1995 BLR ( F B ) 151, ဦးရွှေမိုးပါ၃ နှင့် ဦးအိုက်ဖုန်းပါ၂ စီရင်ထုံးပါအဆုံးအဖြတ်ကိစ္စ။[ Part Five ]

 ဆရာကြီးဦးမြသင်ကြားပို့ချချက်များ

1995 BLR ( F B ) 151 

ဦးရွှေမိုးပါ၃(ကိုယ်တိုင်နှင့်ကွယ်လွန်သူဒေါ်အီခမ်း၏တရားဝင်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်)

                          နှင့်

ဦးအိုက်ဖုန်းပါ၂

တရားရုံးချုပ်တရားသူကြီးချုပ်ဦးအောင်တိုး၊တရားသူကြီးများဖြစ်ကြသောဦးကျော်ဝင်း၊ဦးအောင်မြင်၊ဦးသန်းဖေ၊ဦးတင်အုံးနှင့်ဦးတင်ထွတ်နိုင်တို့ရှေ့တွင်

စီရင်ထုံးပါအဆုံးအဖြတ်ကိစ္စ။[ Part Five ]

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ပစ္စည်းလွှဲပြောင်းခြင်းနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်းသည့် AIR Commentaries ကျမ်း(တတိယအကြိမ်မြောက်ထုတ်)(၁၉၅၀ပြည့်နှစ်ထုတ်)တွင်၊ပုဒ်မ၅၂ကိုဋီကာချဲ့ရာ၌၊ပထမတွဲစာမျက်နှာ၇၂၈တွင်အောက်ပါအတိုင်းပြဆိုထားသည်-

[ 29. Transfer executed before but registered after suit. The section cannot apply so as to affect a transfer of property made before suit but registered thereafter. ]

တရားရုံးများလက်စွဲ(ဒုတိယအကြိမ်မြောက်ထုတ်)စာမျက်နှာ၇၆၅တွင်၊စံကျမ်းအဖြစ်သတ်မှတ်ခဲ့သော၊ Sir HARI SINGH GOUR, Kt., M.A., D.Litt., D.C L. LL.D. M.L.A.ပြုစုသော LAW OF TRANSFER ကျမ်း(၁၉၉၅ခုနှစ်ထုတ်)၊ပထမတွဲစာမျက်နှာ၄၁၉တွင်၊အောက်ပါအတိုင်းပြဆိုထားသည်-

[ Sale-deed executed before institution of suit for specific performance- Registration of sale-deed after institution of the suit. _ In the case of AIR 1948 Patna 60, Sadei Sahu Vs. Chandramani Dei and Another.

It has been held that Section 47 of the Regulation Act can only be read together with Section 54, Transfer of Property Act, 1882, on the basis that the transfer by registered instrument under Section 54, Transfer of Property Act, 1882, once effected relates back to the date of execution or other conventional date. That this is so, is clear from the decision of the Judicial Committee in AIR 1927 PC 42. Kalyanasundaram Pillai vs Karuppa Mooppanar and from the application that decision made by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Faiyazuddin Khan v. Mt. Zahur Bibi AIR 1938 Pat. 134. ]

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AIR 1948 Patna 60

Sadei Sahu Vs. Chandramani Dei and Another

Date of Decision: 17-02-1947

Citation : AIR 1948 Patna 60

Hon'ble Judges : Bennett, J;Beeyor, J

Bench : Full Bench

အမှုတွင်၊စီရင်ချက်အပိုဒ်၅၊၆၊၇၌၊အောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်သည်-

5. The first point taken by Mr. B.K. Pal on behalf of the appellant was that the sale to the respondent was pendente lite in that the deed of sale was not registered until three days after the institution of suit No. 242 of 1930. He argued that since Section 54, T.P. Act, 1882, provides that a sale of tangible immovable property can only be made by a registered instrument, it follows as of course that the date of the transfer for the purposes of Section 52 of that Act, which enunciates the doctrine of his pendens, must be the date of registration. This argument however entirely ignores Section 47, Registration Act, 1908, which itself repeats the corresponding provision of the earlier Registration Acts of 1864,1866,1871 and 1877 and which provides as follows:

A registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration.

