1963 BLR ( C C ) 485

ဆရာကြီးဦးမြသင်ကြားပို့ချချက်များ

1963 BLR ( C C ) 485 

DAW THAN MAY (APPELLANT/APPLICANT)

                            V.

KO KYAW HLINE AND 3 OTHERS (RESPONDENTS).*

Before U San Maung, J.

အမှုတွင်၊သီးခြားသက်သာခွင့်အက်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၉အရတရားစွဲဆိုသောအမှု၌ပေါ်ပေါက်သောတရားစွဲဆိုရန်အကြောင်းသည်၊ဆိုင်ရေးဆိုင်ခွင့်အပေါ်အခြေပြု၍တရားစွဲဆိုသောအမှုတွင်ပေါ်ပေါက်သောတရားစွဲဆိုရန်အကြောင်းနှင့်လုံးလုံးလျားလျားကွဲပြားခြားနားသည်ဟု၊တရားဝန်ကြီးဦးစံမောင်ကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းဆုံးဖြတ်ထုံးဖွဲ့သည်-

“Further more, the cause of action in a suit under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act is entirely different from the cause of action of a suit based on title. Therefore, a decree granted in the former suit should not be restrained by injunction from being executed in the latter suit.”

အထက်ပါအတိုင်းပြတ်ပြတ်သားသားထုံးဖွဲ့လိုက်ရာအငြင်းပွါးစရာပြဿနာမရှိနိုင်တော့။

တရားမပြင်ဆင်မှုပေါ်ပေါက်လာပုံအကြောင်းကို၊စီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ၄၈၈တွင်တရားဝန်ကြီးဦးစံမောင်ကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းပြဆိုသည်-

“So the nett result of the two suits was that Daw Than May's claim for possession under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act was unsuccessful, and Ma Mya Ngwe's claim for declaration of title and for injunction was also unsuccessful.

There was complete status quo.

On the 29th of June 1960, a few days after she had filed her appeal against the judgment and decree in Civil Regular Suit No. 36 of I958, Daw Than May applied to the Township Judge to " recall and vacate the order of dismissal dated the 27th April 1960 " pending the result of her appeal against the judgment and decree in the connected suit. 

Her application was, however, kept pending and order was passed on the 20th August 1962, dismissing her application mainly on the ground that the application which was purported to be under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code did not lie.

The present application for revision is against that order.”

စီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ၄၈၈နှင့်၄၈၉တွင်၊အိန္ဒိယစီရင်ထုံးနှစ်ရပ်ကိုရည်ညွှန်း၍အောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်သည်-

“As observed by Page, J. (as he then was) in Satishchandra De v.Madanmohan Jati (2) : A.I.R. (1931) Cal. 483 at p. 484.

" In suits under section 9, Specific Relief Act, questions of title are irrelevant, for, like the old assize of novel dis-seizin in Plantagenet times, section 9 was enacted to afford a summary remedy against persons who had taken the law into their own hands and had ejected those in possession of land otherwise than through process of law.”

In this connection the observation of a Bench of the Madras High Court in Narayana Row v. Dharmachar (3) I.L.R. XXVI Mad. 514. may also be usefully quoted. The learned Judges said:

"The only effect of section 9 of the Specific Relief Act  is that a person who has been dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law and who brings a summary suit within the time prescribed by that section, is entitled to be reinstated even if the defendant by whom he was dispossessed be the true owner or a person authorized by or claiming under him. But a decree passed in such a suit will not have the force of res judicata on the question of title."

စီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ၄၈၉၊ဒုတိယအပိုဒ်တွင်အောက်ပါအတိုင်းဆက်လက်သုံးသပ်ဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

“Therefore irrespective of the fact that the plaintiff in the cross-suit is the true owner of a piece of land, the plaintiff in a prior suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act is entitled to a quick and summary justice in the form of a decree for ejectment of the person who had forcibly dispossessed him. 

Furthermore, I do not see how as in Civil Regular Suit No. 36 of 1958, now under considera-tion, a plaintiff can be given a decree for injunction restraining the person obtaining a decree under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act from executing his decree for eject-ment. 

As already observed above the cause of action in such a suit is entirely different from the cause of action in a suit based on title. 

Logically, therefore, a decree granted on a good and subsisting cause of action should be allowed to be executed and not restrained by injunction from being executed.”