အများကိုကိုယ်စားပြု၍စွဲဆိုသောအမှုနှင့်မီးသေခြင်း

ဆရာကြီးဦးမြသင်ကြားပို့ချချက်များ

အများကိုကိုယ်စားပြု၍စွဲဆိုသောအမှုနှင့်မီးသေခြင်း

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တဦးသို့မဟုတ်တဦးထက်ပိုသူများကမိမိတို့နှင့်အမှုတွင်အကျိုးတူသက်ဆိုင်ခွင့်ရှိသောသူများကိုယ်စားစွဲဆိုသောအမှုကိုအများကိုကိုယ်စားပြု၍စွဲဆိုသောအမှု[ Representative Suit ]ဟုခေါ်သည်။

သာဓကတရပ်မှာပစ္စည်းလွှဲပြောင်းခြင်းအက်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၅၃အရစွဲဆိုသောအမှုဖြစ်သည်။

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အကျိုးခံစားခွင့်တရပ်တည်းတွင်သက်ဆိုင်သူအားလုံးအတွက်တဦးတယောက်ကတရားစွဲဆိုနိုင်ခြင်းသို့မဟုတ်ခုခံချေပနိုင်ခြင်း။

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တရားမကျင့်ထုံးဥပဒေအမိန့်၁၊နည်း၈တွင်အောက်ပါအတိုင်းပြဌာန်းထားသည်-

၈။     ။( ၁ )တရားမမှုတမှုတွင်အကျိုးသက်ဆိုင်သူအများအပြားရှိရာ၌၎င်းတို့အနက်တဦးကဖြစ်စေ၊တဦးထက်ပိုသောသူတို့ကဖြစ်စေတရားရုံး၏ခွင့်ပြုချက်ဖြင့်အကျိုးသက်ဆိုင်သူအားလုံးအတွက်၊သို့မဟုတ်ထိုသို့အကျိုးသက်ဆိုင်သူအားလုံး၏အကျိုးငှါတရားစွဲဆိုနိုင်သည်၊သို့မဟုတ်တရားစွဲဆိုခြင်းခံနိုင်သည်၊သို့မဟုတ်ယင်းအမှုတွင်ခုခံချေပနိုင်သည်။ယင်းသို့စွဲဆိုသောအမှု၌အမှုစွဲဆိုထားကြောင်းအကြောင်းကြားစာကိုတရားရုံးကတရားလို၏စရိတ်ဖြင့်ထိုအကျိုးသက်ဆိုင်သူအားလုံးထံသို့အကြောင်းကြားစာလက်ထိလက်ရောက်ချအပ်ခြင်းဖြင့်ဖြစ်စေ၊လူအရေအတွက်များခြင်းကြောင့်သော်လည်းကောင်း၊အခြားအကြောင်းတရပ်ရပ်ကြောင့်သော်လည်းကောင်းလက်ထိလက်ရောက်ချအပ်ရန်အကြောင်းအားလျော်စွာလက်တွေ့မဆောင်မရွက်နိုင်လျှင်ကြော်ငြာခြင်းဖြင့်ဖြစ်စေအမှုတမှုချင်းအလိုက်တရားရုံးကညွှန်ကြားသည့်အတိုင်းအကြောင်းကြားရမည်။

( ၂ )မည်သူမဆို[ Any persons မဟုတ်၊ Any person ဖြစ်သည်။ပုံနှိပ်ရာ၌မှားယွင်းခြင်းဖြစ်နိုင်သည်။တဦးဦးဟုဘာသာပြန်ရန်ဖြစ်သော်လည်းစကားစပ်အရမည်သူမဆိုဟုဘာသာပြန်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ]မိမိအတွက်ဖြစ်စေ၊မိမိ၏အကျိုးငှါဖြစ်စေနည်းဥပဒေခွဲ( ၁ )အရစွဲဆိုထားသောသို့မဟုတ်ခုခံချေပထားသောအမှု၌မိမိကိုယ်တိုင်အမှုသည်အဖြစ်ပါဝင်ခွင့်ပြုရန်တရားရုံးသို့လျှောက်ထားနိုင်သည်။

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ဥပဒေသဘော

ယေဘုယျဥပဒေသမှာအမှုတမှုတွင်အကျိုးသက်ဆိုင်ခွင့်ရှိသူအားလုံးအမှုသည်များအဖြစ်ပါဝင်သင့်သည်။သို့မှသာအမှုတွင်အကျုံးဝင်သောအကြောင်းအရာအားလုံးကိုအပြီးသတ်အဆုံးအဖြတ်ပေးနိုင်မည်ဖြစ်ရာယင်းအကြောင်းအရာနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ထပ်မံတရားဆိုင်ကြခြင်းကိုရှောင်ရှားနိုင်မည်ဖြစ်သည်။

[ I. L. R. (1955) Raj.910 ]

[ မောင်ထွန်းဝ နှင့် မောင်သာကဒိုး၊ 1 L. B. R. 252 ]

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ဤနည်းဥပဒေမှာဤယေဘုယျဥပဒေသ၏ခြွင်းချက်ဖြစ်သည်။ပုဂ္ဂိုလ်အများသည်အမှုတမှုတွင်အလားတူအကျိုးသက်ဆိုင်ခွင့်ရှိကြလျှင်၎င်းတို့အနက်တဦးသို့မဟုတ်တဦးထက်ပိုသူတို့သည်တရားရုံး၏ခွင့်ပြုချက်ဖြင့်အများအတွက်၊ထို့ပြင်ထိုသူများအနေဖြင့်တရားစွဲဆိုနိုင်သည်။သို့မဟုတ်ထိုသူတို့အပေါ်တရားစွဲဆိုနိုင်ကြောင်းဤနည်းဥပဒေတွင်ခွင့်ပြုထားသည်။အကျိုးအကြောင်းအပေါ်တွင်လည်းကောင်း၊သင့်မြတ်သောမူအပေါ်တွင်လည်းကောင်းအခြေခံကာအဆင်ပြေမှု၊အကြောင်းညီညွတ်မှုကိုရှေ့ရှုလျက်ဤနည်းဥပဒေကိုပြဌာန်းထားသည်။တဦးချင်းဖြစ်စေနှစ်ဦးသို့မဟုတ်သုံးဦးစုပေါင်း၍ဖြစ်စေတရားစွဲဆိုပါကကုန်ကျသည့်စရိတ်စက၊တွေ့ကြုံရမည့်ဒုက္ခများကိုရှောင်ရှားနိုင်ရန်လည်းရည်စူးသည်။

[ A. I. R. 1955 Mad. 281 ]

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အမိန့်၁၊နည်း၈၏ရည်ရွယ်ချက်မှာအများနှင့်သက်ဆိုင်သည့်ထရပ်(စ်)ကဲ့သို့သောလူအများအပြားအကျိုးသက်ဆိုင်ခွင့်ရှိကြသည့်အမှုဖြစ်အကြောင်းအရာတရပ်တည်းအပေါ်မလိုအပ်ဘဲအကြိမ်ကြိမ်တရားဖြစ်ကြခြင်းကိုရှောင်ရှားနိုင်ရန်အတွက်ဖြစ်သည်။

[ တော်ပင်အွန် နှင့် တော်ချိန်ချိုင်း၊ 1958 B.L.R.( H.C ) 357 ]

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ဤနည်းဥပဒေသည်အမှုသည်အရေအတွက်ကိုမခန့်မှန်းနိုင်၍အလွန်များသည့်အမှုများနှင့်သာသက်ဆိုင်သည်မဟုတ်။တသီးပုဂ္ဂလအခွင့်အရေးများနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍တရားဆိုင်ကြသည့်အမှုများနှင့်သာသက်ဆိုင်သည်မဟုတ်၊ပုဂ္ဂိုလ်အများအပြားအကျိုးသက်ဆိုင်ခွင့်ရှိကြပြီးအများနှင့်တဝက်တပျက်သက်ဆိုင်သောအကြောင်းအရာများနှင့်လည်းသက်ဆိုင်သည်။ဤနည်းဥပဒေပါအချက်အလက်များနှင့်ကိုက်ညီလျှင်မည်သည့်အမှုများနှင့်မဆိုသက်ဆိုင်သည်။

[ I.L.R. ( 1952 ) 2 Raj. 900 ]

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ဤနည်းဥပဒေနှင့်သက်ဆိုင်ရန်အလို့ငှါအောက်ပါအချက်များနှင့်ညီညွတ်ရမည်-

( ၁ )အမှုသည်အရေအတွက်များပြားရမည်။

( ၂ )အမှုတွင်၎င်းတို့၏အကျိုးသက်ဆိုင်ခွင့်တို့သည်တူရမည်။

( ၃ )တရားရုံး၏ခွင့်ပြုချက်ရရှိရမည်။[ မောင်ထွန်းသိန်း နှင့် မောင်ဆင်၊ 12 Ran.670 ]