6. This section can only be read together with Section 54, T.P. Act, 1882, on the basis that the transfer by registered instrument u/s 54, T.P. Act, 1882, once effected, relates back to the date of execution or other conventional date. That this is so, is, in my opinion, clear from the decision of the Judicial Committee in AIR 1927 42 (Privy Council) and from the application of that decision made by a Division Bench of this Court in Faiyazuddin Khan v. Mt. Zahur Bibi AIR 1938 Pat. 134. In the case in the Privy Council, it was held that where a Hindu governed by the Mitakshara School executed a deed of gift and made it over to the donee, who accepted the gift, but prior to registration the donor adopted a son, the adoption did not render the gift inoperative, although the gift had not been registered before adoption. The ratio decidendi of their Lordships" decision was stated by Lord Salvesen as follows:

They (their Lordships) are unable to see how the provisions of Section 123, T.P.Act, can be reconciled with Section 47, Registration Act, except upon the view that, while registration is a necessary solemnity in order to the enforcement of a gift of immovable property, it does not suspend the gift until registration actually takes place. When the instrument of gift has been handed by the donor to the done and accepted by him, the former has done everything in his power to complete the donation and to make it effective. Registration does not depend upon his consent, but is the act of an officer appointed by law for the purpose, who, if the deed is executed by or on behalf of the donor and is attested by at least two witnesses, must register it if it is presented by a person having the necessary interest within the prescribed period Neither death nor the express revocation by the donor, is a ground for refusing registration, if the other conditions are complied with.

7. The provisions of Section 123, T.P. Act, 1882, which govern the mode of a valid transfer of immovable property by way of gift, are as categorical and mandatory in their terms as are those of Section 54 of that Act and I am of opinion that they cannot be distinguished in their relation to Section 47, Registration Act. That this is so, follows clearly from the decision of this Court above referred to in Faiyazuddin Khan v. Mt. Zahur Bibi AIR 1938 Pat. 134 where in reliance upon the decision of the Judicial Committee above quoted, it was held that where a deed relating to certain properties requiring registration was executed and before it could be registered the properties were attached, the attachment did not prevail against the deed or prevent registration thereof and that when registered the deed took effect from the date of its execution.

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Madras High Court

Kalianasundaram Pillai vs Karuppa Muppanar And Ors. And ... 

on 13 November, 1922

Equivalent citations: 73 Ind Cas 206

Author: W Schwabe

Bench: W Schwabe, Coutts-Trotter, K Sastri

JUDGMENT Walter Schwabe, C.J.

အမှုတွင်၊တရားသူကြီး Coutts Trotter, J. ကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်သည်-

3. I am of the same opinion and only desire to add a word, because I had occasion in Venkati Rama Reddi v. Pillati Rama Reddi 38 Ind. Cas. 707: 40 M. 204: 31 M.L.J. 690: 4 L.W. 465 (1917) M.W.N.112: 20 M.L.T. 450 to consider the present state of the case-law on this subject. My brother Seshagiri Ayyar and myself came to the conclusion that certain of the cases reported in the Madras series were contrary to the general trend of authority and incorrectly decided, and I pointed out in the reference that two well known writers of text-books had expressed the opinion that some Madras cases--I may take Ramamirtha Ayyan v. Gopala Ayyan 19 M. 433 : M.L.J. 207 : 6 Ind. Dec.(N.S.) 1007 as a type--were wrongly decided. Accordingly, in order to set doubts at rest, we sent the case up to a Full Bench asking this question: "Whether a deed of gift registered by the done after the death of the donor without the consent of the legal representatives of the donor is valid?" The Full Bench in that case took the same view as the one which myself and my brother Seshagiri Ayyar had indicated, and decided that the registration was perfectly valid, even although the doner or his representatives did not consent to its registration; that the donee could effect registration, and that when that was done the title would date back to the date of the execution of the document. That seems to me to follow the plain words of the Statute, and I do not think that, after an authoritative ruling given by this Court so lately as 1917, we should depart from it. If the appellant wishes to show that that decision is wrong, I think he must seek to decision the Privy Council.

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AIR 1927 PC 42.

Bombay High Court

Kalyanasundaram Pillai vs Karuppa Mooppanar 

on 13 December, 1926

Equivalent citations: (1927) 29 BOMLR 833

Author: Salvesen

Bench: Sinha, Blanesburgh, Salvesen, J Wallis

JUDGMENT Salvesen, J

အမှုတွင်၊ပရီဗီကောင်စီကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်ဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

The leading statutory provisions on which the solution of the question depends are Sections 122 and 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and Sections 47 and 49 of the Indian Registration Act III of 1877. Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act is as follows :-

'Gift' is the transfer of certain existing movable or Immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called the done, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee.

Such acceptance must be made during the life-time of the donor and while he is still capable of giving.

If the done dies before acceptance, the gift is void.

