AIR 1968 SC 1165

ဆရာကြီးဦးမြသင်ကြားပို့ချချက်များ

Supreme Court of India

Nair Service Society Ltd vs Rev. Father K. C. Alexander & Ors 

on 12 February, 1968

Equivalent citations: 1968 AIR 1165, 

                                    1968 SCR (3) 163

စီရင်ထုံးတွင်အမှုဖြစ်စဉ်ကို၊စီရင်ချက်စာမျက်နှာ၅နှင့်၆၊အပိုဒ်၆တွင်အောက်ပါအတိုင်းဖော်ပြသည်-

6. The facts in this appeal are as follows The plaintiff filed a suit in forma pauperis on October 13, 1942 against the Society, its Kariasthan (Manager) and four others for possession of 131.23 acres of land from Survey Nos. 780/1 and 780/2 of Rannipakuthy in the former. 

State of Travancore and for mesne profits past and future with compensation for waste. 

The suit lands are shown as L(1) on a map Ex. L prepared by Commissioners in CMA 206 of 1110 M.E. and proved by P.W. 10. The two Survey Nos. are admittedly Government Poramboke lands. 

The plaintiff claimed to be in possession of these lands for over 70 years. 

In the year 1100 M.E. a Poramboke case for evicting him from an area shown as L(2) measuring 173.38 acres, but described in the present suit variously as 160, 161 and 165 acres, was started under the Travancore Land Conservancy Regulation IV of 1094 M.E.(L.C. case No. 112/1100 M.E.) by Pathanamathitta Talk Cutchery. 

This land is conveniently described as 160 acres and has been so referred to by the High Court and the Sub-Court. 

The plaintiff was fined under the Regulations and was evicted from the 160 acres. 

The Society applied for Kuthakapattom lease of this area on August 11, 1938. 

The lease was granted but has not been produced in the case. 

It was for 165 acres and the Society was admittedly put in possession of it on July 24, 1939 or thereabouts. 

The lease was for 12 years. 

Plaintiff's case was that on 13/16 October, 1939 a number of persons acting on behalf Of the. Society trespassed upon and took possession of the suit lands (131.23 acres) in addition to the 160 acres. 

The plaintiff, therefore, claimed possession of the excess land from the Society, its Manager and defendants 3 to 6, who were acting on behalf of the Society. 

The plaintiff also claimed mesne profits and compensation for waste.

The Society contended that the plaint lands were Government Reserve and that the plaintiff was dispossessed by Government from these lands when he was dispossessed of the 160 acres. 

The suit land is in two parts. Ex. L. shows these two parts as L(1)(a) and L(1) (b). 

The Society had applied for another Kuthakapattom lease in respect of L (1) (b) and obtained it. during the pendency of the suit on March 10, 1948. 

In this Kuthakapattom, which is Ex. 1, the land is shown as 256.13. acres and the lease is made without limit of time. Simultaneously a demand was made from the Society for arrears of Pattom at the same rate as for the Kuthakapattom in respect of the whole land after setting off the amount already paid by the Society. 

The Society in its written statement did not aver that it was not in possession of L (1) (a) and resisted the suit in regard to the entire suit lands. 

Subsequently it attempted by argument to limit its defence to L(1) (b) which was additionally granted to it, in the Kuthakapattom Ex. 1. Although the suit pended for 17 years in the Sub-Court no application for amendment was made. 

The Society asked for amendments several times, the last being on October 15, 1958. 

However, on the last day of hearing of, the appeal in the High Court(December 14, 1965) the Society applied for an amendment of the written statement limiting its defence to portion L(1)(b) disclaiming all interest in portion, L (1) (a) and attempted to plead the grant of the second Kuthakapattom in its favour on March 10, 1948. 

The High Court rejected this application by its judgment under appeal and, awarded possession against the Society of the entire suit land. 

The Society in its case denied the right of the plaintiff to bring a suit for ejectment or its liability for compensation as claimed by the plaintiff. 

In the alternative, the Society claimed the value, of improvements effected by it, in case the claim of the plaintiff was decreased against it. 

The other defendants remined ex-parte in the suit and did not appeal. They have now been shown as proforma respondents by the Society.”

