ကာလစည်းကမ်းသတ်အက်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၃အကြောင်း။

 ဆရာကြီးဦးမြသင်ကြားပို့ချချက်များ

ကာလစည်းကမ်းသတ်အက်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၃အကြောင်း

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ကာလစည်းကမ်းသတ်အက်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၃တွင်၊အောက်ပါအတိုင်းပြဌာန်းထားသည်-

[ Subject to the provisions contained in sectiens 4 10 25 (inclusive), every suit instituted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the first schedule shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.]

[ ပုဒ်မ၄မှပုဒ်မ၂၅အထိပါရှိသောပုဒ်မများပါပြဌာန်းချက်များနှင့်မဆန့်ကျင်စေဘဲ၊ပထမဇယားတွင်ပြဌာန်းထားသောစည်းကမ်းသတ်ကာလကုန်ဆုံးပြီးမှစွဲဆိုသည့်(တရားမကြီးမှု၊အယူခံမှုနှင့်လျှောက်ထားမှု)တို့ကို၊ကာလစည်းကမ်းသတ်ချက်ကိုအကြောင်းပြု၍၊ချေပခြင်းမပြုသော်လည်း(ပလပ်ရမည်။)]

                 ပထမကဏ္ဍ။          ။တရားမကြီးမှုများ

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တရားမကြီးမှုအမျိုးအမည်-ကန့်သတ်သည့်ကာလ-အစပြု၍ရေတွက်ရမည့်အခါကာလ

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ပုဒ်မ၃ပါပြဌာန်းချက်များကို၊အထက်ပါဇယားနှင့်စပ်ဟပ်ဆင်ခြင်ပါက၊ပုဒ်မ၃၌အတိအလင်းပြဌာန်းထားသည့်အတိုင်း၊ပထမ(ပထမကဏ္ဍ)ဇယားရှိသက်ဆိုင်ရာအမှတ်စဉ်ဒုတိယစာတိုင်၌သတ်မှတ်ထားသောစည်းကမ်းသတ်ကာလကုန်ဆုံးပြီးမှစွဲဆိုသည့်အတွက်ပလပ်ခြင်းခံရသည်မှာ[တရားမကြီးမှု]စသည်တို့ဖြစ်သည်။

[ တောင်းဆိုမှု ]မဟုတ်။

[ လက်ရောက်ရပိုင်ခွင့်အခွင့်အရေး ]လည်းမဟုတ်။

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အဆိုလွှာအရကာလစည်းကမ်းသတ်ကျော်လွန်ကြောင်းပေါ်ပေါက်လျှင်၊တရားပြိုင်ကထုချေသည်ဖြစ်စေ၊မထုချေသည်ဖြစ်စေ၊တရားရုံးကထိုပြဿနာကိုမိမိသဘောအလျောက်ဖော်ထုတ်ဆုံးဖြတ်ရန်တာဝန်ရှိသည်။

သို့သော်အဆိုလွှာတွင်ထိန်ချန်ပြီးရေးသားတတ်သည်။

ကာလစည်းကမ်းသတ်ပြဿနာကိုအဆိုလွှာတွင်မပေါ်ပေါက်သောအကြောင်းခြင်းရာများအရဆုံးဖြတ်ရန်ဖြစ်လျှင်၊တရားပြိုင်သည်ထိုပြဿနာကို၊တရားမကျင့်ထုံးဥပဒေ၊အမိန့်၈၊နည်း၂အရထုချေရန်တာဝန်ရှိသည်။

ထုချေခြင်းမပြုလျှင်၊ထိုပြဿနာကိုတရားရုံးကမိမိသဘောအတိုင်းခွင့်ပြုနိုင်သည်။

နစ်နာမည့်ကာယကံရှင်ကိုယ်တိုင်က၊ကာလစည်းကမ်းသတ်ကျော်လွန်ကြောင်းဝန်ခံလျှင်၊တရားပြိုင်ကထုချေသည်ဖြစ်စေ၊မထုချေသည်ဖြစ်စေပလပ်သင့်သည်။

ထိုကဲ့သို့မဟုတ်ဘဲ၊ကာလစည်းကမ်းသတ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍အငြင်းပွါးနေပြီး၊ငြင်းချက်ထုတ်နုတ်ထားခြင်းလည်းမရှိလျှင်၊တရားရုံးကတရားလိုသည်မည်သည့်သက်သာခွင့်ရထိုက်သနည်းဆိုသည့်နောက်ဆုံးငြင်းချက်တွင်၊တရားရုံးကမိမိသဘောအတိုင်းဆုံးဖြတ်ရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။

သာဓကကို၊ A. I. R. 1940 Rangoon 207. ၊ 1940 RLR 273 စီရင်ထုံးတွင်တွေ့မြင်နိုင်သည်။

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A. I. R. 1940 Rangoon 207

OFFICIAL TRUSTEE V. MRS. RAEBURN

ROBERTS C. J. AND DUNKLEY J.

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1940 RLR 273 

THE OFFICIAL TRUSTEE

                 V.

MRs. RAEBURN AND OTHERS.*

Before Sir Ernest Goodman Roberts, Kt., Chief Justice, and Mr. Justice Dunkley.

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1940 RLR 273 

THE OFFICIAL TRUSTEE

                 V.

MRs. RAEBURN AND OTHERS.*

Before Sir Ernest Goodman Roberts, Kt., Chief Justice, and Mr. Justice Dunkley.

