ကိုယ်စားလှယ်ဟူသည်အကြီးအကဲကိုယ်စား၊ပြုလုပ်မှုတခုပြုလုပ်ရန်စေခိုင်းခြင်းခံရသူဖြစ်သည်။

 ဆရာကြီးဦးမြသင်ကြားပို့ချချက်များ

[ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်ဟူသည်အကြီးအကဲကိုယ်စား၊ပြုလုပ်မှုတခုပြုလုပ်ရန်စေခိုင်းခြင်းခံရသူဖြစ်သည်။]

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ဥပဒေပညာရှင် SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, BART., နှင့် DINSHAH FARDUNJI MULLA, M.A., LL.B.. တို့ပြုစုသော THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, WITH A COMMENTARY, CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY. SECOND EDITION. 1909. ကျမ်းစာမျက်နှာ၅၂၉တွင်အောက်ပါအတိုင်းပြဆိုသည်-

Page-525

CONSTRUCTION OF POWERS OF ATTORNEY.

S. 188.

Construction of Powers of Attorney.-A power of attorney is a formal instrument (generally executed under seal in England, but not in India outside the Presidency towns) by which authority is conferred on an agent.

Such an instrument is construed strictly, and confers only such anthority as is given expressly or by necessary implication.

Bryant v. La Banque du Peuple

[1893] A. C. 170;

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Appeal Cases ဆိုသည်မှာ၊ပရီဗွီကောင်စီမှထုတ်ဝေသောစီရင်ထုံးများကိုစုစည်း၍ထုတ်ဝေထားခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။

[ PRIVY COUNCIL.]

BRYANT, POWIS, AND BRYANT, LIMITED, DEFENDANT; AND LA BANQUE DU PEUPLE, PLAINTIFF.

BRYANT, POWIS, AND BRYANT, LIMITED, DEFENDANT; AND THE QUEBEC BANK, PLAINTIFF.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF QUREN'S BENCH FOR LOWER CANADA, 

PROVINCE OF QUEBEC (APPEAL SIDE).

1892 Dec. 9, 10, 11. 1893 March 4.

LORD HOBHOUSE, LORD MACNAGHTEN, LORD HANNEN, LORD SHAND, and SIR RICHARD COUCH.

စီရင်ထုံးတွင်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်၏အခွင့်အာဏာအတိုင်းအတာကိုအောက်ပါအတိုင်းဖော်ပြထားသည်-

[ When the every act of the agent is authorised by the terms of the power, it is binding on the constituent, is to all persons dealing in good faith with the agent ]

Bryant v. La Banque du Peuple [1893] A. C. 170;စီရင်ထုံးအား၊ပဋိညာဉ်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၁၈၈အောက်တွင်အနက်အဓိပ္ပာယ်ဖွင့်ဆိုထားသည်။

ပဋိညာဉ်ဥပဒေတွင်[ agent ]ခန့်သူအား[ principal ]ဟုသုံးနှုန်းသည်။

အင်္ဂလန်နိုင်ငံတွင်[ Constituent ]ဟုသုံးနှုန်းသည်။

မဲဆန္ဒနယ်ဟူ၍လည်းအဓိပ္ပာယ်ရသည်။

ပဋိညာဉ်ဥပဒေတွင်၊အကြီးအကဲဟူ၍အဓိပ္ပာယ်ယူရမည်။

ကိုယ်စားလှယ်နှင့်ဆောင်ရွက်ချက်တို့သည်၊အကြီးအကဲအပေါ်တွင်အတည်ဖြစ်သည်။

ကိုယ်စားလှယ်နှင့်သဘောရိုးဆောင်ရွက်သူများနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍အကြီးအကဲပေါ်တွင်အတည်ဖြစ်သည်ဟုပြဆိုသည်။

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Vijiathammal vs M. Kadir Sultan And Anr. 

on 12 March, 1935

Equivalent citations: (1935)69MLJ179, AIR 1935 MADRAS 599

Varadachariar, J.

စီရင်ထုံးတွင်၊ Bryant, Powis, and Bryant, Ltd. v. La Banque Du Peuple (1893) A.C. 170 ပရီဗွီကောင်စီ၏စီရင်ထုံးအားရည်ညွှန်းကိုးကား၍အောက်ပါအတိုင်းပြဆိုသည်-

[ 3. Ex. I is the power of attorney defining the authority of the third defendant. 

One argument before me was that the power given to the agent under Ex. I to purchase goods necessarily implies the power to borrow; and reliance was placed in this connection on Withington v. Herring (1829) 5 Bing. 443 : 130 E.R. 1132. 

Though the language used there is somewhat wide, that decision has been understood by text writers as relating to incidental powers where the payment of money is necessary and incidental to the completion of the particular transaction for which the agent was appointed. 

It seems to me too much to rely on that case as supporting the general proposition that an authority to purchase implies an authority to borrow for the purpose. 

The reasoning of the Judicial Committee in Bryant, Powis, and Bryant, Ltd. v. La Banque Du Peuple (1893) A.C. 170 is directly against any such general proposition. ]

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Vijiathammal vs M. Kadir Sultan And Anr. 

on 11 August, 1936

Equivalent citations: 158IND. CAS.242, (1937)1MLJ23, AIR 1937 MADRAS 27

Pandrang Row, J.