တရားလိုကမိမိလက်ရှိမြေများအတွင်းသို့၊တရားပြိုင်အသင်းသည်မိမိလူများ၏အကူအညီဖြင့်ကျူးကျော်ဝင်ရောက်ကာလက်ရောက်ရယူထားသည့်အတွက်လက်ရောက်ရလိုမှုစွဲဆိုသောအမှုဖြစ်သည်။

တရားပြိုင်ဘက်မှအခြားအချက်များအပြင်”အချင်းဖြစ်မြေများမှာနိုင်ငံတော်ပိုင်ဖြစ်သဖြင့်၊တရားလိုသည်မြေလက်ရောက်ရလိုမှုစွဲဆိုခွင့်မရှိ”ဟုထုချေသည်။

အချင်းဖြစ်မြေမှာအခြားသူ(Third party)ပိုင်ဖြစ်၍လက်ရောက်ရလိုမှုစွဲဆိုခွင့်မရှိဟူသောထုချေချက်မျိုးကို” jus tertii “ဟုခေါ်သည်။

“ jus tertii “သည်၊လက်တင်ဘာသာစကားဖြစ်သည်။

ထိုပြဿနာနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍၊ G.C.V.Subbarrao ပြုစုသောသီးခြားသက်သာခွင့်ဥပဒေ(အက်ဥပဒေဟုအမည်မပေးပါ)ကျမ်း(၁၉၉၄ခုနှစ်ထုတ်)စာမျက်နှာ၂၅၆နှင့်၂၅၇တို့တွင်အောက်ပါအတိုင်းပြဆိုသည်-

"Jus tertii - The defendant may plead the title to the property belongs to a third party. The expression jus terti means right to third party. If A, who prima face is liable to restore property to B, alleges that C has a paramount(ထိပ်တန်း) title, A is said to set up the jus tertii.

This may not be done by an agent as against his principal. 

Mozley&Whiteley's law Dictionary; 10 th Ed.

As stated in Prem's Judicial Dictionary: If the defendant desires to set up the command of some third person as a justification (ကျိုးကြောင်းပြချက်)for an act alleged to be wrongful, he must name that third person, and plead that he did the act by his order, he must also show that such third person had a legal right to give an order. While a plea of jus tertii can effectively be taken in suit for ejectment, jus tertii.

In Nair Service Sociery v. Alexander (A. I.R 1968 SC 1165). Hidayatullah,J., held that jus tertii cannot be pleaded by a defendant who is himself a trespasser. 

He observes:"Since in every such case between trespassers the title must be outstanding in a third party a defendant will be placed in a position of dominance. He has only to evict the prior trespasser and set pretty pleading (အတော်အတန်လျှောက်လဲသည်)that the title is in someone else." 

As Erle, J., put it in Burling v. Read (1) parties might imagine that they acquired some right by merely intruding upon land in the night, running up (တက်သုတ်ရိုက်ကာဆောက်သည်)a hut and occupying it before morning. 

This will be subversive of the fundamental doctrine which was accepted always and was affirmed in Perry v Clisold ((1907) A.C .73).

The attention of the Supreme Court was invited to the difference of opinion on the subject (အကြောင်းအရာ)between the decision in Doed Carter v.Barnard (1849) 130.B. 945) and the decision in Asher v. Whitlock. ((1865) 1 Q. B. 1) but Hidayatullah, J., pointed out that the conflict should be regarded as settled by the Privy Council decision in Perry .Clisold (1907)AC.73. 

It was contended that Perry v. Clisold((1907) A.C.73) should not be followed.

Hidayatullah, J., observed: "The cases of the Judicial Committee are not binding on us but we approve of the dictum in Perry v. Clissold(1907) A.C. 73). 

The result is that jus tertii cannot be pleaded by a trespasser. "

စီရင်ချက်စာမျက်နှာ၁၃နှင့်၁၄တွင်အိန္ဒိယတရားလွှတ်တော်ချုပ်ကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်သည်-

It is not necessary to refer to the other authorities some of which are already referred to in the _judgment under appeal and in the judgment of the same court reported in Kuttan Narayaman v.Thomman Mathai(1). 

The last cited case gives all the extracts from the leading judgments to which we would have liked to refer. 

We entirely agree with the statement of the law in the Madras case from which we have extracted the observations of the learned Judges. 

The other cases on the subject are collected by Sarkar on Evidence under s. 110.

The Limitation Act, before its recent amendment provided a period of twelve years as limitation to recover possession of immovable property when the plaintiff, while in possession of the property was dispossessed or had discontinued possession and the period was calculated from the date of dispossession or discontinuance. 