( ၄ )အမှုတွင်ကိုယ်စားပြုလိုသည့်အမှုသည်များထံအကြောင်းကြားစာပို့ရမည်။

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အများဆိုင်ရာအခွင့်အရေးနှင့်ပတ်သက်သောအမှုများတွင်တဦးတယောက်တည်းကတရားလိုပြုလုပ်၍တရားစွဲဆိုလျှင်အမိန့်၁၊နည်း၈အရတရားရုံး၏ခွင့်ပြုချက်ရယူခြင်းနှင့်သက်ဆိုင်ရာစိတ်ဝင်စားသူများအားအကြောင်းကြားစာထုတ်ခြင်းစသည်တို့ကိုပြုလုပ်ရန်လိုအပ်ပေသည်။

[ ဦးစံဦး နှင့် ဦးလှမြင့်၊ 1984 B.L.R. 250 ]

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အမှုသည်အသီးသီးသည်တရားစွဲဆိုခွင့်ရှိရမည်။တရားစွဲဆိုခွင့်မရှိသူအားအများကိုယ်စားတရားစွဲဆိုခွင့်မပြုနိုင်။

[ A.I.R. 1947 Mad. 100 ]

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ဤနည်းဥပဒေအရတရားလိုများကိုကိုယ်စားပြု၍တရားစွဲဆိုနိုင်သည့်နည်းတူတရားပြိုင်များအားကိုယ်စားပြုသူအပေါ်တွင်လည်းစွဲဆိုနိုင်သည်။

[ A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 542 ]

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သာမန်အားဖြင့်အများကိုကိုယ်စားပြုစွဲဆိုသောအမှုကိုဤနည်းဥပဒေတွင်ပါရှိသောလုပ်ထုံးလုပ်နည်းကိုလိုက်နာစွဲဆိုရန်ဖြစ်သည်။သို့သော်ဆိုင်ရာဥပဒေ၌တဦးတယောက်အားတစုံတခုသောအကြောင်းအရာတွင်အလားတူအကျိုးသက်ဆိုင်ခွင့်ရှိသူများအားကိုယ်စားပြု၍တရားစွဲဆိုခွင့်ပြုထားလျှင်၎င်းသည်ဤနည်းဥပဒေတွင်ပြဌာန်းထားသောလုပ်ထုံးလုပ်နည်းများကိုလိုက်နာခြင်းမပြုဘဲအများကိုကိုယ်စားပြု၍တရားစွဲဆိုနိုင်သည်။

[ A.I.R. 1944 Lah. 220 ]

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မီးသေခြင်း[ 1964 BLR 917 ]

၁၁။  ။တရားမမှုတမှုတွင်တိုက်ရိုက်အားဖြင့်လည်းကောင်း၊အဓိကအားဖြင့်လည်းကောင်း၊အငြင်းပွါးလျက်ရှိသည့်အကြောင်းအရာသည်တရားရုံးတရုံးကကြားနာ၍အပြီးသတ်ဆုံးဖြတ်ပြီးသောယခင်တရားမမှုတွင်ဆိုင်ရေးဆိုင်ခွင့်တရပ်တည်းအရတရားဆိုင်ကြသည့်ထပ်တူ[ ၁၉၅၉ခုနှစ်၊တပ်မတော်အက်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၁၉၇(၃)နှင့်ပုဒ်မ၂၀၁ ]အမှုသည်များအချင်းချင်း၌ဖြစ်စေ၊၎င်းအမှုသည်တို့ကိုသို့မဟုတ်၎င်းတို့အနက်တဦးဦးကိုအမှီပြု၍တောင်းပိုင်သူ[ ကာလစည်းကမ်းသတ်အက်ဥပဒေပထမဇယားအမှတ်စဉ်၄၇၊တရားမပုံစံ၁၅၃တွင်လက်အောက်ခံကာဟုဘာသာပြန်သည်။ ]အမှုသည်များအချင်းချင်း၌ဖြစ်စေတိုက်ရိုက်အားဖြင့်လည်းကောင်း၊အဓိကအားဖြင့်လည်းကောင်းအငြင်းပွါးခဲ့သောအကြောင်းအရာပင်ဖြစ်ပြီးနောက်အမှုကိုသော်လည်းကောင်း၊အငြင်းပွါးသည့်အကြောင်းအရာနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်းသောငြင်းချက်ထပ်မံပေါ်ပေါက်သည့်အမှုကိုသော်လည်းကောင်း၊ယခင်အမှုအားစစ်ဆေးစီရင်ခဲ့သောတရားရုံးကစစ်ဆေးစီရင်ပိုင်ခွင့်အာဏာရှိလျှင်မည်သည့်တရားရုံးကမျှနောက်အမှုသို့မဟုတ်အဆိုပါငြင်းချက်ကိုစစ်ဆေးစီရင်ခြင်းမပြုရ။

ရှင်းလင်းချက်၁။     ။xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

ရှင်းလင်းချက်၂။     ။xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

ရှင်းလင်းချက်၃။     ။xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

ရှင်းလင်းချက်၄။     ။xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

ရှင်းလင်းချက်၅။     ။xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

ရှင်းလင်းချက်၆။     ။လူတစုသည်အများပြည်သူဆိုင်ရာရပိုင်ခွင့်နှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ဖြစ်စေ၊ပုဂ္ဂလိကရပိုင်ခွင့်နှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ဖြစ်စေ၊အများအတွက်သဘောရိုးဖြင့်တရားဆိုင်ကြလျှင်အဆိုပါရပိုင်ခွင့်တွင်အကျိုးသက်ဆိုင်သူအားလုံးသည်လည်းဤပုဒ်မပါကိစ္စအလို့ငှါထိုသို့တရားဆိုင်ကြသူတို့ကိုအမှီပြု၍တောင်းဆိုကြသည်ဟုမှတ်ယူရမည်။

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မီးသေခြင်းဥပဒေသဘော

တရားရုံးတရုံးကအဆုံးအဖြတ်ပေးပြီးဖြစ်သောအကြောင်းအရာတရပ်ကိုနောက်ထပ်အဆုံးအဖြတ်မပေးရန်တရားမကျင့်ထုံးဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၁၁တွင်ပိတ်ပင်ထားသည်။ပြဿနာတရပ်တည်းနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍အမှုသည်တဦးအပေါ်တကြိမ်ထက်ပို၍တရားစွဲဆိုခွင့်ပြုပါက၎င်းအားစိတ်ဆင်းရဲ၊ကိုယ်ဆင်းရဲဖြစ်စေပေလိမ့်မည်။ထို့ပြင်အများပြည်သူအကျိုးငှါမှုခင်းများသည်ပြီးပြီးပြတ်ပြတ်ဖြစ်သင့်သည်။ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်တရပ်မီးသေ၊မသေဆိုသောပြဿနာမှာယင်းဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်မှန်၊မမှန်အပေါ်မူမတည်ချေ။

[ A.I.R. 1928  Cal.777 ( F.B. ) ]

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သို့မဟုတ်ပါကဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်တိုင်းမှားယွင်းသည်ဟုစောဒကတက်ကြမည်ဖြစ်၍မှုခင်းများအဆုံးသတ်တော့မည်မဟုတ်။

[ 24 All. 138 ]

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မီးသေခြင်းဆိုင်ရာဥပဒေသသည်အကြောင်းနှစ်ရပ်အပေါ်အခြေခံသည်။ပြဿနာတရပ်တည်းနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍တဦးတယောက်သောသူအားနှစ်ကြိမ်တရားစွဲဆိုပါကဒုက္ခရောက်စေမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ထို့ပြင်အများပြည်သူအကျိုးငှါမှုခင်းများသည်ပြီးပြီးပြတ်ပြတ်ဖြစ်သင့်သည်။

[ A.I.R. 1947 Mad. 5 ]

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တရားစွဲဆိုရန်အကြောင်းတရပ်အပေါ်အခြေခံကာတရားမမှုတမှုကိုစွဲရသည်ဖြစ်ရာယင်းတရားစွဲဆိုရန်အကြောင်းသည်အမှုတွင်ချမှတ်သည့်စီရင်ချက်နှင့်ပေါင်းစပ်သွားပြီဖြစ်၍နောက်ထပ်အမှုစွဲဆိုရန်အလို့ငှါတရားစွဲဆိုရန်အကြောင်းမရှိတော့။

[ မမြစန်း နှင့် ဒေါ်မိုးစိန်၊ 1999 BLR 169 ( F.B. ) ]

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ဒေါ်ကြင်နု နှင့် ဦးမိုဟာမက်ယူစွပ်[ 1989 BLR 4 ]အမှုတွင်မီးသေခြင်းဆိုင်ရာဥပဒေသ၏ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ကိုအောက်ပါအတိုင်းရှင်းပြသည်-

