2 UBR (1897-1901) 229 ,MA MYA AND TWO OTHERS V. MA MYE. Before H. Thirkell White. Esq., C.I.E.

ဆရာကြီးဦးမြသင်ကြားပို့ချချက်များ

2 UBR (1897-1901) 229 

MA MYA AND TWO OTHERS V. MA MYE.

Before H. Thirkell  White. Esq., C.I.E.

အမှုကို၁၈၇၈ခုနှစ်၊ဩဂုတ်လ(၄)ရက်နေ့၌စီရင်ဆုံးဖြတ်ခဲ့သဖြင့်ထုံးဖွဲ့ခဲ့သည်မှာနှစ်ပေါင်းတရာကျော်ပြီဖြစ်သည်။

ပစ္စည်းခွဲဝေပေးစေလိုမှုနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍အထက်ပါစီရင်ထုံးကိုစွဲစွဲမြဲမြဲမှတ်သားထားဖို့လိုအပ်သည်။

ပစ္စည်းခွဲဝေပေးစေလိုမှုစွဲဆိုရာတွင်၊ခွဲဝေရန်ရှိသောပစ္စည်းအားလုံးကိုခွဲဝေပေးရန်တောင်းဆိုရမည်။

ပစ္စည်းတစိတ်တဒေသကိုခွဲဝေပေးရန်စွဲဆိုခြင်းမပြုနိုင်။

အမှုသည်များပူးတွဲပိုင်ဆိုင်သောပစ္စည်းအရပ်ရပ်ကိုခွဲဝေပေးရန်တောင်းဆိုရန်လိုအပ်ခြင်း၏ယေဘုယျမူသဘောမှာ၊အမှုပွါးများခြင်းကိုပိတ်ပင်ရန်ဖြစ်သည်။

အမှုတွင်အင်္ဂလိပ်တရားသူကြီး H. Thirkell White က၊အိန္ဒိယစီရင်ထုံးသုံးရပ်ကိုရည်ညွှန်းကိုးကား၍အောက်ပါအတိုင်းဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

“In this case the appellant sued on behalf or herself and her two minor children either for the possession of a certain house in the possession of the defendant or for a share of it.

The Lower Court found that the whole estate had not been made the subiect-matter of the suit and as a partition suit dismisse it.

Held,-cn the authority of the cases reported in Indian Law Reports,12Calcutta, 567, I4 Calcutta, 122, and 7 Bombay. 272, that the judgment of the Lower Court was correct, and that a suit for partition cannot be brought unless the whole estate is brought into the division.

Refereaces:

I.L.R. 12, Cal., 567

-        14, Cal., 122.

-           7,Bom., 272.”

အမှုတွင်၊ပစ္စည်းခွဲဝေပေးစေလိုမှု၌တရားလိုနှင့်တရားပြိုင်တို့ပူးတွဲပိုင်ပစ္စည်း”တရပ်လုံး”(whole)မဟုတ်ဘဲ၊အချို့အဝက်ကိုချန်ထားပြီးအချို့ကိုခွဲဝေပေးရန်တရားစွဲဆိုခွင့်မရှိဟုထုံးဖွဲ့ထားသည်။

ထိုဥပဒေသဘောကို”technical ground”ဟုခေါ်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။

ထုံးနည်းမကျမှုဖြစ်သည်။

အထူးသတိပြုပါ။

မြန်မာစာအဖွဲ့၏အင်္ဂလိပ်-မြန်မာအဘိဓာန်၊စာမျက်နှာ၆၇၆တွင်-

“hotchopt”ကို”ဗြုတ်စဗြင်းတောင်း”ဟုဘာသာပြန်သည်။

(ထိုဘာသာပြန်ချက်ကခွဲရန်ရှိသောပစ္စည်းစုတရပ်လုံးကိုဆိုလိုကြောင်းဖော်ညွှန်းသည်။)

တရားရုံးများလက်စွဲ(ဒုတိယအကြိမ်ထုတ်)စာမျက်နှာ၈၆၊အပိုဒ်Vရှိ-

”technical error”ကိုမြန်မာဘာသာဖြင့်ထုတ်ဝေသောတရားရုံးများလက်စွဲစာမျက်နှာ၉၂၌၊စွဲဆိုပုံနည်းနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်းသည့်အချက်များမှားယွင်းခြင်းဟုဆီလျော်အောင်ဘာသာပြန်သည်။

အမွေဆက်ခံရေးအက်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၄၉(မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဥပဒေအတွဲ၁၁၊စာ၁၇၄)၏ဘေးမှတ်စုတွင်”brought into hotchpot”ဟူသောစကားရပ်ကိုသုံးထားသည်။