Mr. Nambiar argues that there cannot be two periods of limitation, namely, 6 months and 12 years for suits based on possession alone and that the longer period of limitation (1) 1966 Kerala Law Times 1.requires proof of title by the plaintiff. 

We do not agree. 

No doubt there are a few old cases in which this view was expressed but they have since been either overruled or dissented from. 

The uniform view of the courts is that if s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act is utilised the plaintiff need not prove title and the title of the defendant does not avail him. 

When, however, the period of 6 months has passed questions of title can be raised by the defendant and if he does so the plaintiff must establish a better title or fail. 

In other words, the right is only restricted to possession. only in a suit under S. 9 of the Specific Relief Act but that does, not bar a suit on prior possession within 12 years and title neednot be proved unless the defendant can prove one. 

The present. amended articles 64 and 65 bring out this difference. 

Article 64 enables a suit within 12 years from dispossession, for possession of immovable property based on possession and not on title, when the plaintiff while in possession of the property has been dispossessed. 

Article 65 is for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title. The amendment is not remedial but declaratory of the law. 

In our judgment the suit was competent.

Mr. Nambiar also relies in this connection upon s. 110 of the, Indian Evidence Act and claims that in the case of the Society there is a presumption of title. 

In other words, he relies upon the principle that possession follows title, and that after the expiry of 6 months, the plaintiff must prove title.

That possession, may prima facie raise a presumption of title no one can deny but this presumption can hardly arise when the facts are known. 

When the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides. 

In this case s. 110 of the Evidence Act is immaterial because neither party had title. 

It is for this reason that Mr. Nambiar places a greater emphasis on the plea that a suit on bare possession cannot be maintained after the expiry of 6 months and that the Society has a right to plead jus tertii. 

The first must be held to be unsubstantial and the second is equally unfounded.

The proposition of law on the subject has been summed up by Salmond on Torts (13th Edn.) at page 172 in the following "The mere de facto and wrongful possession of land is a valid title of right against all persons who cannot show a better title in themselves, and is therefore sufficient to support an action of trespass against such persons. 

Just as a legal title to land without the possession of it is insufficient for this purpose, so conversely the possession of it without legal title is enough. 

In other words, no defendant in an action of trespass can plead the jus tertii--the right of possession outstanding in some third person-as against the fact of possession in the plaintiff.

“The maxim of law is Adversus extraneous vitiosa possessio prodesse solet,* and if the plaintiff is in% possession the jus tertii ,does not afford a defence. 

Salmond, however, goes on to say:"But usually the plaintiff in an action of ejectment is not in possession: he relies upon his right to possession, unaccompanied by actual possession. 

In such a case he must recover by the strength of his own title, without any regard to the weakness of the defendant's. 

The result, therefore, is that in action of ejectment the jus tertii is in practice a good defence. This is sometimes spoken of as the doctrine of Doe v.Barnard [1849] 13 Q.B. 945.'

Salmond, however, makes two exceptions to this statement and the second he states thus "Probably, if the defendant's possession is wrongful as against the plaintiff, the plaintiff may succeed though lie cannot show a good title : Doe d. Hughes v. Dyball (1829) 3 C & P 610; Davision v. Gent (1857) 1 H & N 744. 

But possession is prima face evidence is not displaced by proof of title. 

If such prima facie evidence is not displaced by proof of title in a third person the plaintiff with prior possession, will recover. 

So in Asher v. Whitlock [(1865) L. R. 1 Q. B. 1] where a man inclosed waste land and died without having had 20 years' possession, the heir of his devisee was held entitled to recover it against a person who entered upon it without any title. 

This decision, although long, doubtful, may now be regarded as authoritative in consequence of its express recognition of the Judicial Committee in Perry v. Clissold [1907] A.C. 73."

Mr. Nambiar strongly relies upon the above exposition of the law and upon institutional comments by Wiren "The Plea of jus tertii in ejectment" (1925) 41 L. Q.R. 139, Hargreaves "Terminology and Title in Ejectment (1940) 56 L.Q.R. 376 and Holdsworth's article in 56 L. Q.R. 479.

In our judgment this involves an incorrect approach to our problem. 

To express our meaning we may begin by reading Perry v. Clissold to discover if the principle that possession is *Prior possession is a good title of ownership against all who cannot show a better.”