စီရင်ထုံးတွင်လည်း Bryant Powis and Bryant v. La Banque du Peuple Bryant : Powis and Byrant v. Quebec Bank (1893) A.C. 170 by Lord Macnaghten at p. 177. ပရီဗွီကောင်စီ၏စီရင်ထုံးအားရည်ညွှန်း၍အောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်ဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

[ 1. This is a Letters Patent Appeal from the Judgment of Varadachariar, J., dated 12th March, 1935, in S.A. No. 482 of 1931. 

The plaintiff who is the appellant sued to recover a sum of Rs. 1,000 with interest thereon and her case was that that amount was deposited by her with the firm of defendants 1 and 2 at Negapatam on 21st November, 1924, the actual payment having been made to the third defendant who was then the local agent of the firm of defendants 1 and 2. 

Defendants 1 and 2 denied that the firm was bound by the transaction which the agent had no power to enter into on their behalf and it was also contended that the transaction was not entered in the books of the firm and the firm did not get the benefit of the money in question. 

In other words they disclaimed their liability altogether. 

The plaintiff had asked for a decree in the alternative against the third defendant in case she was not able to establish the liability of defendants 1 and 2. 

In the trial Court there was a decree against defendants 1 and 2 as well as against the third defendant but in appeal the Subordinate Judge of Negapatam dismissed the suit as against defendants 1 and 2. 

From that judgment the second appeal was preferred and it was dismissed with costs. 

The main question in the second appeal was whether as a matter of fact the power-of-attorney granted by defendants 1 and 2 to the third defendant gave authority to borrow on behalf of his principals. 

On this point the opinion of Varadachariar, J., was that the power-of-attorney did not authorise the third defendant to borrow money for or on behalf of his principals. 

The authorities which bear on this point have been discussed by our learned brother in his judgment and it is unnecessary to embark on a further discussion, because to our minds the point is very simple and scarcely leaves room for any doubt.

The authorities do not seem to be of much use in deciding the effect or purport of the particular power-of-attorney which we have to deal with in this case. 

The authorities deal with documents worded differently. 

As to the general principle applicable to cases of this kind there is no dispute, vis., that a power-of-attorney is to be construed strictly, that is to say, where a particular act is alleged to have been done under a power-of-attorney and that allegation is challenged and it is contended that the act was in excess of the authority given by the power of attorney, it is necessary to show that on a fair construction of the entire instrument the authority in question has to be found within the four corners of the instrument either in express terms or by necessary implication. 

The principle has been laid down almost in exactly these words in Bryant Powis and Bryant v. La Banque du Peuple Bryant : Powis and Byrant v. Quebec Bank (1893) A.C. 170 by Lord Macnaghten at p. 177.

Bearing this principle in mind we have examined the power-of-attorney and we are unable to find any reason for differing from the opinion expressed by the learned Judge who heard the second appeal. 

There is no doubt authority given to purchase goods, the principals being merchants carrying on trade in the shape of export and import of goods. 

It is contended that a power to purchase goods includes power to borrow. 

This contention we are unable to accept. 

The conclusion may perhaps be different if the question arises whether a power to purchase goods implies power to pay for them. 

That is not the case here. 

It is not the plaintiff's case that the money was borrowed from her for the purpose of paying for any goods which the third defendant was authorised to purchase on behalf of his principals. 

On the other hand her own case in the plaint is that she made a deposit of the money. 

In other words what she did was consistent only with her belief that the principals (defendants 1 and 2) were carrying on a business which involved also the receipt of deposits from others. 

There is no instance brought to our notice in the evidence of any such deposit having been received on behalf of defendants 1 and 2 at any time; nor is there anything to show that receiving deposits and paying interest thereon was part of their business. 

One might even go to the extent of saying that even if there was power to borrow it would not necessarily imply a power to receive deposits and carrying on a banking business of this kind. 

In this case however we are satisfied that the power-of-attorney does not at all include a general authority to borrow on behalf of the principals and certainly there is no authority whatever to receive deposits of the kind referred to in the plaint. 

Neither the power-of-attorney nor the course of business carried on justifies the inference that the plaintiff believed in good faith that the deposit was made with the principals and not with the third defendant personally. 

It is common knowledge that traders in goods do not make it part of their business to receive deposits of this kind, and it is going too far to suggest that in this particular case there was sufficient ground for believing that the third defendant was acting on behalf of his principals when he received the deposit in question. 

As a matter of fact the plaint itself rests on the allegation that defendants 1 and 2 carried on as a part of their business the business of receiving moneys as deposits and repaying the same with interest. 

This allegation is undoubtedly untrue and devoid of foundation. 

No attempt has been made to substantiate it. 

The accounts of the firm do not show any such transactions. 

The allegation in the plaint, unfounded as it was, shows that the plaintiff had realised it was not possible to bring home liability to defendants 1 and 2 unless it was established that her money had been received by the third defendant as part of the business carried on by him on behalf of his principals. 

As observed already, there is no foundation for this allegation and there can be no doubt that defendants 1 and 2 never received deposits as part of their business either themselves or through their agent at any time. 

In particular the plaintiff's money never went into the firm's accounts and it is not shown that the firm had any benefit therefrom.

Thus even on the ground of benefit received the plaintiff has no cause of action because no such benefit has been established. 

Her cause of action is entirely limited to the 3rd defendant and she has got a decree against him. 

The claim to recover the money from defendants 1 and 2 is baseless, and it was rightly rejected by the lower appellate Court and in our opinion the judgment of our brother Varadachariar, J., dismissing second appeal is perfectly right. 

The Letters Patent Appeal is therefore dismissed with costs. ]

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