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အထက်ဖော်ပြစီရင်ထုံး၏မြန်မာဘာသာပြန်ဆိုချက်မှာအောက်ပါအတိုင်းဖြစ်သည်-

မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်အထက်ပိုင်းစီရင်ထုံးများ

(၁၈၉၇-၁၉၀၁)

စာမျက်နှာ၁၅၇

မမြပါ၃ နှင့် မမြဲ

အိချ်။သာကယ်ဝှိုက် C. I. E. သခင်ရှေ့တော်

ဤအမှု၌အယူခံတရားလိုသည်မိမိကိုယ်တိုင်အတွက်မှစ၍။အရွယ်မရောက်သေးသောမိမိကလေးနှစ်ယောက်တို့အတွက်ပါ။တရားခံလက်၌ရှိသောအိမ်တအိမ်ကို။လက်ရှိရလိုကြောင်းသော်၎င်း။သို့မဟုတ်ဝေစုရလိုကြောင်းသော်၎င်း။စွဲဆိုကြောင်း။

အောက်ရုံးတော်ကအမွေရပစ္စည်းအလုံးကိုအမှု၏အချင်းဖြစ်အကြောင်းအရာမပြုမလုပ်အယူရှိပြီးလျှင်။၎င်းအမှုကိုပစ္စည်းခွဲဝေမှုဖြစ်သည့်အနေနှင့်ပလပ်လိုက်၏။

ကောက်ယူဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်။   ။အိန္ဒိယကာလကတ္တားစီရင်ထုံး၁၂။မျက်နှာ၅၆၇။ကာလကတ္တားစီရင်ထုံး၁၄။မျက်နှာ၁၂၂နှင့်။ဘုံဘိုင်စီရင်ထုံး၇။မျက်နှာ၂၇၂တို့၌ထုတ်ဆောင်ရည်ညွှန်းသောအခွင့်အာဏာများအရအောက်ရုံးတော်စီရင်ချက်မှာ။မှန်ကန်ကြောင်း။၎င်းပြင်အမွေရပ်ပစ္စည်းအလုံးကိုခွဲဝေရာသို့သွတ်သွင်းမှသာ။သို့မဟုတ်လျှင်ပစ္စည်းခွဲဝေရန်အမှုစွဲမမဆိုနိုင်ဟူ၍ကောက်ယူဆုံးဖြတ်ကြောင်း။

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ILR 14 Cal 122 

Jogendra Nath Mukerji v. Jugobundhu Mukerji & Anr. (minor) by their mother and guardian Nistarini Dabi & Ors.

အမှုတွင်၊အောက်ပါအတိုင်းဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

“Before the trial court it appears that reliance was placed on Jogendra Nath Mukerji v. Jugobundhu Mukerji & Anr. (minor) by their mother and guardian Nistarini Dabi & Ors. reported at ILR 14 Cal 122 in which Chief Justice Petheram dismissed the partition suit since the plaintiff has sought to partition only a portion of joint property.”

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Calcutta High Court

Haridas Senyal And Ors. vs Pran Nath Sanyal And Ors. 

on 2 January, 1886

Equivalent citations: (1885) ILR 12 Cal 566

Author: Tottenham

Bench: Tottenham, O'Kinealy

JUDGMENT Tottenham, J.

အမှုတွင်၊အောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်ဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

“1. This was a suit for the partition of a khanabari belonging to the parties in this suit. 

The defendants objected that, if this particular khanabari only were partitioned, the result would be serious to them; that there are two other khanabaris adjoining the one in question, and that the partition ought to be applied to them also as well as to other joint-family property. 

The lower Appellate Court has decided that this suit for partition of this single khanabari could not be maintained, and has dismissed it.

2. We think that the weight of authority is in favour of the lower Appellate Court's decision. 

The cases are quoted by Mr. Mayne in his book on Hindu Law (See Mayne's Hindu Law, Section 417, 3rd Ed., p. 469). 

In the present instance we think that the decision of the Court below is reasonable as well as in accordance with law. 

The appeal is dismissed with costs.”

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Bombay High Court

Hari Narayan Brahme vs Ganpatrav Daji And Anr. 

on 8 March, 1883

Equivalent citations: (1883) ILR 7 Bom 272

Author: Kemball

Bench: Kemball, Pinhey

JUDGMENT Kemball, J.