စီရင်ချက်စာမျက်နှာ၁၅နှင့်၁၆တွင်၊တရားလွှတ်တော်ချုပ်ကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းဆက်လက်သုံးသပ်သည်-

“good against all but the true owner has in any way been departed from. Perry v. Clissold reaffirmed the principle by stating quite clearly :

"It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the statute of Limitation applicable to the case, his right is for ever extinguished, and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title."

Therefore, the plaintiff who was peaceably in possession was entitled to remain in possession and only the State could evict him. 

The action of the Society was a violent invasion of his possession and in the law as it stands in India the plaintiff could maintain a possessory suit under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act in which title would be immaterial or a suit for possession within 12 years in which the question of title could be raised. 

As this was a suit of latter kind title could be examined.

But whose title? 

Admittedly neither side could establish title. 

The plaintiff at least pleaded the statute of Limitation and asserted that he had perfected his title by adverse possession. 

But as he did not join the State in his suit to get a declaration, he may be said to have not rested his case on an acquired title. 

His suit was thus limited to recovering possession from onewho had trespassed against him. 

The enquiry, thus narrowsto this: did the Society have any title in itself, was it acting under authority express or implied of the true owner or was it just pleading a title in a third party?

To the first two questions we find no difficulty in furnishing an answer. 

It is clearly in the negative.

So the only question is whether the defendant could plead that the title was in the State? 

Since in every such case between trespassers the title must beoutstanding in a third party a defendant 'will be placed in a position of dominance. 

He has only to evict the prior trespasser and sit pretty pleading that the title is in someone else. 

As Erle, J. put it in Burling' v. Read (11 Q.B. 904) 'parties might imagine that they acquired - some right by merely intruding upon land in the night, running up a hut and occupying it before morning'. 

This will be subversive of the fundamental doctrine which was accepted always and was reaffirmed in Perry V. Clissold. The law does not therefore, countenance the doctrine of 'findings keepings'.

Indeed Asher v. Whitlock [1885] 1 Q.B. I goes much further. 

It laid down as the head-note correctly summarizes A person in possession of land without other title has a devisable interest, and the heir of, his devisee can maintain. 

ejectment against a person who had entered upon the land cannot show title or possession in any one prior to the testator. 

No doubt as stated by Lord Macnagthen in Perry v. Clissold, Doe v. Barnard (supra) lays down the proposition that "if a person having only a possessory title to land be supplanted in the possession by another who has himself no better title, and afterwards brings an action to recover the land, he must fail in case he shows in the course of the proceedings that the title on which he seeks to recover was merely possessory". 

Lord Macnaghten observes further that it is difficult, if not impossible to reconcile Asher v. Whitlock with Doe v. Barnard and then concludes "The judgment of Cockburn, C.J., is clear on the point. 

The rest of the Court concurred and it mav be observed that one of the members of the court in Asher v. Whit,lock (Lush, J.) had been counsel for the successful party in Doe v. Barnard. 

The conclusion at which the court arrived in Doe v. Barnard is hardly consistent with the views of such eminent authorities on real property law as Mr. Preston and Mr., Joshua Williams-. 

It is opposed to the opinions of modem text-writers of such weight and authority as Professor Maitland and Holmes, J.of the Supreme Court of the United States (see articles by Professor Maitland in the Law Quarterly Review Vols. 1, 2 and 4; Holmes, Common Law p. 244; Professor J. B. Ames in 3 Hary. Law Rev. 324 n.") 

The difference in the two cases and which made Asher v. White prevail was indicated in that case by Mellor, J. thus "In Doe v. Barnard the plaintiff did not. rely on her own possession merely, but showed a prior possession in her husband, with whom she was unconnected in point of title.

Here the first possessor is connected in title with the plaintiff; for there can be no doubt that the testator's interest was devisable.'11

The effect of the two cases is that between two claimants, neither of whom has title in himself the plaintiff if dispossessed is entitled to recover possession subject of course to the law of limitation. 

If he proves that he was dispossessed within 12 years he can maintain his action. 

it is because of this that Mr. Nambiar claimed entitled to plead jus terti. 

His contention is that in action of ejectment (as opposed to an action of trespass) jus tertii is capable of being pleaded. 

The old action of ejectment was used to try freehold titles but it was abolished in 1873. 

It was also used "for recovery ofland by one who claimed not the right to' seisin but the right to possession by virtue of some chattel interest such as a term of year.

" In such cases "the defence of jus tertii admits that the plaintiff had such a

right of entry as, would generally entitle him to succeed, but seeks to rebut that conclusion by setting up a better right in some third person" or that the plaintiff had- no right of entry at all.