အမှုတွင်၊ခုံရုံးကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

[Where the question of limitation is purely one of law capable of determination on the facts admitted or proved before the Court, the Court is bound under s. 3 of the Limilation Act to raise the question suo motu and decide it.

Maqbul Ahmad v Pratap Singh, I.L.R. 57 All. 242, referred to.

Where the question of limitation raises issues of fact not arising from the plaint, the defendant is bound under 0. 8, r.2 of the Civil Procedure Code to raise such question in his written statement; if he fails to do so, thereafter it is in the discretion of the Court to allow the question to be raised or not.

Venkata Naidu v. B. Naidu, I.L.R. 25 Mad. 367; MS. Cheilyar Firm v. Bholat, I.L.R. 13 Ran, 43, referred to.]

စီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ၂၈၉နှင့်၂၉၀၌၊တရားသူကြီးချုပ် ROBERTS ကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်သည်-

[ROBERTS, C.J. The question of limitation does not appear to have been raised in the pleadings. Can it be argued at this stage ?]

[Under s. 3 of the Limitation Act the Court is bound to take notice of the plea if on the pleadings the point can be decided. 

Order VIII, r. 2 does not stand in the way.

Though the defence ought to have been raised in the written statement, yet it is not legally necessary where the question of limitation can be decided on the face of the plaint. See M.S. Chettiar Firm v.S. E. Bholat (1). I.L.R. 13 Ran, 43.]

စီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ၃၀၁၊၃၀၂၊၃၀၃၌၊ ROBERTS, C.J. and DUNKLEY, J: တို့က၊ကာလစည်းကမ်းသတ်ပြဿနာနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍၊အောက်ပါအတိုင်းထုံးသာဓကအကိုးအကားများဖြင့်အကျယ်တဝင့်သုံးသပ်သည်-

[Turning now to the question of limitation, admittedly this question is not raised in the pleadings, and was not mentioned on behalf of the defendant-appellant until the twenty-fifth day of the hearing of the suits, when all the evidence had been recorded and the arguments of counsel had begun. 

For the plaintiffs-respondents it is urged that the point ought not to have been allowed to be raised at that stage, and reliance is placed on the provisions of Order VIII, Rule 2, of the Civil Procedure Code, which, so far as it is material, reads as follows :

" The defendant must raise by his pleading all matters which show the suit not to be maintainable • • as, for instance, • . limitation, ... • •”

The defendant-appellant, on the other hand, relies on the provisions of section 3 of the Limitation Act, which runs as follows :

“Subject to the provisions contained in sectiens 4 10 25 (inclusive), every suit instituted ……………. after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the first schedule shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence."

These at first sight seemingly contradictory provisions are easily reconcilable. 

Section 3 makes the question of limitation a material question although not raised by the parties; but a Court is not bound to raise and decide a question of fact of its own motion. 

Hence, where the question of limitation is purely one of law capable of determination on the facts admitted or proved before the Court, the Court is bound under the provisions of section 3 to raise the question suo motu and decide it. [Maqbul Ahmad and others v Pratep Narain Singh and others (1).](1935) 1.L.R. 57 All. 242, 250.

But where the question of limitation raises issues of fact not arising from the plaint, the defendant is bound under Order VIII, Rule 2, to raise such question in his written statement; if he fails to do so, thereafter it is within the discretion of the Court to allow the question to be raised or not.[Venkata Narasinha Naidu and another v. Bhash-yakarlu Naidu and another (2).](1902) I.L.R. 25 Mad, 367, 378.

The law was briefly stated in this sense in M.S. Chettiar Firm v. S. E. Bholat(3). (1934) I.L.R. 13 Ran. 43, 46,

Now, in these suits the question of limitation was raised by the facts alleged in the plaints themselves, and the Court was therefore bound, under the provisions of section 3 of the Limitation Act, to decide the question on the facts stated in the plaints, at whatever stage of the hearing it was raised, or even if it was not raised at all by the parties themselves.

Section 3 lays down that every suit instituted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the first schedule shall be dismissed, with a saving clause in regard to the provisions of the succeeding sections of the Act. 

Hence the normal periods of limitation are those prescribed by the first schedule, and sections 4 to 27 provide exceptions to or qualifications of the ordinary provisions of the law. 

Consequently il is necessary, first, to decide what arlicle of the first schedule of the Limitation Act is applicable to these suits and to apply it, and then to see whether sections 4 to 25 of the Act contain any exception or qualification which modifies the ordinary law in its application to these cases. 

It is common ground that the article applicable is Article 120, and this prescribes a period of limitation of six years and lays down that time begins to run when the right to sue accrues. 

Now the plaints set out that the cause of action arose in August, 1928, and on certain subsequent dates, and the plaints were filed on the 3rd September, 1937. 

Hence under Arlicle 120 all righis of action based upon alleged breaches of trust occurring prior 1o the 3rd September, 1931, were prima facie barred by limitation. Two such breaches of trust are alleged in the plaint, namely, (1) failure to invest the. trust funds between August, 1928, and February, 1929, and (2) improper investments on mortgage in December,1928. 

The suits, so far as they are based on these alleged breaches of trust, were therefore prima facie barred by limitation; and, as we have said, the facts necessary for this decision are set out in the plaints themselves, and the Court was therefore bound by the provisions of section 3 to decide the question of limitation, although it was not raised in the wrilten staternents of the defendant-appellant.]

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