[ အကြောင်းကိစ္စတရပ်တည်းနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍အမှုများထပ်တလဲလဲစွဲဆိုခြင်းကိုပိတ်ပင်နိုင်ရန်တရားမကျင့်ထုံးဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၁၁ကိုပြဌာန်းထားခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။လျှောက်ထားခံရသူသည်မိမိအပေါ်ချမှတ်ထားသောဒီကရီမှာလိမ်လည်လှည့်ဖြား၍ရယူထားသောဒီကရီဖြစ်ကြောင်းအကြောင်းပြကာတရားတထုံးစွဲဆိုခဲ့သည်။ယင်းအမှု၌အရေးနိမ့်သောအခါစွပ်စွဲချက်အသစ်အချို့ကိုဖြည့်စွက်ပြီးတရားတထုံးစွဲဆိုပြန်သည်။ယင်းကဲ့သို့အချက်အလက်အသစ်များဖြည့်စွက်ကာအမှုထပ်တလဲလဲစွဲဆိုခွင့်ပြုမည်ဆိုပါကမှုခင်းများသည်ပြီးပြတ်တော့မည်မဟုတ်ချေ။လျှောက်ထားခံရသူသည်အကြောင်းကိစ္စတရပ်နှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ထပ်တလဲလဲတရားစွဲဆိုခြင်းဖြင့်တရားရုံး၏ယန္တရားကိုအလွဲသုံးစားပြုရာရောက်ပြီးတဖက်အမှုသည်များအားလည်းနစ်နာစေကြောင်းပေါ်လွင်ထင်ရှားသည်။ ]

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ကိုယ်စားပြုစွဲဆိုသောအမှု[ ရှင်းလင်းချက်၆ ]

ကိုယ်စားပြုစွဲဆိုသောအမှုတွင်ချမှတ်သောစီရင်ချက်သည်ယင်းအမှု၌အမှုသည်အဖြစ်အတိအလင်းဖော်ပြထားခြင်းမရှိသောအမှုသည်အပေါ်မီးသေစေရန်အောက်ပါအချက်များနှင့်ညီညွတ်ရမည်-

( ၁ )အမှုသည်တဦးသို့မဟုတ်အမှုသည်အများက၎င်းတို့နှင့်အမှုတွင်အတိအလင်းဖော်ပြထားခြင်းမရှိသောအခြားသူတို့အတွက်အတူတူတောင်းဆိုသောအခွင့်အရေးတရပ်ရှိရမည်။

( ၂ )အမှုတွင်အတိအလင်းဖော်ပြထားခြင်းမရှိသောသူတို့သည်ယင်းအခွင့်အရေး၌အကျိုးသက်ဆိုင်ခွင့်ရှိရမည်။

( ၃ )အကျိုးသက်ဆိုင်ခွင့်ရှိသူအားလုံးကိုယ်စားသဘောရိုးဖြင့်တရားစွဲဆိုခြင်းဖြစ်ရမည်။

( ၄ )အမှုသည်အမိန့်၁၊နည်း၈အရစွဲဆိုသောအမှုဖြစ်လျှင်ထိုပုဒ်မပါလိုအပ်ချက်အားလုံးကိုတိကျစွာလိုက်နာပြီးဖြစ်ရမည်။

[ 56 Mad. 657 ]

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ရှင်းလင်းချက်၆သည်အမိန့်၁၊နည်း၈တွင်အကျုံးဝင်သောအမှုများနှင့်သာမကအမှုသည်များကအမှုသည်မဟုတ်သောအခြားအကျိုးသက်ဆိုင်သူများအားကိုယ်စားပြုခွင့်ရှိသောအမှုများနှင့်လည်းသက်ဆိုင်သည်။

[ ကရှစ်နာမိုဟန် နှင့် မောင်ရွှေ၊ 1958 BLR ( H C ) 635 (အေကဘီအပေါ်မိမိပိုင်မြေနှင့်ကပ်လျက်ရှိသောဘီပိုင်မြေပေါ်၌ရှိပြီးဖြတ်သန်းသွားလာခြင်းကိုအဟန့်အတားဖြစ်စေမည့်အတားအဆီးများကိုဖယ်ရှားပေးရန်နှင့်ထိုလမ်းသွားလာခွင့်ကိုတားဆီးနှောင့်ယှက်ခြင်းမပြုရန်ထာဝရတားဝရမ်းရလိုကြောင်းစွဲဆိုရာအနိုင်ရရှိသည်။ထို့နောက်စီ၊ဒီနှင့်အီးတို့ကအေစွဲဆိုခဲ့သောအမှု၌အချင်းများသည့်မြေသည်သာသနာ့မြေဖြစ်ပြီးမိမိတို့သည်ထရပ်(စ်)တီးများဖြစ်သည်ဟုဆိုကာထိုမြေပေါ်၌အေဖြတ်သန်းသွားလာခြင်းကိုတားမြစ်သည့်ထာဝရတားဝရမ်းရလိုမှုစွဲဆိုသည်။ယခင်အမှု၌တရားဆိုင်ခဲ့သောမြေပေါ်တွင်သွားလာခွင့်ကိုပိတ်ပင်ရန်စီ၊ဒီနှင့်အီးတို့သည်ဘီနည်းတူအကျိုးသက်ဆိုင်ခွင့်ရှိကြသည်ဖြစ်၍မီးသေခြင်းဆိုင်ရာဥပဒေသအရနောက်အမှုစွဲဆိုခြင်းကိုပိတ်ပင်သည်။ ]

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အမှုသည်တဦးကအမှုတွင်မိမိအတွက်တောင်းဆိုသောသက်သာခွင့်သည်အခြားသူများနှင့်အတူတူသက်ဆိုင်ရုံမျှဖြင့်ထိုသူသည်အခြားသူများကိုယ်စားတရားစွဲဆိုသည်ဟုမဆိုနိုင်သဖြင့်ရှင်းလင်းချက်၆နှင့်မသက်ဆိုင်။

[ A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 645 ]

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ရှင်းလင်းချက်၆နှင့်သက်ဆိုင်စေရန်သဘောရိုးဖြင့်တရားဆိုင်ရမည်။ယခင်အမှုတွင်တရားပြိုင်အားအမှုသည်အဖြစ်မပါသူများ၏ကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖြစ်ဖြင့်ဖြစ်စေ၊အုပ်ထိန်းသူအဖြစ်ဖြင့်ဖြစ်စေတရားစွဲဆိုခြင်းမပြု၊တရားပြိုင်ကလည်းပုဂ္ဂိုလ်အရမိမိ၏ကိုယ်ပိုင်ဆိုင်ရေးဆိုင်ခွင့်နှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍မိမိ၏အကျိုးကျေးဇူးအတွက်သာခုခံချေပခဲ့လျှင်ရှင်းလင်းချက်၆နှင့်ငြိစွန်းရန်အကြောင်းမရှိနိုင်။

[ ဦးမောင်ဖြူပါ၄ နှင့် ဦးထွန်းအောင်ဖြူပါ၃၊ 1967 BLR ( C C ) 153 ]

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အမိန့်၁၊နည်း၈အရစွဲဆိုသောအမှုကိုအမှုသွားအမှုလာအရဆုံးဖြတ်ခြင်းမပြုဘဲကိုယ်စားပြုစွဲဆိုသောတရားလို၏လျှောက်ထားချက်အရပလပ်လိုက်လျှင်ယင်းအမှုတွင်ကိုယ်စားပြုခံရသူတို့သည်အမှုစွဲဆိုကြောင်းအကြောင်းကြားစာသာရပြီးအမှုတွင်အမှုသည်အဖြစ်ထည့်သွင်းခြင်းခံရပါကအမှုတွင်ချမှတ်သောစီရင်ချက်သည်မီးသေခြင်းမရှိ။

[ သိုင်းဗန်နိုင်းအားချီ နှင့် အို၊အာရ်၊အမ်၊ပီ၊အာရ်၊အမ်၊ရာမနသန်ချစ်တီးယား၊ 1940 R.L.R. 643 ]

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တရားမကျင့်ထုံးဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၁၁၏ရှင်းလင်းချက်၆( မီးသေခြင်း )ပါပြဌာန်းချက်များသည်အမိန့်၁၊နည်း၈အရစွဲဆိုသောအမှုနှင့်သက်ဆိုင်သည်။သို့သော်အမိန့်၁၊နည်း၈အရစွဲဆိုသောအမှုတွင်၎င်းနည်းဥပဒေ၌ပါရှိသောပြဌာန်းချက်များကိုအတိအကျလိုက်နာရမည်။

[ 56 Mad. 657, A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 183 ]

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သို့မဟုတ်ပါကနောက်ထပ်စွဲဆိုသောအမှုအားပိတ်ပင်ခြင်းမရှိ။

[ A.I.R. 1938 All. 523 ]

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ထို့ပြင်အမှုသွားအမှုလာအရဆုံးဖြတ်ခြင်းမပြုဘဲကိုယ်စားပြု၍စွဲဆိုသောတရားလို၏တင်ပြချက်အရအမှုကိုပလပ်လိုက်ခြင်းသည်အမှုတွင်အမှုသည်အဖြစ်အမှန်တကယ်မပါဘဲအမှုစွဲဆိုကြောင်းအကြောင်းကြားစာရရှိရုံသာရရှိသောအမှုတွင်ကိုယ်စားပြုခြင်းခံရသူတဦးအပေါ်မီးသေခြင်းမရှိ။

[ သိုင်းဗန်နိုင်အာချီ နှင့် အို၊အာ၊အမ်၊ပီ၊အာ၊အမ်၊ရာမန်နသန်ချစ်တီးယား၊ 1940 R.L.R. 643 ]

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1958 BLR ( H C ) 635 ( 638 )

APPELLATE CIVIL.

Before U Thaung Sein, J.

KRISHNA MOHAN (APPELLANT)

                     V.