To summarize, the difference between Asher v. Whitlock and Doe v. Bamard is this.: In Doe v.Barnard the principle settled was that it is quite open to the defendant to rebut the presumption that the prior possessor has title, i.e., seisin. 

This he can do, by showing that the title is in himself; if he cannot do this he, can show that the title is in some third person. 

Asher v. Whitlock lays down that a person in possession of land has a good title against the world except the true owner and it is wrong in principle for any one without title or authority of the true owner to dispossess him and relying on his position as defendant in ejectment to remain in possession. 

As Loft in his Maxim No. 265 puts it Possession contra omnes velet prater eur cui ius sit possessions (He that bath possession bath right against all but him that bath the very right): See Smith v. Oxenden 1 Ch. Ca 25. A defendant in such a case must show in himself or his predecessor a valid legal title, or probably a possession prior to the plaintiff's and thus be able to raise a presumption prior in time. It is to be noticed that Ames (Harvard Law Review Vol. III p. 313 at 37); Carson (Real Property Statutes 2nd Ed. p. 180); Halsbury (Laws of England, Vol. 24, 3rd Ed. p. 255 f.n. (o); Leake (Property in Land, and Ed. p. 4, 40); Lightwood (Time Limit. on Actions pp.

120-133); Maitland (supra), Newell (Action in, Ejectment, American Ed. pp. 433-434);-Pollock (Law of Torts, 15th Ed. P. 279); salmond Law of Torts (supra); and William and Yates (Law of Ejectment, 2nd Ed., pp. 218, 250) hold that Doe v. Barnard does not represent true law. 

Winer (to whom I am indebted for much of the information) gives a list of other writers who adhere still to the view that jus tertii can be pleaded. 

Mr. Nambiar pressed upon us, the view that we should not accept Perry v.Clissold. 

It must be remembered that that case was argued twice before the Privy Council and on the second occasion Earl of Halsbury, L. ' C. Lords Macnaghten, Davey, Robertson, Atkinson, Sir Ford North and Sir Arthur Wilson heard the case. Lord, Macnaghten's judgment is brief but, quite clear.”

စီရင်ချက်စာမျက်နှာ၁၇တွင်၊အောက်ပါအတိုင်းဆက်လက်သုံးသပ်၍၊ဥပဒေပြဿနာအပေါ်ဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

“Mr. Nambiar relies upon two other cases of, the Privy Council and a reference to them is necessary.

In Dharani Kanta Lahiri v. Garbar Ali Khan, 25 M.L.J. 95 P.C. a suit in ejectment was filed. 

The plaintiffs failed to prove that the lands of which they complained dispossession were ever in their possession within 12 years before suit and that the lands were not the lands covered by a sanad which was produced by the defendants. 

The case is distinguishable. 

It is to be noticed that Lord Macnaghten was the President of the Board and the judgment of the Board, December 5, 1912, did not base the case on Doe v. Barnard or even refer to it. The second is Mahabir Prasad v. Jamuna Singh, 92 I.C. 31 P.C. 

In this case the Board observed as follows"Counsel for the appellant (defendant) admits that in the face of the ruling by the Board he could not impugn the reversionary right of the plaintiff's vendors, but he contends that the defendant is in possession and in order to eject him the plaintiff must show that there is no other reversionary heir in the same degree 'or nearer than his assignors whose title he (the defendant) can urge against the plaintiff's claim for ejectment. 

In other words, the action being one of ejectment the defendant is entitled to plead in defence the right of someone else equally entitled with theplaintiff's vendors.'11

After observing this the Board held that the defendant had failed to prove his point. 

The observation does not lead to the conclusion that a defendant can prove title in another unconnected with his own estate. 

The case is not an authority for the wider proposition.

The cases of the Judicial Committee are not binding on us but we approve of the dictum in Perry v. Clissold. No subsequent case has been brought to our notice departing from that view. 

No doubt a great controversy exists over the two cases of De v. Barnard and Asher v. Whitlock but it must be taken to be finally resolved by Perry v.Clissold. 

A similar view has been consistently taken in India and the amendment of the Indian Limitation Act has given approval to the proposition accepted in Perry v. Clissold and may be taken to be declaratory of the law in India. 

We hold that the suit was maintainable.”

