မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတရားစီရင်ရေးသမိုင်း[ က ]

ဆရာကြီးဦးမြသင်ကြားပို့ချချက်များ

မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတရားစီရင်ရေးသမိုင်း[ က ]

ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်က၊၁၉၄၈ခုနှစ်တွင်တည်ထောင်စဉ်ကဟိုက်ကုတ်လွှတ်တော်တွင်တရားဝန်ကြီးအဖြစ်၁၆နှစ်နီးပါးတာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်ခဲ့သောဦးဘဦး၊၁၉၄၆ခုနှစ်တွင်ရှေ့ဆင့်နောက်ဆင့်တရားလွှတ်တော်တရားဝန်ကြီးဖြစ်လာသောရှေ့နေချုပ်ဦးထွန်းဖြူ၊၎င်း၏ရှေ့နေချုပ်နေရာတွင်ရှေ့နေချုပ်အဖြစ်ခေတ္တထမ်းဆောင်ပြီးနောက်တရားဝန်ကြီးဖြစ်လာသောဦးဧမောင်၊ဝတ်လုံတော်ရရှေ့နေဦးကျော်မြင့်၊ပေါင်းလေးဦးကတရားဝန်ကြီးအဆင့်ရှိသူများဖြစ်ကြသည်။

ယခုတရားလွှတ်တော်တွင်ပထမဆုံးနိုင်ငံတော်တရားဝန်ကြီးချုပ်၊ဝတ်လုံတော်ရဦးဘဦး၊တရားလွှတ်တော်ချုပ်တရားဝန်ကြီးဦးဧမောင်နှင့်ဦးကျော်မြင့်တို့တာဝန်ယူကြသည်။

ဝတ်လုံတော်ရရှေ့နေများအဖြစ်ရှေ့နေလိုက်ခဲ့သူများဖြစ်သည်။

ဦးဧမောင်မှာဝါရင့်ဝတ်လုံတော်ရအဖြစ်၁၉၃၆ခုနှစ်ခန့်မှစ၍၁၉၄၅ခုနှစ်အထိရှေ့နေချုပ်အဖြစ်ထမ်းဆောင်ခဲ့ပြီးဟိုက်ကုတ်လွှတ်တော်တွင်တရားသူကြီး၂နှစ်ခန့်ဝါရှိသောဦးသိမ်းမောင်ကိုတရားလွှတ်တော်ချုပ်တွင်တာဝန်မပေးဘဲတရားလွှတ်တော်တရားဝန်ကြီးအဖြစ်တာဝန်ပေးသည်။

တရားဝန်ကြီးများတွင်ရှေ့နေရှေ့ရပ်ဦးထွန်းဖြူ၊ရှေ့နေချုပ်၊အစိုးရတရားလွှတ်တော်ရှေ့နေ၊ခရိုင်တရားမနှင့်စက်ရှင်တရားသူကြီးအဖြစ်တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်ခဲ့သည့်တရားဝန်ကြီးများ၊ဝတ်လုံတော်ရရှေ့နေဖြစ်ပြီး၊ခရိုင်တွင်လိုက်ရင်းအစိုးရရှေ့နေ PP အဖြစ်တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်သူတို့သည်တရားဝန်ကြီးဖြစ်လာကြသည်။

စစ်ကြိုခေတ်ပရီဗီကောင်စီဝင်များနည်းတူဥပဒေတတ်ကျွမ်းသူများကယခင်တရားလွှတ်တော်ချုပ်တွင်လည်းကောင်း၊ဦးသိမ်းမောင်ဦးစီးသောတရားဝန်ကြီးများသည်စစ်ကြိုခေတ်ဟိုက်ကုတ်လွှတ်တော်တရားဝန်ကြီးများကဲ့သို့အတွေ့အကြုံရှိသူများဖြစ်၍တရားစီရင်မှုမှာပုံမှန်အတိုင်းဖြစ်ခဲ့သည်။

ခရိုင်တွင်စစ်ကြိုခေတ်လုပ်သက်ရင့်တရားသူကြီးများ၊နယ်ပိုင်တရားသူကြီးများ၊မူမပျက်တရားစီရင်ကြသည်။

နယ်ပိုင်တရားသူကြီးများအခြေအနေကြောင့်အရည်အချင်းပြည့်မြို့နယ်တရားသူကြီးများလုံလုံလောက်လောက်မရှိသော်လည်း၊တရားစီရင်မှုပုံမှန်လည်ပတ်ခဲ့သည်။

