of construction of the Dalhousie Institute and not for any other purpose, the respondent is in the position of a trustee of the site for the said purpose. 

In consequence, he held that the compensation amount could not be withdrawn by the respondent except for the purpose of acquiring a new site for the purpose for which the original grant was intended to be made. 

We have not referred to the other findings recorded by the Special Land Acquisition Judge with regard to the claim in respect of premises Nos. 34/1 and 35 Dalhousie Square, as well as the compensation amount awarded for the building on 34 Dalhousie Square because they are not material for the purpose of this appeal. 

The respondent filed an appeal against the original decree No. 111 of 1954 in the Calcutta High Court attacking the view of the Special Land Acquisition Judge that the respondent was in the position of a trustee with reference to the compensation amount and placing restrictions regarding the manner in which the amount could be withdrawn.”

ရှုံးနိမ့်သူက Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court သို့အယူခံတက်ရောက်ရာ၊အယူခံတရားရုံး၏သုံးသပ်ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ကိုစီရင်ချက်စာမျက်နှာ၂၊အပိုဒ်၆၊၇၊၈တွင်အောက်ပါအတိုင်းပြဆိုသည်-

“6. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court heard the appeal and the cross-objections. 

The learned Judges felt that the question whether there was a grant, valid or invalid in law, and the character of the respondent's possession of the land from about 1865 requires further careful and detailed consideration. 

The learned Judges were also of the view that from the various exhibits referred to by the parties before them further records may be available from the Government, the Corporation or the Institute, which may throw considerable light on the point in controversy between the parties. 

In this view the learned Judges felt that the parties must be permitted to adduce further oral and documentary evidence before the Special Land Acquisition Judge and that the appeal should be disposed of finally after the receipt of such evidence. 

Accordingly by order dated June, 23, 1959 the learned Judges, retaining the appeal and the cross-objections on the file of the High Court, directed the Special Land Acquisition Judge to record any additional evidence that may be adduced by the parties.

7. After remand It is seen that excepting examining an Assistant Engineer on the side of the appellant State, no further oral or documentary evidence was adduced by the parties. 

The appeal and the cross-objections were taken up for final hearing after receipt of this evidence. 

The learned Judges by judgment and decree dated September 9, 1963 agreed with the conclusions arrived at by the Special Land Acquisition Judge and dismissed the appeal filed by the respondent as well as the cross-objections filed by the appellant.

8. The respondent has not further challenged the dismissal, of its appeal. Therefore the point that arose for consideration by the High Court in the cross-objections filed by the appellant alone arises for consideration in this appeal.”

စီရင်ချက်စာမျက်နှာ၃၊အပိုဒ်၁၃တွင်ဆန့်ကျင်လက်ရှိထားမှုအကြောင်းကိုအောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်သည်-

“On the other hand, the material evidence will only show that the Government permitted the Institute to put up a building on the land and be in permissive occupation. 

That is, according to the learned Counsel, the respondent is in the position of a licensee and as such no claim of a grant or of adverse possession can ever be sustained.”

စီရင်ချက်စာမျက်နှာ၅၊အပိုဒ်၁၆နှင့်၁၇တွင်၊တရားလွှတ်တော်ချုပ်၏သုံးသပ်ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ကိုအောက်ပါအတိုင်းပြဆိုသည်-

“16. There is no material placed before us to show that the grant has been made in the manner required by law though as a fact a grant of the site has been made in favour of the Institute. 

The evidence relied on by the Special Land Acquisition Judge and the High Court also clearly establishes that the respondent has been in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the site for over 60 years. 

In this respect the material documentary evidence referred to by the High Court clearly establishes that the respondent has been treated as owner of the site not only-by the Corporation, but also by the Government. 

The possession of the respondent must have been on the basis of the grant made by the Government, which, no doubt, is invalid in law. 

As to what exactly is the legal effect of such possession has been considered by this Court in Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay as follows:

...the position of the respondent Corporation and its predecessor in title was that of a person having no legal title but nevertheless holding possession of the land under colour of an invalid grant of the land in perpetuity and free from rent for the purpose of a market. 

Such possession not being referable to any legal title it was prima face adverse to the legal title of the Government as owner of the land from the very moment the predecessor in title of the respondent Corporation took possession of the land under the invalid grant. 

This possession has continued openly, as of right and uninterruptedly for over 70 years and the respondent Corporation has acquired the limited title to it and its predecessor in title had been prescribing for during all this period, that is to say, the right to hold the land in perpetuity free from rent but only for the purposes of a market in terms of the Government Resolution of 1865....

17. The above extract establishes that a person in such possession clearly acquires title by adverse' possession. 

In the case before us there are concurrent findings recorded by the High Court and the Special Land Acquisition Judge in favour of the respondent on this point and we agree with those findings.”