စာမျက်နှာ၂၊အပိုဒ်၅နှင့်၆တွင်၊အောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်သည်-

“5. The cause of action in the former suits (why three separate suits were permitted, is not clear) was the right of each plaintiff to have a partition of all the family property liable to partition; and it is indisputable that, as a general rule, a member of an undivided family cannot sue his co-sharers for his share in a portion only of family property, and that he must bring into [hotchpot] any undivided property in his own possession, in order that there may be a complete and final partition.

6. No doubt the rule that every partition suit shall embrace all the joint family property has been held to be subject to certain qualifications, as, for instance, where different portions of it lie in different jurisdictions, or where a portion is not available for actual partition as being in the possession of a mortgagee; but I am not aware of any authority for the proposition that a member who sues for partition of property in the hands of the defendant, can refuse to bring into [hotchpot] any undivided property held by himself, on the ground that it is situated within another jurisdiction.

It is asked, what would be the effect if the undivided property in the possession of the plaintiff were in foreign territory, but that is not the case here. 

It is obvious that, when a plaintiff seeks to recover a share of property in the hands of the defendant, it is necessary for the Court to decide whether, under the circumstances of the case, he is entitled to that partition; and I apprehend that no Court would decide that a plaintiff who withheld property which he might, and therefore ought to bring into [hotchpot] had a right to the partition of the property in the possession of the defendant. 

In the present case, when Keshavrav and his brothers sued the plaintiff's grandfather Martand for a share of the property in Martand's possession, the latter was bound to resist the claim upon all the grounds possible to him, and one of these grounds undoubtedly was that the then plaintiffs were in possession of undivided property which they were withholding from the general partition. 

The plaintiffs expressly challenged Martand with reference to the village of Saspade, and Martand having neglected to make the omission of that village a ground of defence, I think the judgment which followed involved the decision of every claim of title upon the cause of action, and must be taken between the parties as amounting to a positive adjudication of such claim. 

For these reasons I would confirmed the decree of the Court below, with costs.”

အခြားတရားသူကြီး Pinhey, J. က၊၎င်း၏သဘောထားအမြင်ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ကိုစာမျက်နှာ၂နှင့်၃၊အပိုဒ်၇၊၈တို့တွင်အောက်ပါအတိုင်းပြဆိုသည်-

“7. In my opinion the Court below is right, and I would confirm its decree. It has been contended on the, authority of Subba Rau v. Rama Rau 3 Mad. H.C. Rep. 376 that the suit is maintainable because the Poona Court had no jurisdiction over the village of Saspade, which is in the Satara District, and which is the subject of the present suit. 

Without expressing any opinion as to whether that case was rightly decided, it is very clear that it differs very much from the present case. 

In the Madras case the plaintiff was out of possession of property in two districts, and the Madras High Court ruled that he might sue separately in the Munsif's Court in each district, because neither Munsif's Court had jurisdiction over the property in the other district, and the plaintiff was not bound to include both properties in one suit, and apply to the High Court for sanction of the trial.

8. But in this case another rule of law comes in, viz.,) that a plaintiff suing for partition must bring into [hotchpot] all family property in his possession. 

In three former suits, three of the present defendants, brethren of the present plaintiff's grandfather, sued the present plaintiff's grandfather in the Poona Court for their Shares of the villages of Bhawadi and Pangari in the Poona District, stating that they were in possession of the village of Saspade in the Satara District, but that to it the present plaintiff's grandfather had no claim. 

Notwithstanding this statement in regard to Saspade, the present plaintiff's grandfather neither challenged it, nor did he claim any share of the village of Saspade in the event of being compelled to give to the then claimants their shares in Bhawadi and Pangari. 

It seems to me clear that if the present plaintiff's grandfather were entitled to any share in the village of Saspade., he was bound to assert his claim to it when sued for a partition of family property in the suits in the Poona Court, and the grandfather having failed to assert his claim then, I am of opinion that plaintiff cannot now make it the subject of a fresh suit.”

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1907-1909

2 UBR 21 

NGA PO CHEIN Vs. MI PWA THEIN.

Before G. W. Shaw, Esq., C.S.I.

အမှုတွင်၊အင်္ဂလိပ်တရားသူကြီး G. W. Shaw က၊မမြပါ၃ နှင့် မမြဲစီရင်ထုံးကိုရည်ညွှန်းအတည်ပြု၍အောက်ပါအတိုင်းဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

“Where plaintiff sued for a share of produce of land alleging that he was a co-heir and the land undivided family property, and defendant denied these allegations.

Held -that the suit was one for partial partition and, as such, was not maintainable on the principle laid down in Mi Mya v. Mi Mye (U.B.R., 1897-0I, II. P. 220).

The authorities for Mi Mya vs. Mi Mye examined and the decision affirmed.”