၁၉၆၂ခုနှစ်တွင်တရားလွှတ်တော်ချုပ်နှင့်တရားလွှတ်တော်တို့ကိုဖျက်သိမ်းပြီး၊တရားသူကြီး၆ဦးဖြင့်တရားရုံးချုပ်ကိုတည်ထောင်သည်။

တရားလွှတ်တော်ချုပ်တရားဝန်ကြီးဦးဘိုကြီးသည်တရားသူကြီးဖြစ်လာသည်။

ဝါရင့်တရားသူကြီးဦးစံမောင်နှင့်အခြားတရားသူကြီးတို့တရားစီရင်ရေးကိုထိန်းနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။

၁၉၆၂ခုနှစ်တွင်ဒေါက်တာမောင်မောင်တရားရုံးချုပ်တရားသူကြီးဖြစ်လာသည်။

၁၉၄၆ခုနှစ်တွင် BAဘွဲ့ရပြီး၊၁၉၄၈ခုနှစ်တွင် BL ဘွဲ့၊၁၉၄၉ခုနှစ်တွင်ဝတ်လုံတော်ရရှေ့နေဖြစ်ပြီးဥပဒေပါရဂူဘွဲ့ရသည်။

တရားရုံးချုပ်တည်ထောင်ပြီး၁၉၆၇ခုနှစ်အထိစီရင်ထုံးများထူမြဲထူသည်။

အိန္ဒိယနိုင်ငံတရားလွှတ်တော်ရှေ့နေများပြည်တော်ပြန်သွားကြရာမှစီရင်ထုံးများ၁၉၇၃ခုနှစ်အထိပါးသွားသည်။

တရားစီရင်မှုတွင်ရှေ့နေရှေ့ရပ်တို့၏ရှေ့နေပညာအရေးပါမှုပြယုဂ်တရပ်ပေလား။

၁၉၇၄ခုနှစ်တွင်နှစ်ဆန်း၌ပြည်သူ့တရားစီရင်ရေးစနစ်ကိုတည်ထောင်သောအခါဗဟိုတရားရုံးမှခရိုင်(နောက်ပိုင်းတွင်တိုင်း၊ပြည်နယ်)တရားရုံးနှင့်မြို့နယ်တရားရုံးများတွင်ရုံးထိုင်တရားစီရင်ရေးအဖွဲ့အဆင့်ဆင့်တို့စီရင်ချက်မရေးတော့။

ဗဟိုတရားရုံးနှင့်အဆင့်ဆင့်သောတရားရုံးများ၏စီရင်ချက်များပါးလာသည်။

ဗဟိုတရားရုံးမှာပိုပါးလာသည်။

စီရင်ချက်တို့၏ကဏ္ဍမသိမသာကျဉ်းမြောင်းလာသည်။

တရားသူကြီး၏အလုပ်တွင်စီရင်ချက်ရေးခြင်းသည်ရုံးထိုင်တရားသူကြီး၏ကြောင်းကျိုးဆင်ခြင်မှုကိုမြင့်စေသည်။

ကြောင်းခြင်းရာများကိုသက်ဆိုင်ရာဥပဒေနှင့်ချိန်ထိုးစီရင်ချက်ချခြင်းသည်ရုံးထိုင်တရားသူကြီး၏ဦးနှောက်ကိုသွေးပေးသော၊လေ့ကျင့်ပေးသောပညာတရပ်ဖြစ်ရာ၊စီရင်ချက်မရေးသည်နှင့်အမျှ၊ကြောင်းကျိုးဆင်ခြင်သည့်ပညာသည်လည်းဖုံတင်လာမည်မှာဧကန်ဖြစ်သည်။

တရားရေးအကြံပေးဖြင့်ဆောင်ရွက်မှုတို့သည်ကျိုးကြောင်းပညာကိုသွေးရန်အခွင့်အရေးမရ။

မင်းတိုင်းကြေသာတာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်သည့်တရားရေးအကြံပေးချက်မှန်၊မမှန်မှတ်ကျောက်တင်ပေးသည်လည်းမရှိ။

တချိန်တည်းမှာပင်လုပ်သက်ရင့်ရှေ့နေကြီးများနေရာတွင် LLB., BAဘွဲ့ရရှေ့နေများပေါ်လာသည်။

ရှေ့နေအတွေ့အကြုံပြည့်ပြည့်ဝဝသင်ယူခွင့်မရသော်လည်း၊ဝမ်းလှသောအသက်မွေးမှုဖြစ်၍၊ငတ်သေသောရှေ့နေမရှိ။