4. Section 123 is in these terms :-

For the purpose of making a gift of immovable property, the transfer must be effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor, and attested by at least two witnesses

5. The controversy in the numerous cases in the Courts of India which have dealt with this point has always centred round the words in this section :-

The transfer must be effected by a registered instrument, and it has been forcibly argued that, until registration, there is no complete gift, and that if the donor dies or revokes or becomes incapable of making the gift before registration, it cannot take effect. On the other hand, attention must be directed to Section 47 of the Indian Registration Act of 1877, which is in these terms :-

A registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had bean required or made, and not from the time of its registration.

6. The learned Chief Justice in the Court below, after referring to the above sections, said :-

The effect of these sections in my judgment is that if a title is complete except for registration, no subsequent alienation or dealing with the property by the vendor or donor as the case may be can defeat the title which on registration becomes an absolute title dating from the date of the execution of the document.

7. The other two Judges concurred in this view, making special reference to the case of Venkati Rama Reddi v. Pillati Rama, Reddi (1916) I.L.R. 40 Mad. 204, F.B., which, being a decision of the Full Bench, was binding upon them. In that case the donor died on the day following the execution of the deed of gift, and the deed was not presented for registration until a period of six months had elapsed from the date of his death; facts which, as it appears to their Lordships, were cartainly not less cogent in favour of imcompleteness than are those in the present case; and there the District Judge held that the gift deed, not having been registered by the donor during her lifetime, was void, and that the post-mortem registration was of no effect. This judgment was, however, reversed on appeal by the unanimous decision of the Full Bench. There was no express finding of fact, so far as appears from the report, that the deed of gift had been delivered to and accepted by the donee prior to the death of the donor, although, perhaps, this may be implied from the circumstances. In the present case, fortunately, there is no room for doubt on this point, because the learned Judges of the High Court remitted this question of fact to the Subordinate Judge and he reported that the deed had been delivered over, on the day of its execution, to one of the trustees appointed under it on behalf of himself and the other trustee. The decision of the Full Bench in Venkati Rama Reddi's case is thus summarized in the head-note :-

There is nothing in Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act which requires the donor to have the deed registered; all that is required is that he should have executed the deed. Once such an instrument is duly executed, the Registration Act allows it to be registered even though the donor may not agree to its registration, and upon registration the gift takes effect from the date of execution.

8. Their Lordships think that this statement of the law needs qualification by reference to Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, and is only correct upon the footing that the gift had been accepted by or on behalf of the done during the lifetime of the donor. A deed of gift executed in accordance with the terms of Section 123 of immoveable property but never communicated to the intended done, and remaining in the possession of the grantor, undelivered, would, in their Lordships' opinion, not come within the ruling of the Full Bench in the case in question.

9. The only other case to which it is necessary to refer is a Full Bench decision of the High Court of Bombay in 1924, namely, Atmaram Sakharam v. Vaman Janardhan (1924) I.L.R. 49 Bom. 388: s.c.27 Bom. L.R. 290, F.B. The circumstances in that case were very much the same as in the present, and the decision is thus correctly expressed in the head-note :-

Where the donor of immovable property has handed over to the done an instrument of gift duly executed and attested, and the gift has been accepted by the donee, the donor has no power to revoke the gift prior to the registration of the instrument.

10. This case was very fully argued and the argument on behalf of the appellant in the present appeal could not be better stated than it was in the dissenting judgments of Shah Acting C.J. and Mulla J.; and these arguments were all brought very forcibly under their Lordships' notice, and supplemented by the learned counsel for the appellant. Their Lordships, however, cannot accept them. They are unable to see how the provision of Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act can be reconciled with Section 47 of the Indian Registration Act, except upon the view that, while registration is a necessary solemnity in order to the enforcement of a gift of immoveable property, it does not suspend the gift until registration actually takes place. When the instrument of gift has been handed by the donor to the donee and accepted by him, the former has done everything in his power to complete the donation and to make it effective. Registration does not depend upon his consent, but is the act of an, officer appointed by law for the purpose, who, if the deed is executed by or on behalf of the donor and is attested by at least two witnesses, must register it if it is presented by a person having the necessary interest within the prescribed period. Neither death, nor the express revocation by the donor, is a ground for refusing registration, if the other conditions are complied with. Their Lordships accordingly find themselves in complete agreement with the judgment of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case cited. As this decision, and the similar decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court, had settled the law for these Presidencies, it is unnecessary to refer to the various conflicting decisions of inferior tribunals which were overruled. Their Lordships apprehend that the Judges of the High Court of Madras, in allowing leave to the appellant in the present case to proceed with his appeal, desire to elicit an authoritative opinion as to the soundness of the two latest decisions in the Madras Courts and their Lordships think it desirable that a point which has occasioned so much controversy in the past should be settled by a decision, which will apply to the whole of India.