MAUNG SHWE AND THREE OTHERS (RESPONDENTS).*

1958 Nov. 13.

အမှုတွင်၊အေကဘီအပေါ်မိမိပိုင်မြေနှင့်ကပ်လျက်ရှိသောဘီပိုင်မြေပေါ်၌ရှိပြီးဖြတ်သန်းသွားလာခြင်းကိုအဟန့်အတားဖြစ်စေမည့်အတားအဆီးများကိုဖယ်ရှားပေးရန်နှင့်ထိုလမ်းသွားလာခွင့်ကိုတားဆီးနှောင့်ယှက်ခြင်းမပြုရန်ထာဝရတားဝရမ်းရလိုကြောင်းစွဲဆိုရာအနိုင်ရရှိသည်။ထို့နောက်စီ၊ဒီနှင့်အီးတို့ကအေစွဲဆိုခဲ့သောအမှု၌အချင်းများသည့်မြေသည်သာသနာ့မြေဖြစ်ပြီးမိမိတို့သည်ထရပ်(စ်)တီးများဖြစ်သည်ဟုဆိုကာထိုမြေပေါ်၌အေဖြတ်သန်းသွားလာခြင်းကိုတားမြစ်သည့်ထာဝရတားဝရမ်းရလိုမှုစွဲဆိုသည်။ယခင်အမှု၌တရားဆိုင်ခဲ့သောမြေပေါ်တွင်သွားလာခွင့်ကိုပိတ်ပင်ရန်စီ၊ဒီနှင့်အီးတို့သည်ဘီနည်းတူအကျိုးသက်ဆိုင်ခွင့်ရှိကြသည်ဖြစ်၍မီးသေခြင်းဆိုင်ရာဥပဒေသအရနောက်အမှုစွဲဆိုခြင်းကိုပိတ်ပင်ကြောင်းတရားဝန်ကြီးဦးသောင်းစိန်ကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းထုံးဖွဲ့သည်-

[ Evidence Act, s. 41-Judgments in rem-Civil Procedure Code, s. 11- Res judicata-Explanation VI not confined to cases covered hy 0.1, R. 8.

A filed a suit against B in the Township Court of Mandalay and obtained a decree for removal of obstruction over the right of way over B's land which adjoined A's land as well as a pernetual injunction against B from obstructing that right. 

Subsequently, C,D and E along with another, who died later, claiming the land in dispute in the previóus suit to be a religious land and themselves to be trustees thereof sued A in the same Court for a permanent injunction to restrain him from making use of that land for going to and froin his house to the main road. 

A contended that the judgment in the previous suit filed by him operated as a bar to the subsequent suit on the principles of res judicata. 

The Township Court refused to accept his plea and decreed the suit. 

On appeal the District Court of Mandalay set aside the decree on the ground that the decision in the previous suit by A acted as a bar to the subsequent suit and that the right of passage acquired by A was an easement available" against all the world".

Held: That the wordings of s. 41 of the Evidence Act clearly lay down that the orily judgments which nay be regarded as judgments in reni are those passed by a competent Court in the exercise of probate, matrimonial or insolvency jurisdiction and that the Township Court of Mandalay did not purport to exercise any such jurisdiction at the time when the previous suit was decided.

Held further: That Explanation VI of s. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code is not confined to cases covered by Order 1, rule 8 of the Code, but would include any litigation in which, apart from the rules altogether, parlies are entitled to represent interested persons other than themselves and that since C. D. E and the deceased person were interested in the same manner as B, i.e., to prevent the right of passage over the suit land, which was litigated in the former suit the subsequent suit filed by them was barred by the principles of res judicata. ]

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Kumarandy Kudumban (Died) And Ors. 

                         vs 

Venkatasubramania Aiyar And Ors. 

on 13 December, 1926.

Equivalent citations: 101 IND. CAS.58, (1927)52 MLJ 641, AIR 1927 MADRAS 645

JUDGMENT

Devadoss, J.

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* A. I.R. 1927 Madras 645

DEVADOSS, J.

Kumarandy Kulumban and others— Plaintiffs-Appellants.

                         V.

Venkatasubramania Aiyar and others -Defendants-Respondents.

Second: Appeal No. 484 of 1924, Decided on 13th December 1926, from the decree of the Dist. J., Ramnad, in Appeal Suit No. 311 of 1922.

အမှုတွင်၊အမှုသည်တဦးကအမှုတွင်မိမိအတွက်တောင်းဆိုသောသက်သာခွင့်သည်အခြားသူများနှင့်အတူတူသက်ဆိုင်ရုံမျှဖြင့်ထိုသူသည်အခြားသူများကိုယ်စားတရားစွဲဆိုသည်ဟုမဆိုနိုင်သဖြင့်ရှင်းလင်းချက်၆နှင့်မသက်ဆိုင်ကြောင်းအောက်ပါအတိုင်းဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

[ 4. It is urged for the respondents that Explanation VI to Section 11 applies to the case. 

Explanation VI is as follows:

Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the person so litigating.

5. Granting for argument's sake that the contentions in both the cases are the same, was there bona fide contest in the previous case by persons who claimed a private right in common for themselves and others? 

In Ex. I-a the 2nd 'defendant vaguely asserted the right of all the people to catch fish in the tank. 

He did not purport to represent the others, nor did he ask the Court to make all the inhabitants of the villages parties to the action. 

That he claimed a right in himself to catch fish appears from paragraph 12 of the written statement which says:

As these defendants have been-enjoying the fish caught in the ulvai of Periakulam aforesaid for a long time over 12 years, the plaintiffs ' are precluded from disputing the right of these defendants,

6. The 2nd defendant did not assert a right on behalf of the others, but he claimed a right in himself along with others. 

He cannot therefore be said to have represented the interests of the other inhabitants of the village in the suit. 

It is only when persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all the persons interested in such right shall be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating. 

The facts of the cases relied upon by Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar are distinguishable from the facts of this case. 

In Rangamma v. Narasimhacharyulu (1916) 31 MLJ 26. the suit was brought by the 1st plaintiff for recovery of the possession of certain sites for himself and the other Agraharamdars. 

In a previous suit by another Agraharamdar the plaintiff in the subsequent suit was the 4th defendant. 

The substantial relief claimed in that suit was included among the reliefs prayed for in the previous suit. 

Some of the Agraharamdars remained ex parte in the previous suit. 

Sadasiva Aiyar, J., after an examination of the authorities held that the suit was barred by res judicata by reason of the decision in the previous suit, and Moore, J., concurred with Sadasiva Aiyar, J., and observed:

The joint right which the plaintiff claimed is identical with the relief sought for in the present suit, and he was clearly litigating bona fide in the interests of all the Agraharamdars.

7. In Gopalacharyulu v. Subbamma (1919) ILR 43 M 487: 38 MLJ 493 it was held that "Explanation V to Section 11, C.P.C., applies not only to cases where leave of Court has been granted under Order 1, Rule 8, but also to cases where some of the persons claiming a private right in common with others litigate bona fide on behalf of themselves and such others." 

The learned Chief Justice observes at p. 494:

The language of the Explanation may seem dangerously general and Edge, C.J., has observed in Ram Narain v. Bisshishar Prasad (1888) ILR 10A 411 that we should be careful in applying it, and that it should not be applied to any case which does not come within its very wording. 

I entirely agree, and should certainly hesitate to hold that any litigation had been bona fide within the meaning of the Explanation, in which there had been a substantial departure from the accepted rules as to the joinder of parties, as for instance by suing without the leave of the Court in a case properly falling under Order 1, Rule 8 or in suits as regards public rights, without the authority prescribed in Sections 91 and 92.

At the same time, I cannot say, on the strictest construction, that the plaintiff's litigation in the earlier suit in this case was otherwise than bona fide within the meaning of the section.

He impleaded all the other agraharamdars as defendants, including Rukmaniamma through whom The present 10th defendant claims, and they remained ex parte. 

When she died after being impleaded as a respondent in the first defendant's appeal to the District Court and before the hearing of the appea; the failure to bring on record her legal representative was due to the default of the other side.

8. In that case all that could be done to bring the necessary parties before the Court was done. 

Can it be said that in O.S. No. 501 of 1907 the parties took any action to bring the necessary parties before the Court. 

If the 2nd defendant in that case wanted to put forward the rights of all the people of the villages, he should have asked the Court to make the others parties so that their rights might be adjudicated upon. 

Where a party sets up his own individual right which Happens to be common to him and others, he cannot be said to be litigating on behalf of the others. 

It is not necessary that in order to attract the provisions of Expl., VI the suit should be a representative suit, for if it is a representative suit under Order 1, Rule 8 no question can arise as to the binding nature of the decision in such suit, nor is it necessary that the party should be sued in a representative capacity.

But the person litigating must put forward a right common to him and others not only on his behalf but on behalf of the others as well. 

If he simply puts forward a right alleged to be common to him and others, that would not make him a representative of the others. 

The word "bona fide" in Expl. VI could only apply to a litigation where every attempt is made to bring all the persons interested before the Court. 

The meaning of due care and caution cannot be applied to one who puts forward only his own right as one of a body of persons who have equal rights with himself.

9. The case in Meyyappan Servai v. Meyyappan Ambalam (1923) 46 MLJ 471. to which I was a party, does not apply to the present case. 