နေစရာအိမ်မရှိသောရှေ့နေမရှိဘဲအလုပ်ဖြစ်သည်။

ယှဉ်ပြိုင်ရှေ့နေလုပ်ရသည့်စနစ်လည်းမှေးမှိန်သွားသည်။

တရားစီရင်ရေးပညာကိုစီရင်ထုံးများမှ၊အင်္ဂလိပ်ဘာသာဖြင့်ရေးထားသောကျမ်းများမှအဓိကရနိုင်သည်။

ဘွဲ့ရတရားရေးဝန်ထမ်းများ၊ရှေ့နေပေါက်စများ၊အင်္ဂလိပ်စာရေးတတ်ဖို့၊ပြောတတ်ဖို့ဝေးစွ၊နားလည်အောင်ဖတ်နိုင်ရန်အခက်အခဲတွေ့သည်။

စီရင်ထုံးများနှင့်ဥပဒေကျမ်းများပါအင်္ဂလိပ်စာ၏အဆင့်အတန်းနှင့်တက္ကသိုလ်များကအပ်နှင်းသောရိုးရိုးဘွဲ့၊ RL လက်မှတ်နှင့် LL B ဘွဲ့ရတို့၏အင်္ဂလိပ်စာပညာသည်ကွာဟသည်။

၁၈၇၂ခုနှစ်မှ၁၉၆၇ခုနှစ်အထိကာလအတွင်းထုတ်ဝေသောစီရင်ထုံးအများစုမှာအင်္ဂလိပ်ဘာသာဖြင့်ရေးသားထားသောစီရင်ချက်များဖြစ်သည်။

တက္ကသိုလ်တွင်သင်ယူခဲ့သောအင်္ဂလိပ်စာဖြင့်အလုပ်မဖြစ်နိုင်တော့။

အထူးသဖြင့်တက္ကသိုလ်များတွင်အထူးပြုဘာသာသင်ကြားရေးစနစ်တွင်အင်္ဂလပ်စာသင်ယူရေးကဏ္ဍကျဉ်းမြောင်းသွားသည်။

ထိုစနစ်အတိုင်းဘွဲ့ရသည်အထိအင်္ဂလိပ်စာသင်ခဲ့ရသည်။

LL B ဘွဲ့အတွက်အင်္ဂလိပ်စာ၏အရေးပါမှုကိုသတိမမူ။

အင်္ဂလိပ်စာကိုအလေးပေးရန်သင်ရိုးတွင်မပါ။

ဤအခြေအနေအမြစ်တွယ်ခဲ့သည်မှာအနည်းဆုံးနှစ်ငါးဆယ်ပင်ကျော်ခဲ့ပါပြီ။

အဆင့်ဆင့်သောတရားရုံးများသည်ပြည်သူ့တရားသူကြီးစနစ်မကျင့်သုံးမီတရားစီရင်ရေးအဆင့်ကိုပြန်ရောက်ရန်အတော်ကြိုးပမ်းရပါဦးမည်။

စီရင်ထုံးများသည်ယခင်တရားလွှတ်တော်ချုပ်၊တရားလွှတ်တော်နှင့်တရားရုံးချုပ်[ ၁၉၆၂-၇၃ ]အဆင့်သို့ရောက်ရန်၊တရားရေးလောကသို့ရောက်နေသောဥပဒေပညာရှင်တိုင်း[ တရားသူကြီး၊ရှေ့နေရှေ့ရပ် ]၏တာဝန်ဖြစ်သည်။

ထိုတာဝန်ကျေပွန်ရန်အင်္ဂလိပ်စာရေးတတ်ဖို့၊ပြောတတ်ဖို့သည်အဓိကအလုပ်။

ပြောတတ်၊ရေးတတ်လျှင်ပြောဖွယ်မရှိ။

ဖတ်တတ်ဖို့သည်အဓိကဖြစ်သည်။

အစိုးရစစ်၁၀တန်း(တက္ကသိုလ်ဝင်တန်း)စာမေးပွဲအောင်သူတိုင်းပိုကောင်းသည့်အားထုတ်မှုရှိလျှင်စီရင်ထုံးများကိုနားမလည်နိုင်စရာအကြောင်းမရှိ။

