စွဲဆိုသောအမှုနှင့်စီရင်ထုံးဖြစ်ရပ်ချင်းတူမတူမဆန်းစစ်ခြင်း

ဆရာကြီးဦးမြသင်ကြားပို့ချချက်များ

စွဲဆိုသောအမှုနှင့်စီရင်ထုံးဖြစ်ရပ်ချင်းတူမတူ၊မဆန်းစစ်ခြင်းသည်၊2004 BLR 146အမှုတွင်အထူးခုံရုံးကစီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ၁၅၁၌”စီရင်ထုံးဟူသည်သက်ဆိုင်ရာအမှု၏ဖြစ်ရပ်အတွက်သာလျင်ထုံးသာဓကဖြစ်သည်။”ဟူသောလမ်းညွှန်မှုကိုသတိမချပ်မိကြောင်းထင်ရှားသည်။

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1971 BLR 83အမှုတွင်အောက်ပါအတိုင်းမြွက်ဆိုသည်-

“စီရင်ထုံးကိုကိုးကားရာတွင်စီရင်ချက်အပြည့်အစုံကိုဖတ်ရှုမှသာလျင်အမှုအချက်အလက်တို့ကိုသိမြင်နိုင်သည်။ခေါင်းစီးမှတ်ချက်တို့သည်အကြောင်းအရာဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ကိုအရိပ်ပြခြင်းမျှသာပြုနိုင်သည်။စီရင်ထုံးပါအမှုအကြောင်းအရာနှင့်ဆုံးဖြတ်ရန်အမှုအကြောင်းအရာတို့ကိုကောင်းစွာနှိုင်းယှဉ်ရသည်။ပြီးမှသာစီရင်ထုံး၏လမ်းညွှန်မှုယူသင့်သလောက်ယူအပ်သည်။စီရင်ထုံးနောက်သို့ဆုံးဖြတ်ရန်အမှု၏ကြောင်းခြင်းရာများကလိုက်ရန်မဟုတ်။အကြောင်းခြင်းရာများကိုဥပဒေနှင့်စပ်ဟပ်ရာတွင်အခက်အခဲရှိသရွေ့သာလျင်စီရင်ထုံးကဆီလျော်သမျှကောက်ယူရန်ဖြစ်သည်။”

တရားရုံးအဆင့်ဆင့်သည်လည်းကောင်း၊ရှေ့နေများသည်လည်းကောင်း၊အထက်ပါလမ်းညွှန်မှုကိုခံယူရန်ပျက်ကွက်သည်။

လမ်းညွှန်မှုသည်ဆိုင်ရာစီရင်ထုံးစာအုပ်၌သာကိန်းဝပ်နေရန်မဟုတ်။

လိုက်နာရန်ထုံးပြုထားခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။

စီရင်ရန်အမှုကစီရင်ထုံးနောက်သို့လိုက်ရန်မဟုတ်။

အမှုကိုစီရင်ထုံးတွင်ဇွတ်သွင်း၍ဆုံးဖြတ်ရန်မဟုတ်။

စီရင်ထုံးကသာလျင်အမှုဖြစ်ရပ်နောက်သို့လိုက်ရန်ဖြစ်သည်။

ဆိုလိုသည်မှာဆုံးဖြတ်ရန်အမှု၏ဖြစ်ရပ်သည်စီရင်ထုံးပါဖြစ်ရပ်နှင့်တူပါမှကိုးကားဆုံးဖြတ်ရန်ဖြစ်သည်။

ဤဥပဒေသဘောကိုတရားရုံးများနှင့်ရှေ့နေရှေ့ရပ်များနှလုံးမူကြရန်ဖြစ်သည်။

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ဆန့်ကျင်လက်ရှိထားခြင်းမဖြစ်နိုင်ကြောင်းပြဆိုသော-

မသိန်းတင်အမှု၊၁၉၅၄ မတစ(တရားလွှတ်တော်) ၇၃ 

မည်သည့်အခါဆန့်ကျင်လက်ရှိထားခြင်းဖြစ်ကြောင်းပြဆိုသော-

မသန်းကြည်အမှု၊၁၉၆၆ မတစ ၅၅၆

စီရင်ထုံးနှစ်ရပ်ကိုပူးတွဲလေ့လာရန်လိုသည်။

ဆန့်ကျင်ကွဲလွဲသောစီရင်ထုံးများမဟုတ်။

ဖြစ်ရပ်ချင်းမတူသောအမှုများဖြစ်သည်။

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1954 BLR ( H C ) 73

MA THEIN TIN (APPELLANT)

                    V.

MA AYE TIN (RESPONDENT). 

Before U San Maung, J.

အမှုတွင်တရားဝန်ကြီးဦးစံမောင်ကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

“Adverse possession as basis of claim or defence-

Where tossession had its incoption under legal contract, continued possession can never be adverse.

Held: It is not permissible for the defendant to say that she was in possession of the land because its owner had agreed to transfer it to her upon payment of Rs. 125, and at the same time to contend that she has all along been in adverse possession of the land.

Dadoba and others v. Krishna and others, 7 Bom. 34; Tarubai and others v. Venkatrao and others, (1903) 27 Bom. 43, followed.”

စီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ၇၅တွင်၊တရားဝန်ကြီးဦးစံမောင်ကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်ဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

In my opinion, on the defendant's own showing, she cannot be held to have been in adverse possession of the suit land for any period.

She was admittedly in possession of the land with the permission of Daw Saing Hlaw before the alleged sale to her.

In fact it was not an outright sale but merely an agreement to sell for a sum of Rs. 125, as according to Ma Thein Tin herself a formal transfer was to be made only at the time when the agreed sum of Rs. 125 was fully paid up.

When the commencement and continuance of possession of a person is legal and proper, as for example when it can be referred to a contract expressed or implied, it cannot be presumed adverse.

In the case of Dadoba and others v. Krishna and others(1) 7 Bom. 34 it was held that when the possession by the defendant may be referred to the contract of tenancy under which the tenant entered, mere length of enjoyment without payment of rent does not, under ordinary circumstances, affect the relation of the parties.

See also Tarubai and others v. Venkatrao and others (2).  (1903) 27 Bom. 43.In the case under appeal it is not permissible for the defendant to say that she was in possession of the suit land because its owner had agreed to transfer the land to her upon payment of Rs. 125, and at the same time to contend that she has all along been in adverse possession of the land.

In the result the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.

Advocates' fees 3 gold mohurs.”

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1966 BLR ( C C ) 556 

MA THAN KYI AND SIX OTHERS(APPELLANTs)

                            V.

DAW GE (RESPONDENT).

Before U Thet Pe, J

အမှုတွင်၊တရားသူကြီးဦးသက်ဖေကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

“Suit for recovery of possession of a house site -infructuous sale deed--evidence of possession of the site as purchaser not as licensee--adverse possession from the date of invalid sale-Limitation Act, Article 144.

Held : The infructuous sale deed clearly shows that the respondens had been in possession of the land not in the capacity of a licensee as alleged by the appellants but in the capacity of an owner after her purchase from U Po Kyan, father of the appellants. Since the respondent came into and remained in possession of the property after the execution of the unregistered sale deed, her possession became adverse to the vendor from the date of the invalid sale and & suit by the vendor or his successor-in-title after the lapse of 12 years from that date would undoubtedly be barred under Article 144, Limitation Act.

Qadar Bakhsh and others v. Mangha Mal and others. A.I.R. (1923) Lah.495. 

Sohar Lal v. Mohan Lal, I.L.R. 50 All. 986 at 997 ; 

Mahipal Singh v. Sarjoo Prasad. A.I.R. (1926) Oudh, 141 : 

Mi. Jasoda Kuar v. Janak Missri and others, A.J.R. (1925) Pat. 787, referred to.”

စီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ၅၅၉နှင့်၅၆၀တွင်၊တရားသူကြီးဦးသက်ဖေကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်သည်-

Then the appellants must also fail on the merits of the case as well.

It is no longer in dispute that the respondent had been in possession of the suit land after her purchase from the late U Po Kyan, the father of the appellants for a sum of K 1so by means of a sale deed dated Ist March 1947 (Exhibit 1). 

Since this sale deed, though compulsorily registrable under section 17 of the Registration Act, had not been registered it does not affect the suit property nor can it be received as evidence of any transaction affecting the suit property. 

But under proviso to  section 49. Registration Act, the respondent is entitled to use it in evidence for the purpose of proving a collateral purpose, namely, the nature or character of the possession and how she had come upon the suit land vide Qadar Bakhsh and others v. Mangha Mal and others (1) A.I.R. (1923) Lah. 495. where it was held that:

" A document, although inadmissible for want of registra-tion, to prove title, may be referred to in order to ascertain the nature of the possession sought to be disturbed."

'The infructuous sale deed clearly shows that the respondent had been in possession of the land not in the capacity of a license as alleged by the appellants but in the capacitv of an owner after her purchase from U Po Kyan, father of the appellants. Since the respondent came into and remained in possession of the property after the execution of the unregistered sale deed, her possession became adverse to the vendor from the date of the invalid sale and a suit by the vendor or his successor-in-title after the lapse of 12 years from that date would undoubtedly be barred under Article 144, Limitation Act. Thus in Sohan Lal v. Mohan Lal (6) I. L.R. 50 All. 986 at 997.Mukerii, I., who wrote the leading judgment  had remarked that:

...Where in an intended sale, which can be effected in law only by a registered document, no such document is executed and yet the intending purchaser gets possession, he gets possession with the consent of the intending vendor; but, nonetheless, the purchaser's possession begins adversely to the vendor. If the intending purchaser be fortunate enough to continue, undisturbed by the vendor, in possession for a2 years, he would acquire a perfect title as against the former owner, the vendor. ••

The same view has been expressed in Mahipal Singh v. Sarjoo Prasad (7)A.I.R. (196a) Oudh 111. the relevant head-note of which reads:

" If the possession is acquired by a person under an invalid title and he continues to remain in possession for more than 12 years, although the document relating to his title may be invalid for want of registration or any other ground yet the possession having lasted for more than 12 years the title be comes an unassailable one."

It has also been ruled in Mt. Jasoda Kuar v. Janak Missir and others (8)A. I.R. (1925) Pat. 787. that:

"Even when a registered sale deed is found to be illegal, the purchaser gets full title to the property purchased, if he is put in possession in pursuance of the registered deed and continues to be in possession for over twelve years openly and adversely to the vendor."

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