There the father was sued as representing the joint family. In that case I observed at p. 478:

That if by mistake or oversight persons who have an interest in the property in dispute are not joined as parties, but a person or persons who could represent the interest of such persons are made parties, the decision would"bind all those who have an interest in the property.

10. It cannot be said that in the previous suit any attempt was made to bring before the Court all the persons who were in terested in the fishery right in order to.contest the claim put forward by the plaintiffs. 

On a careful consideration of the whole case I hold that the decision in the previous suit does not operate as a bar to the present suit.

11. The next point is whether the appellants have acquired a right by prescription. 

The learned Advocate-General's contention is that subsequent to the date of the plaint in the previous suit the plaintiffs have acquired a right by prescription to the fishery.

This point was raised before the Subordinate Judge, but he disallowed it on the ground that the plaintiffs could not have acquired a prescriptive right between the date of the disposal of the second appeal and the date of the institution of the present suit. 

The contention of the appellants now is that the plaintiffs were in enjoyment of the fishery right adversely to the other inhabitants during the pendency of the previous suit and they have acquired a title by prescription. 

This is a question of fact which has not been tried. 

Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar for the respondents contends that a communitylike the PaMars could not acquire a prescriptive title to the fishery right for the Pallars are a fluctuating,body and the public or a portion of the public cannot acquire a prescriptive right to fishery or to any immoveable property. 

Reliance is placed upon Neill v. Duke of Devonshire (1882) 8 AC 135. and Harris v. Chesterfield (Earl) as supporting the respondents' contention. 

In Neill v. Duke of Devonshire (1882) 8 AC 135. it was held that "the public cannot in law prescribe for a profit a prendre in alieno solo, nor acquire any right adversely to the owner under any statute of limitation; and an incorporeal hereditament such as a several fishery, which can only pass by deecl, cannot be abandoned." 

In Harris v. Chesterfield (Earl) (1911) AC 623. there was a difference of opinion between the learned Lords who decided that case. 

The minority including Lord Loreburn, L. C, held that a lawful origin for the exercise of the freeholders' claim ought to be presumed. 

In that case the freeholders of certain parishes claimed a right to fish in the river Wye. Lord Loreburn, L. C, observed at p. 628:

Accordingly I come to the crucial inquiry, Is it in reason possible (that there may have been a lawful origin for the right here claimed, that is to say, a right in freeholders of the five parishes adjoining the river Wye on its right bank from Blackwell's Ditch as far as Gorse Acre to fish and sell their catch by themselves and their domestic servants? 

That it must be subject to all Acts of Parliament and other valid regulations goes without saying and is indeed said, if it were needed, in the ancient records of the claim. But can such a thing here have been ever created?

12. Now it appears to me that this question should be answered in the affirmative.

13. The plaintiffs in this case claimed to have acquired the right to fishery by reason of the villagers granting them) that right more than a hundred years ago for a certain consideration, namely, the undertaking of the Pallars to do what is known as kudimaramath, that is, repair of the channel and the tank. Whatever may be the English Law on the subject, a village community in India can acquire a customary right and the Pallars who are cultivators of the soil may be granted a right to the fishery in a tank. 

It is not possible to express any decided opinion on this point without knowing what the case of the plaintiffs is. 

The case has not been tried, and it is only after it has been tried, and the facts made clear that the law on the point could be applied to the facts found.

14. In the result I set aside the decrees of the Lower Courts and direct the Subordinate Judge of Ramnad at Madura to restore the suit to file and dispose of the same according to law. 

Costs of this appeal and the appeal to the Lower Court will abide the result. 

The Court-fee may be refunded. ]

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1967 BLR ( C C ) 153 ( 159 )

နိုင်ငံတော်တရားရုံးချုပ်

တရားမပဌမအယူခံမှု

တရားသူကြီးဦးသက်ဖေရှေ့တွင်

ဦးမောင်ဖြူပါ၄ (အယူခံတရားလိုများ)

                        နှင့်

ဦးထွန်းအောင်ဖြူပါ၃ (အယူခံတရားခံများ)

အမှုတွင်၊ရှင်းလင်းချက်၆နှင့်သက်ဆိုင်စေရန်သဘောရိုးဖြင့်တရားဆိုင်ရမည်။ယခင်အမှုတွင်တရားပြိုင်အားအမှုသည်အဖြစ်မပါသူများ၏ကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖြစ်ဖြင့်ဖြစ်စေ၊အုပ်ထိန်းသူအဖြစ်ဖြင့်ဖြစ်စေတရားစွဲဆိုခြင်းမပြု၊တရားပြိုင်ကလည်းပုဂ္ဂိုလ်အရမိမိ၏ကိုယ်ပိုင်ဆိုင်ရေးဆိုင်ခွင့်နှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍မိမိ၏အကျိုးကျေးဇူးအတွက်သာခုခံချေပခဲ့လျှင်ရှင်းလင်းချက်၆နှင့်ငြိစွန်းရန်အကြောင်းမရှိနိုင်ကြောင်းတရားသူကြီးဦးသက်ဖေကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

[ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်။    ။အမှုတွင်အယူခံတရားလိုတို့အနေဖြင့်အယူခံတရားခံဦးထွန်းအောင်ဖြူအားသက်သေခံအက်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၁၁၅နှင့်အကျုံးဝင်အောင်တစုံတရာပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည်ဆိုသောစွပ်စွဲချက်မရှိချေ။ယခင်စွဲဆိုသည့်အမှုများတွင်ဦးထွန်းအောင်ဖြူကအယူခံတရားလိုတို့၏မိခင်ဒေါ်စိန်ရွှေမြကိုသာအမှုသည်တရားခံအဖြစ်ထည့်သွင်းခဲ့သည်။အယူခံတရားလိုတို့အားအမှုသည်များအဖြစ်ထည့်သွင်းခဲ့ခြင်းမရှိသဖြင့်ဦးထွန်းအောင်ဖြူသာလျှင်အပြစ်ရှိသူဖြစ်သည်ဟုဆိုရန်ရှိပေသည်။အယူခံတရားလိုတို့အနေဖြင့်၎င်းတို့အားတရားစွဲဆိုခြင်းမပြုသည့်အမှုတွင်အမှုသည်အဖြစ်ထည့်သွင်းရန်ပြောဆိုလျှောက်ထားရန်မလိုပေ။ထိုကဲ့သို့ပြောဆိုလျှောက်ထားရမည်ဟုလည်းမည်သည့်ဥပဒေကမှပြဌာန်းထားခြင်းမရှိချေ။သို့ဖြစ်ရာအယူခံတရားလိုတို့သည်သက်သေခံအက်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၁၁၅အရအမှုစွဲဆိုခြင်းမှအပြီးသတ်ပိတ်ပင်ထားပြီးမဖြစ်နိုင်။

ထပ်မံဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်။   ။ယခင်အမှုဖြစ်သည့်စစ်တွေမြို့ခရိုင်တရားမရုံး၏၁၉၆၂ခုနှစ်၊တရားမကြီးမှုအမှတ်၉၌အယူခံတရားလိုတို့၏မိခင်ဒေါ်စိန်ရွှေမြအား၊အယူခံတရားခံဦးထွန်းအောင်ဖြူသည်ပုဂ္ဂိုလ်အနေဖြင့်တရားစွဲဆိုခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။အယူခံတရားလိုတို့၏ကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖြစ်သော်၎င်း၊အုပ်ထိန်းသူအဖြစ်သော်၎င်းတရားစွဲဆိုခဲ့ခြင်းမဟုတ်ချေ။ဒေါ်စိန်ရွှေမြကလည်းကွယ်လွန်သူ၎င်း၏ယောကျ်ားဦးသာပွင့်၏အမွေစားအမွေခံအဖြစ်ပုဂ္ဂိုလ်အရခုခံချေပခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။အယူခံတရားလိုတို့၏ကိုယ်စားလှယ်အနေဖြင့်ခုခံချေပခဲ့ခြင်းမဟုတ်သဖြင့်၊ဒေါ်စိန်ရွှေမြ၏ပြုမူချက်နှင့်၎င်းအပေါ်ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်သည်အယူခံတရားလိုတို့အပေါ်တည်မြဲခိုင်မာသည်၊အပြီးသတ်စီရင်ဆုံးဖြတ်ပြီးဖြစ်သည်ဟုယူဆခြင်းမပြုနိုင်ပေ။ဒေါ်စိန်ရွှေမြသည်၎င်း၏ကိုယ်ပိုင်ဆိုင်ရေးဆိုင်ခွင့်နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ခုခံချေပရာ၌မိမိ၏အကျိုးကျေးဇူးအတွက်သာဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်၍၊အယူခံတရားလိုတို့အပေါ်တရားမကျင့်ထုံးဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၁၁၏ရှင်းလင်းချက်အပိုဒ်၆နှင့်ငြိစွန်းသည်ဟုမဆိုနိုင်ချေ။ ]

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1940 RANGOON LAW REPORTS. 643

APPELLATE CIVIL.

Before Sir Ernest H. Goodman Roberts, Kt., Chief Justice, and Mr. Justice Blagden.

THAIVANAI ACHI

                V.