11. Their Lordships will accordingly humbly advise His Majesty that the judgment and decrees of the High Court should be affirmed, and that this appeal should be dismissed. The appellant must pay the costs.

အထက်ပါအမှုများသည် 1995 BLR ( F B ) 151 အမှုနှင့်ဖြစ်ရပ်ချင်းထပ်တူထပ်မျှတူသည်။

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စုံညီခုံရုံးသည် 1937 RLR ( F B ) 375 စီရင်ထုံးကိုလည်းကောင်း၊အထက်ပါကျမ်းနှစ်စောင်လာမြွက်ဆိုချက်ကိုလည်းကောင်းလေ့လာခွင့်ရဟန်မတူ။

စုံညီခုံရုံးသည်စာချုပ်စာတမ်းမှတ်ပုံတင်ခြင်းအက်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၄၇ပါပြဌာန်းချက်များထက်၊ပုဒ်မ၄၉(က)ပါပြဌာန်းချက်များကို 12 Ran ( D B ) 263 အမှုမှာကဲ့သို့အလေးထားဆင်ခြင်သည်။

1937 RLR ( F B ) 375 အမှုနှင့်အထက်ပါကျမ်းများတွင်မူ၊ပုဒ်မ၄၇အားအလေးထားသဖြင့်ကွဲလွဲသောအဖြေနှစ်ရပ်ပေါ်ပေါက်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။

ဦးအိုက်ဖုန်းတို့ကဦးရွှေမိုးတို့အပေါ်နှုတ်ကတိအရမြေကွက်များနှင့်တိုက်ကိုရောင်းချရန်ပဋိညာဉ်အတိုင်းဆောင်ရွက်ပေးစေရန်၁၁-၂-၈၆နေ့တွင်တရားစွဲဆိုစဉ်က၊ဦးရွှေမိုးတို့သည်ဦးသိန်းမောင်တို့အား၃၁-၁၂-၈၅နေ့တွင်ထိုပစ္စည်းများကိုရောင်းချကြောင်းအရောင်းအဝယ်စာချုပ်ချုပ်ဆိုပြီးဖြစ်သည်။

စီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ၁၅၄တွင်[အထက်ပါပြဿနာနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍အယူခံတရားလိုများ၏တရားရုံးချုပ်ရှေ့နေကအချင်းဖြစ်ပစ္စည်းများအားဦးရွှေမိုးတို့ဇနီးမောင်နှံက၃၁-၁၂-၈၅နေ့တွင်ဦးသိန်းမောင်နှင့်ဒေါ်အုံးမေတို့အားစာချုပ်ချုပ်ဆို၍ရောင်းချခဲ့ကြောင်း၊ထိုစာချုပ်ကိုမှတ်ပုံတင်ရန်၃၀-၁-၈၆နေ့တွင်တင်ပြခဲ့ကြောင်း၊သက်ဆိုင်ရာကစိစစ်တန်ဖိုးဖြတ်ခြင်းများပြုလုပ်ပြီးနောက်တန်ဘိုးငွေကျပ်၁၃သိန်းဖြင့်မှတ်ပုံတင်စာချုပ်ချုပ်ဆိုခွင့်ပြုခဲ့၍လိုအပ်သောမှတ်ပုံတင်ကြေးငွေများပေးသွင်းခဲ့ရာသက်ဆိုင်ရာမှ၂-၅-၈၆နေ့တွင်မှတ်ပုံတင်အရောင်းစာချုပ်အမှတ်၂၁၁/၈၆ကိုအပြီးသတ်ချုပ်ဆိုပေးခဲ့ကြောင်း]စသည်ဖြင့်လျှောက်လဲသည်ဟုဖော်ပြထားရာ၊ဦးသိန်းမောင်တို့အားရောင်းချသောစာချုပ်မှာကတိစာချုပ်မဟုတ်ဘဲ၊မှတ်ပုံတင်ရန်ချုပ်ဆိုသောအရောင်းအဝယ်စာချုပ်ဟုယူဆရသည်။

စီရင်ချက်အစပါဦးသိန်းမောင်နှင့်ဒေါ်အုံးမေတို့အားရောင်းချရန်စီစဉ်နေကြောင်းသိရ၍ဟူသောအဆိုပြုချက်ကိုဆင်ခြင်ကြည့်ပါက၊ယူဆချက်မှန်ကြောင်းမြင်သာသည်။

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