လက်ရှိထားပိုင်ခွင့်အရပစ္စည်းလက်ရောက်ရလိုကြောင်းစွဲဆိုသည့်အမှု၌အချင်းဖြစ်ပစ္စည်းမှာအခြားသူ(ဥပမာ နိုင်ငံတော်)ပိုင်ပစ္စည်းဖြစ်ခဲ့လျှင်ထိုဆိုင်ရေးဆိုင်ခွင့်မရှိသောတရားလိုကလက်ရောက်ရလိုကြောင်းတရားစွဲဆိုခွင့်ရှိမရှိပြဿနာအပေါ် အင်္ဂလန်နိုင်ငံတွင်သဘောထားအမြင်များကွဲပြားခဲ့သည်။

အင်္ဂလန်နိုင်ငံတွင်သဘောထားအမြင်များကွဲပြားခဲ့သည့်သမိုင်းကြောင်းကို AIR 1968 SC 1165 စီရင်ထုံး၌စိစစ်ပြီး(1907)A.C.73(Appeal Court)စီရင်ထုံးသည်ဖော်ပြခဲ့သောအခြေခံဥပဒေသဘောတရား(principle)မှသွေဖီခြင်းမရှိဟုအောက်ပါအတိုင်းရှင်းရှင်းလင်းလင်းထုံးဖွဲ့ကာမူသဘောတရားကိုပြန်လည်အတည်ပြုခဲ့ကြောင်း(reaffirmed)တွေ့ရသည်ဟုအိန္ဒိယနိုင်ငံတရားလွှတ်တော်ချုပ်ကစီရင်ထုံးတွင်ပြဆိုသည်။

AIR 1968 SC 1165 အမှုတွင်၊(1907) A.C.73 စီရင်ထုံးကိုကိုးကားပြီးနောက်၊အိန္ဒိယနိုင်ငံတရားလွှတ်တော်ချုပ်က-

“Therefore, the plaintiff who was peaceably in possession was entitled to remain in possession and only the State could evict him.”

ဟုဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

ယင်းအဆုံးအဖြတ်သည်မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကလက်ခံကျင့်သုံးလျက်ရှိသော၊”လက်ရှိထားပိုင်ခွင့်ဆိုင်ရာတရားဥပဒေအတိုင်း”ဖြစ်သည်ကိုတွေ့မြင်နိုင်သည်။

တရားလိုသည်အချင်းဖြစ်မြေကိုအေးအေးချမ်းချမ်းလက်ရှိထားမြဲထားခွင့်ရှိသည်ဟု၊ AIR 1968 SC 1165 အမှုတွင်ချမှတ်သောအမိန့်သည်၊အမှုအနိုင်အရှုံးကိုအဆုံးအဖြတ်ပြုသည့်၊ပဓာနကျသည့်ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ဖြစ်သည်။

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စာရေးသူ၏သီးခြားသက်သာခွင့်အက်ဥပဒေစာအုပ်စာမျက်နှာ၂၃တွင်အထက်ဖော်ပြပါစီရင်ထုံးပါထုံးဖွဲ့ချက်ကိုမြန်မာဘာသာဖြင့်ပြန်ဆိုကာအောက်ပါအတိုင်းဖော်ပြခဲ့သည်-

[ပိုင်ရှင်အသွင်ဖြင့်မြေလက်ရှိဖြစ်ပြီးပိုင်ရှင်၏သာမာန်အခွင့်အရေးကိုသုံးစွဲနေထိုင်သူတဦးသည်ပိုင်ရှင်အစစ်မှတပါးခပ်သိမ်းကုန်သောသူတို့နှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ပိုင်ဆိုင်ခွင့်အခိုင်အမာရှိသည်။

ပိုင်ရှင်အစစ်သည်စည်းကမ်းသတ်ကာလအတွင်းမိမိအခွင့်အရေးကိုအရေးဆိုခြင်းမပြုလျှင်၊ထိုသူ၏အခွင့်အရေးသည်ဆိတ်သုဉ်းသွားပြီးလက်ရှိထားလျက်ရှိသောသူသည်ပိုင်ဆိုင်ခွင့်အပြီးအပိုင်ရရှိသည်။

ပိုင်ရှင်မဟုတ်သောအခြားသူကထိုသို့လက်ရှိထားခြင်းကိုအနှောင့်အယှက်ပြုလာလျှင်၊လက်ရှိထားသူသည်သီးခြားသက်သာခွင့်အက်ဥပဒေအရလက်ရောက်ရလိုကြောင်းစွဲဆိုနိုင်သည်။]