O.R.M.P.R.M. RANANATHAN CHETTYAR AND ONE.*

1940 Mar. 26.

အမှုတွင်၊အမိန့်၁၊နည်း၈အရစွဲဆိုသောအမှုကိုအမှုသွားအမှုလာအရဆုံးဖြတ်ခြင်းမပြုဘဲကိုယ်စားပြုစွဲဆိုသောတရားလို၏လျှောက်ထားချက်အရပလပ်လိုက်လျှင်ယင်းအမှုတွင်ကိုယ်စားပြုခံရသူတို့သည်အမှုစွဲဆိုကြောင်းအကြောင်းကြားစာသာရပြီးအမှုတွင်အမှုသည်အဖြစ်ထည့်သွင်းခြင်းခံရပါကအမှုတွင်ချမှတ်သောစီရင်ချက်သည်မီးသေခြင်းမရှိကြောင်း၊ Sir Ernest M. Goodman Roberts, Kt., Chief Justice, and Mr. Justice Blagden.တို့ပါဝင်သောခုံရုံးကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

[ Where a representative suit brought under O.1, r. 8 of the Civil Procedure Code is dismissed at the instance of the representor-plaintiff without ant decision on the merits of the cuse, the subject matter of the suit does not become res judicata for a member of the class on whose behalf the suit was brought, so long as he has not been made a party to the suit but was only served with notice of suit.

The representee is bound by a final decision, but it is only by the result of litigation that he becomes bound, and the "decision" means a decision by a judge who is trying the case and not a decision by one of the parties to pursue the matter no further.

In re Calgary and Medicine Hat Land Company, Limited, (1908) 2 Ch.D.652;Kumaravelu Chettiar v. Ayyar, I.L.R. 56 Mad. 657 (P.C.) ; Langmead v. Mabb,(1865) 18 C.B. (N.S) 270; Parsotam Gir v. Narbada Gir, 26 I.A. 175, followed. ]

စီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ-၆၄၈၌၊တရားသူကြီးချုပ်ကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်သည်-

[ Although the representeeis bound by a final decision, it is only by the result of litigation that he becomes bound, and, in my opinion, "the decision " means a decision by a Judge who is trying the case and not a decision by one of the parties to pursue the matter no further.

Another case to which we were referred was that of Kumaravelu Chettiar and others v. Ramaswami Ayyar and others (3). (1933) I.L.R. 56 Mad. 657 (P.C.)

There it was decided that the decision in a former suit only operated as res judicata under certain conditions. 

The present is a case in which there has been no decision in a former suit. 

Accordingly, for all these reasons, I am of opinion that the order of the learned Judge was right, although I am constrained to add that he does not give very many reasons for arriving at the conclusion which he reached, and this appeal must be dismissed with costs, advocate's fee seventeen gold mohurs. ]

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Kumaravelu Chettiar 

              vs 

T.P. Ramaswami Ayyar 

on 11 April, 1933

Equivalent citations: (1933) 35 BOMLR 827, (1933)20 A.I.R. P.C. 183, 56 Mad. 657 

JUDGMENT

Blanesburgh, J.

အမှုတွင်၊တရားမကျင့်ထုံးဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၁၁၏ရှင်းလင်းချက်၆( မီးသေခြင်း )ပါပြဌာန်းချက်များသည်အမိန့်၁၊နည်း၈အရစွဲဆိုသောအမှုနှင့်သက်ဆိုင်သည်။သို့သော်အမိန့်၁၊နည်း၈အရစွဲဆိုသောအမှုတွင်၎င်းနည်းဥပဒေ၌ပါရှိသောပြဌာန်းချက်များကိုအတိအကျလိုက်နာရမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်းစီရင်ချက်စာမျက်နှာ-၂၊၃၊၄၊အပိုဒ်-၄၊၅၊၆၊၇၊၈၊၉၊၁၀၊၁၁၊၁၂၊၁၃၊၁၄၌အောက်ပါအတိုင်းမြွက်ဆိုသည်-

[ 4. It will appear as the case develops, that the decision must finally be rested on a proper appreciation of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure with reference to representative suits, due regard being had to the conditions, if any such there be, which must be observed, if a decree in such a suit is to be binding on persons not actually parties or privies thereto. 

It will accordingly be convenient at the outset to trace the legislative history of representative suits.

5. Prior to the Code of 1877 such suits, although not unknown in India, were not the subject of legislation. 

With reference to them, the practice followed by the Courts there did not apparently differ, in substance, from that which had, for at least a century, obtained in the Court of Chancery in England. 

This practice as described by Lord Macnaghten in Bedford (Duke of) v. Ellis [1901] A.C. 1 is copiously referred to in the judgment of the High Court, and need not be further elaborated now.

It will suffice, as an illustration of the corresponding practice in India, to draw attention to a judgment of the Madras High Court pronounced in the year 1866 in the case of Srikhanti Narayanappa v. Indupuram Ramalingam (1866) 3 M.H.C.R. 226. 

There, in the first of two suits, the plaintiffs had been fifty-four inhabitants of a village who claimed against sixty-seven inhabitants of an adjoining village a revision or alteration of the boundaries between the two. 

The second suit, the subject of the report, was one by other villagers claiming the same relief against the adjoining village, and therein it was held that the two villages had each been effectually represented in the first suit and that the inhabitants of both were, in substance, parties to the earlier litigation, which was of a public nature dealing with a claim in which all had a common interest. In these circumstances the decree in the earlier suit was a bar to the claim being again litigated. 

The Court emphasised the fact that convenience, where community of interest existed, required that a few out of a large number of persons should, under proper conditions, be allowed to represent the whole body, so that in the result all might be bound by the decree, although some only of the persons concerned were parties named in the record. 

In the absence of any statutory provisions on the subject, the Courts in India, it would seem, prior to 1877, assumed the task and duty to determine in the particular case whether, without any real injustice to the plaintiffs in the later suit, the decree in the first could properly be regarded as an estoppel against the further prosecution by them of the same claim.

6. In the seventies of the last century the subject was dealt with by legislation both in England and in India-in England, to refer to its legislation first, by Order XVI, Rule 9, to the Judicature Act, 1873.

The effect of that rule in relation to representative actions was, in substance, to introduce into all the divisions of the High Court the practice which prior to the Act had obtained in the Court of Chancery. 

But, as was pointed out by Fletcher Moulton L.J. in Markt & Co. v. Knight Steamship Company Limited [1910] 2 K.B. 1021, 1038, in extending the procedure to all divisions of the Court, the rule also formulated it, and the question whether the enactment accurately or otherwise expressed the previous practice of the Court of Chancery became accordingly little more than academic.

7. A similar observation may, perhaps, with equal appositeness, be applied to the corresponding Indian legislation on the subject to which attention will presently be directed. 

8. The English Order XVI, Rule 9, which has remained unaltered until now, is in the following terms

Where there are numerous parsons having the same interest in one cause or matter, one or more of such persons may sue or be sued, or may be authorised by the Court or a Judge to defend in such cause or matter, on behalf, or for the benefit of all persons so interested.

9. A passing reference to the English practice under that rule in regard to two matters may be helpful here. 

First, it has been deemed essential that in a representative action the class of persons on behalf of whom relief is sought should be clearly defined. 

In the interests of precision it is expected that the class shall be so defined in the writ (see e. g. Markt & Co. v. Knight Steamship Company, Limited) but the gist of the requirement is that as the judgment in such an action is binding on all the members of the class represented, it is of the essence that the range of the estoppel be defined somewhere on the face of the proceedings. 

Again in England if the action is properly brought by plaintiffs as members of a class having a common interest to vindicate the rights of the class, it will be no objection that they may have added a claim in respect of some matter in which they say they have been wronged in their individual capacity (Bedford (Duke of) v. Ellis, supra). But, all the same, it remains true that if the plaintiffs' claim is substantially one for damages for an alleged wrong, to themselves individually, the suit is not held to be representative in the true or effective sense of the term.

10. In India representative suits were made the subject of legislation in the Code of Civil Procedure of 1877 by provisions clearly based on the English precedent, but with modifications introduced of definite-even of compelling-significance in relation to the very question here under consideration.

These provisions, contained originally in Section 80 of the Code of 1877, are now to be found in Order I, Rule 8, of the Code of 1908, in the terms following :-

(1) Where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit, one or more of such persons may, with the permission of the Court, sue or be sued, or may defend, in such suit, on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so interested, But the Court shall in such case give, at the plaintiff's expense, notice of the institution of the suit to all such persons either by personal service or, where from the number of persons or any other cause such service is not reasonably practicable, by public advertisement, as the Court in each case may direct.

(2) Any person on whose behalf or for whose benefit a suit is instituted or defended under Sub-rule (1) may apply to the Court to be made a party to such suit.

12. The effect of this enactment standing alone appears to their Lordships to be as little open to doubt as is its purpose. 

As in 1873 had happened in England, it formulates in 1877 for India the former exception to the general principle that all persons interested in a suit shall be parties thereto.

It is an enabling rule of convenience prescribing the conditions upon which such persons when not made parties to a suit may still be bound by the proceedings therein. 

For the section to apply the absent persons must be numerous; they must have the same interest in the suit which, so far as it is representative, must be brought or prosecuted with the permission of the Court. 

On such permission being given it becomes the imperative duty of the Court to direct notice to be given to the absent parties in such of the ways prescribed as the Court in each case may require : while liberty is reserved to any represented person to apply to be made a party to the suit.

13. The direction of all these matters, in striking contrast to the English rule, is placed in the hands of the Court, and the obtaining of the judicial permission and compliance with the succeeding orders as to notice, are, as it seems to their Lordships, quite clearly the conditions on which the further proceedings in the suit become binding on persons other than those actually parties thereto and their privies. 

In their Lordships' view the position under Section 30 is correctly and clearly stated by Ameer Ali J. in Baiju Lal Parbatia v. Bulak Lal Pathuk (1897) I.L.R. 24 Cal. 385, where he says (p.389) :-

The effect of Section 30...is, that unless such permission is obtained by the person suing, or defending the suit, his action has no binding effect upon the persons whom ha chooses to represent.

14. "If the course prescribed by Section 30 is not followed in the first case, the judgment does not bind those whose names are not on the record," is another correct statement of the position. See Srinivasa Chariar v. Ragava Chariar (1897) I.L.R. 23 Mad. 28, 32. ]

စီရင်ချက်စာမျက်နှာ-၇၊၈၊၉၊၁၀၊အပိုဒ်-၂၅၊၂၆၊၂၇၊၂၈၊၂၉၊၃၀၊၃၁၊၃၂၊၃၃၊၃၄၊၃၅၊၃၆၊၃၇၊၃၈၊၃၉ရှိအောက်ပါသုံးသပ်ချက်များမှာလည်းမှတ်သားဖွယ်ရာဖြစ်သည်-

[ 25. The learned Judges of the High Court hold the view that the earlier suit was, and was conducted as, a representative suit governed by Section 30, but they do not, as their Lordships very respectfully think, face fully the difficulties in the way of that conclusion. 

Their view that the reference to "family" in the quoted passage from the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge is a slip for "community" is not, in the face of the contemporaneous decree, one to be safely accepted : the omission of all reference to representation cannot properly be regarded as a mere question of form, and, in the result, their Lordships, if it were necessary, would be prepared to hold that this plea of res judicata had not been made good for the simple reason that the original suit is not shown by the respondents to have been a representative suit at all.

26. But even if it be assumed that the original suit was a representative suit governed by Section 30, but one which was prosecuted without leave of the Court and with no notice given of its institution, either as required by the section or at all, then the very serious question arises whether the decree in such a suit is brought within Section 13, Explanation 5, of the Code of 1877, which deals with the plea of res judicata. 

The section, with the addition of the words printed in square brackets and inserted for the first time in 1908, has now become Section 11, Explanation 6, of the present Code. 

It is as follows :-

No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.

Explanation VI.

Where persons litigate bona fide, in respect of [a public right or of] a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all parsons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating.

27. Based upon that enactment, the question with reference to this defence of res judicata, referred by the High Court to the full bench, was, as interpreted by the full bench, as follows (p. 146) :-

Is explanation 6 to Section 11 controlled by Order I, Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code, so as to render a subsequent suit filed with leave under Order I, Rule 8, by two or more members of the community who claim a right in common to them and the other members of the community, and seek to enforce it on behalf of themselves and the community res judicata by reason of a decision given after bona fide contest in a previous suit filed without leave under Section 30, Civil Procedure Code, 1877, by some other members of the community claiming the same right and seeking to enforce it on behalf of the community ?

28. The question, of course, as has been already shown, is based upon assumptions in regard to the "previous suit," which their Lordships do not accept, but its object and meaning will, perhaps, be best appreciated by the answer returned which, shortly stated, was, that Explanation 6 is not controlled by Order I, Rule 8, and if a Court allows a suit to which the rule applies to proceed in a representative capacity for the benefit of numerous parties all these parties will be bound by the decree, if the contest leading to it were bona fide, even although the procedure prescribed by the rule was in no respect followed. 

The far-reaching importance of this pronouncement of the full bench, couched as it is in general terms, will at once be recognised. It introduces into Section 11, Explanation 6-itself an enactment of adjective law only-a result which attaches to the explanation the effect of new substantive law in that it clothes with all the binding force as against them of a res judicata a decree in a representative suit which, apart from the explanation, has no binding effect upon the persons therein expressed to be represented. 

A pronouncement which has this result is not one to be accepted readily, and their Lordships believe it to be mistaken.

29. Before considering it critically, however, it will be convenient to recall the circumstances in which, in the Code of 1908, the words "a public right of" were added to the explanation. 

The addition, it will be found, throws light upon the question at issue.

30. In the Code of 1908 there was introduced, for the first time, a provision-Section 91-by virtue of which the Advocate-General or two or more persons, with his consent in writing, might, in the case of a public nuisance, institute a suit, though no special damage had been caused, for a declaration and injunction, and for such other relief as might be appropriate to the circumstances of the case. 

If the plea of res judicata was to apply to the decree in such a suit, some addition to Explanation 6 seemed to be called for. 

The addition of the words "a public right or of" in the place where they are found was apparently regarded as sufficient for that purpose, because it is everywhere accepted that the enactment therein of Section 91 was the only reason for their insertion in the same Code of 1908.

31. Their Lordships will presently advert to the light thrown upon the explanation as a whole by the introduction of these words.

32. The view of it taken by the full bench, however, purported to be baaed rather upon authority and upon certain general considerations than upon its actual wording. 

And here their Lordships doubt whether any representative authority can be found broad enough to cover the present case, while with the general considerations invoked they are not in sympathy. 

As to authority they are impressed by the fact that even before the Code of 1908 there were several decisions-Thanakoti v. Muniappa (1885) I.L.R. 8 Mad. 496 may be selected as typical-in which the view was taken that if what may be called an Order I, Rule 8, suit was to have the benefit of the explanation the conditions of the rule must have been complied with fully. 

While in other cases in which it might superficially be supposed that the opposite view had been taken it will be found that the question at issue was not so much whether, where none of the conditions of the rule had been complied with the benefit of the explanation could be extended to the decree in a suit expressly within the terms of the rule-which is the present case-as whether to bring the decree within the explanation, the conditions of the rule had not to be observed even in a suit which while within the words of the explanation was not within the words of the rule at all. 

And the result of the decisions has shown that the explanation is not confined to cases covered by the rule but extends to include any litigation in which, apart from the rule altogether, parties are entitled to represent interested persons other than themselves. Nor are their Lordships impressed by the general principles upon which apparently the full bench relied.

First of all the learned Judges in ignoring the conditions imposed by the rule seem to have discounted altogether the requirements as to notice thereby made so prominent. 

The observance of these requirements, their Lordships hold to be essential. They constitute the nearest available substitute when dealing with numerous persons, scattered it may be throughout India, for the personal service upon a defendant required in the case of an ordinary suit. 

It is no more permissible to dispense with the one requirement than with the other if the person in view is to be bound by the decree. 

It may indeed be the case that in some representative suits, however far-reaching the notice, absent persons will have only a chance of knowing that litigation affecting their interests is on foot.

But of that chance they are not to be deprived. 

It will be as good a chance as the Court can give, and they are entitled to rely on the due discharge by the Court of its duty in this matter-one of the most responsible with which it could be entrusted.

33. And the fact that in very many instances the notice directed will not achieve its full purpose : and that many persona concerned may remain in ignorance of the proceedings, may well have prompted the further condition of the explanation that the decree in such a suit to be binding on absent persons must follow a bona fide litigation, This condition the full Court seem to regard as the panacea for all irregularity. 

In their Lordships' judgment it is not so to be read. 

Bona fide litigation will not excuse the neglect of statutory conditions. 

If the litigation be not bona fide the most complete observance of these conditions will not give to the decree the force of a res judicata.

34. In their Lordships' view the difficulty in associating the explanation with the rule is occasioned only by the generality of the words of the rule, and that difficulty, as they think, is removed by the addition to the explanation made in 1908.

35. So far as mere words are concerned it probably would have to be agreed that a suit in respect of a public nuisance brought by any member of the public would be a litigation "in respect of a public right." 

"When, however, it is found that such a litigation where no special damage has been sustained is only authorised under the Code if it be instituted with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General, is it to be said that the benefit of the explanation is to be extended to a decree in such a suit where no such consent has been obtained, the necessity for it having been, perhaps, overlooked ? 

The answer must, it seems, be in the negative; but although the instance is more striking, the same principle must, their Lordships think, apply to a decree in a representative suit properly so-called, when, in view of the provisions of the Code in that behalf," no persons interested in such right other than the persons litigating, are affected by the decree." 

While, however, their Lordships are of opinion that the conclusion they have reached on this important question is justified even on the wording of the explanation, they are by no means unconscious of the difficulties pointed out by the High Court of Madras in Gopalacharyulu v. Subbamma (1919) I.L.R. 43 Mad. 487, and they would not exclude the possibility of a decree being within the benefit of the explanation where the litigation having been bona fide the omission to comply with the conditions of the rule has been inadvertent, and no injury from the omission has been sustained by the plaintiff in the second suit. 

But it is, their Lordships think, imperative to have it recognised that the burden upon a defendant seeking a ruling to that effect is heavy indeed, No encouragement should, they think, be offered to litigants, if they would obtain the full benefit of Order I, Rule 8, to be careless in securing full compliance with the conditions of the rule both in the letter and in the spirit.

36. On the whole case accordingly their Lordships have reached the conclusion that the learned Subordinate Judge was right in holding that the defence of res judicata had not been established.

37. This appeal, therefore, should be allowed, and the case be remitted to the High Court with a direction to dispose on the merits of the defendants' appeal from the decree of March 17, 1923.

38. And their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.

39. The appellants are entitled to their costs of this appeal, and of the appeal to the High Court as from the day when it was opened. 

The remaining costs of that appeal already incurred, and all further costs thereof hereafter to be incurred, will be dealt with by the High Court when disposing finally of the appeal. ]

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Narhari Shastri And Ors. 

                   vs 

Pt. Basudeo Namburi

 on 3 May, 1938

Equivalent citations: AIR 1938 ALL 523, AIR 1938 ALLAHABAD 523

JUDGMENT

Verma, J.

အမှုတွင်၊တရားမကျင့်ထုံးဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၁၁၏ရှင်းလင်းချက်၆( မီးသေခြင်း )ပါပြဌာန်းချက်များသည်အမိန့်၁၊နည်း၈အရစွဲဆိုသောအမှုနှင့်သက်ဆိုင်သည်။သို့သော်အမိန့်၁၊နည်း၈အရစွဲဆိုသောအမှုတွင်၎င်းနည်းဥပဒေ၌ပါရှိသောပြဌာန်းချက်များကိုအတိအကျလိုက်နာရမည်။သို့မဟုတ်ပါကနောက်ထပ်စွဲဆိုသောအမှုအားပိတ်ပင်ခြင်းမရှိကြောင်းစီရင်ချက်အပိုဒ်-၃၊၄၊၅၊၆၊၇၌အောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်သည်-

[ 3. As a matter of fact, it is clear that the provisions of Section 30 of the Code of 1882 were not even thought of during the whole course of that litigation which was started on 19th August 1895. 

It is argued, how ever, on behalf of the defendant respondent that that suit should be taken to have been filed in a representative capacity by the five plaintiffs, even though there was no such allegation in the plaint of that suit, and further that the omission to take the steps enjoined by Section 30 of the Code of 1882 should be regarded as mere inadvertence and should not be held to prevent the decision in that suit from operating as res judicata in the present suit. 

Learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellants has placed before us the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Kumaravelu Chettiar v. Ramaswami Ayyar (1933) 20 A.I.R. P.C. 183 and has contended that in view of that decision of their Lordships it must be held that the decision of the Court below that the present claim is barred by res judicata is erroneous. 

In our judgment this contention is well founded.

In the first place, after going through the plaint and the judgments of the suit of 1895 and certain other documents which, though not printed, have been typed by the defendant respondent, we see no justification for the contention that the Suit No. 345 of 1895 was or purported to be a representative suit.

 The mere fact that the five persons who filed that suit belonged to the Deoprayagi Community, or that they styled themselves as Panch Deoprayagi, cannot in our opinion make it a representative suit. 

The claim put forward was one on behalf of the per-sons who were suing as plaintiffs and was based on a personal right which those plaintiffs claimed for themselves.

In the second place even if the plaintiffs in that suit had purported to sue in a representative capacity, the omission to follow the provisions of Section 30 of the Code of 1882, as held by their Lordships in the case mentioned above, would deprive the decision in that suit of all binding force so far as people who were not parties to that suit are concerned. 

Their Lordships of the Privy Council in the course of their judgment, after quoting and commenting upon the English Order 16, Rule 9, and Order 1, Rule 8, Indian Civil P.C. at p. 286 of the report analyse the provisions of the latter and observe:

The direction of all these matters, in striking contrast to the English rule, is placed in the hands of the Court, and the obtaining of the judicial permission and compliance with the succeeding orders as to notice, are, as it seems to their Lordships quite clearly the conditions on which the further proceedings in the suit become binding on persons other than those actually parties thereto and their privies.

4. Their Lordships approve of the dictum of Amir Ali J. in Baiju Lal Parbati v. Bulak Lal Pathuk (1897) 24 Cal. 385 at p. 390:

The effect of Section 30... is that unless such permission is obtained by the person suing or defending the suit, his action has no binding effect on the persons whom he chooses to represent, and of the dictum in Srinivasa Chariiar v. Ragava Chariar (1900) 23 Mad. 28:

If the course prescribed by Section 80 is not followed in the first case... the judgment does not bind those whose names are not on the record.

5. Proceeding further, their Lordships at page 291 of the report make these observations: But even if it be assumed that the original suit was a representative suit governed by Section 30, but one which was prosecuted without leave of the Court and with no notice given of its institution, either as required by the Section or at all, then the very serious question arises whether the decree in such a suit is brought within Section 13, Expln. 5 of the Code of 1877 which deals with the plea of res judicata.

6. Their Lordships then quote and discuss Expln. 6 to Section 11 of the present Code and explain the reasons why the words "a public right or of" were introduced into that Explanation, and finally overrule the view taken by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court against which the appeal before their Lordships was directed to the effect that:

Explanation 6 is not controlled by Order 1, Rule 8, and if a Court allows a suit to which the rule applies to proceed in a representative capacity for the benefit of numerous parties all these parties will be bound by the decree, if the contest leading to it were bona fide, even although the procedure prescribed by the rule was in no respect followed.

7. In view of this definite and unambiguous pronouncement of their Lordships of the Privy Council, we do not find it possible to uphold the decision of the Court below. 

This ruling was brought to the notice of the learned Judge below. 

He however thought that certain observations of their Lordships towards the end of their judgment justified him in coming to the conclusion that the present suit was barred by res judicata although the provisions of Section 30 of the Code of 1882 had not been complied with in the suit of 1895. 

Now, the passage in the judgment of their Lordships to which the learned Judge refers is to be found at p. 295 of the report and is this:

While however their Lordships are of opinion that the conclusion they have reached on this important question is justified even on the wording of the Explanation, they are by no means unconscious of the difficulties pointed out by the High Court of Madras in Gopalcharyulu v. Subbamma (1920) 7 A.I.R. Mad. 568 and they would not exclude the possibility of a decree being within the benefit of the Explanation where the litigation having been bona fide the omission to comply with the conditions of the rule has been inadvertent, and no injury from the omission has been sustained by the plaintiff in the second suit.

စီရင်ချက်အပိုဒ်-၉၊၁၀၊၁၁၌အောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်ဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

[ 9. It is clear that the facts and circumstances of that case were peculiar and on those facts it was decided that the decision in the previous suit operated as res judicata. 

It will also be noticed from the observations of the learned Chief Justice at pp. 490 and 491 of the report that the Court took the view that the two agraharamdars who had brought the previous suit were litigating on behalf of themselves and the other agraharamdars, that the decree which they had obtained in the trial Court had been obtained by them on behalf of the other agraharamdars, including Rukmaniamma, as well as their own, and that the relief which those plaintiffs had claimed had been claimed on behalf of the other agraharamdars including Rukmaniamma. As we have explained above, that is not the position here. 

The suit of 1895, which is relied upon by the defendant, respondent, was on behalf of the five plaintiffs named, in their individual capacity and for their own benefit, and was not on behalf of or for the benefit of, anybody else. In our judgment the learned Judge below has erred in appreciating the true import of the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council on which he purports to rely and which we have quoted above. 

All that their Lordships meant to say was that it was possible to conceive of cases in which the facts were of a peculiar nature and that therefore they would not exclude the possibility of a decree being within the benefit of the Explanation where the litigation having been bona fide the omission to comply with the conditions of the rule had been inadvertent, and no injury from the omission has been sustained by the plaintiff in the second suit.

10. The learned Subordinate Judge evidently failed to notice the sentences immediately following the passage on which he places reliance. 

Those sentences are these:

But it is, their Lordships think, imperative to have it recognized that the burden upon a defendant seeking a ruling to that effect is heavy indeed. 

No encouragement should, they think, be offered to litigants, if they would obtain the full benefit of Order 1, Rule 8, to be careless in securing full compliance with the conditions of the rule, both in the letter and in the spirit.

11. The learned Subordinate Judge has remarked that the part of the country where this case has arisen is mountainous, that the condition of the people there is backward and that in those parts there were few legal practitioners before 1910. 

These circumstances in our opinion cannot furnish any ground for ignoring the imperative directions contained in Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code. 

We may again refer to the judgment of their Lordships in Kumaravelu Chettiar v. Ramaswami Ayyar (1933) 20 A.I.R. P.C. 183 where also the point had evidently been urged that the former suit having been filed in 1877, which was the year when the Legislature for the first time dealt with the subject of representative suits in the Civil Procedure Code of that year, the provisions on the subject were "only dimly appreciated by the pleaders." 

Their Lord-ships did not attach any importance to that contention. In the case before us the former suit had been filed long after 1877 and long after 1882 when the Civil Procedure Code was again consolidated and amended. 

We are therefore of opinion that the view taken by the Court below is incorrect. 

For the reasons given above, we allow this appeal, set aside the decree of the Court below and remit the case to that Court for trial of the other issues arising in the case. 

The appellants will have their costs of this appeal. 

The costs in the Court below will abide the result. ]

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