မြန်မာစာအဖွဲ့ကပြုစုသောအင်္ဂလိပ်-မြန်မာအဘိဓာန်လှန်ပြီးသိလိုသည့်အင်္ဂလိပ်စာတို့၏အဓိပ္ပာယ်ကိုရှာရန်ဝန်မလေးရ။

ထိုအဘိဓာန်သည်အဘိဓာန်သက်သက်မဟုတ်။

အင်္ဂလိပ်စာလုံးများသုံးစွဲမှုကိုဥပမာများနှင့်တကွရှင်းပြထားသည်။

အဘိဓာန်၌အချို့ဝါကျများ၊စကားစုများစသည်တို့ကိုရှာရန်လက်မနှေးပါနှင့်။

အားထုတ်လျှင်တနှစ်အတွင်းစီရင်ထုံးများကိုမလွဲမသွေနားလည်သည်အထိဖတ်တတ်လိမ့်မည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်းရဲရဲကြီးအာမခံပါသည်။

ဘုရားအလောင်းမဟာဇနက္ကကဲ့သို့အားထုတ်ရန်သာအဓိကဖြစ်သည်။

နားလည်သည်အထိအင်္ဂလိပ်ဘာသာစီရင်ထုံးများကိုဖတ်တတ်လိုစိတ်ပြင်းပြရန်သာလိုသည်။

ပထမဒေါက်တာမောင်မောင်၏စီရင်ထုံးများကိုကနဦးဖတ်ပါ။

၁၉၄၈ခုနှစ်မှ၁၉၇၀ပြည့်နှစ်စီရင်ထုံးများကို၆လမှတနှစ်အတွင်းတွင်အပြီးဖတ်ဖြစ်အောင်ကြိုးပမ်းပါ။

ထို့နောက်၁၉၄၇၊၁၉၄၆၊၁၉၄၂၊၁၉၄၁စသည်ဖြင့်ရှေ့သို့ဖတ်ပါ။

ပရီဗီကောင်စီ၏စီရင်ထုံးများကိုနောက်ဆုံးမှဖတ်ပါ။

ဟိုက်ကုတ်လွှတ်တော်တရားဝန်ကြီးချုပ် Mr. Page နှင့်ဦးဧမောင်တို့၏စီရင်ချက်များရသမြောက်သည်ကိုခံစားမိအောင်ဖတ်ပါ။

ဦးဘဦးက My Burma စာအုပ်တွင်ဟိုက်ကုတ်လွှတ်တော်တရားဝန်ကြီးဘဝကိုပြန်ပြောင်းပြောရာ၌၊အစတွင်အယူခံမှုများကို Mr. Page နှင့်ပူးတွဲရုံးထိုင်ခဲ့ပုံကိုရေးသားရာ၌၊စာမျက်နှာ-၁၁၁နှင့်၁၁၂တွင်အောက်ပါအတိုင်း၊ Mr. Page ကိုချီးကြူးရေးသားထားသည်ကိုတွေ့မြင်နိုင်သည်-

[ Of all the judges in prewar days in Burma, he was in my opinion about the best and the most learned. However difficult and complicated a case might be, he was very quick in grasping it and in discerning the essential point for decision. Not only did he know statute law well, but he had case law at his fingertips. He was especially good at interpreting the statute and the customary law. Without doing any damage to the language of an act, he would interpret statute law - if he could - so as to give full effect to the intention of the Legislature as well as to bring the law into conformity with the political, social, and commercial conditions of the country. He shaped and molded customary law so as to promote and help the welfare and progress of the people. That is what a judge should do - in fact, is expected to do. In the final analysis, the progress, welfare, and advancement of a democratic nation depend in a large measure on judges. They can obstruct, frustrate, or give full effect to the will of a nation by their interpretation, exposition, and application of legal enactments. ]

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အင်တာနက်မှရှာဖွေတွေ့ရှိသော၊ဒေါက်တာမြင့်ဇံရေးသားသည့်-

Victoria University of Wellington Law Review

Zan, Myint --- "The First and Fiftieth Years of Independent Burma's Law Reports" [2004] VUWLawRw 14; (2004) 35(2) Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 385

A COMPARISON OF THE FIRST AND FIFTIETH YEAR OF INDEPENDENT BURMA'S LAW REPORTS

စာတမ်းတွင်၊မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတရားစီရင်ရေးသမိုင်းနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍အရေးပါသောအချက်များကိုအောက်ပါအတိုင်းကောက်နုတ်ဖော်ပြလိုက်ပါသည်-

1 Supreme and High Court Judges in 1948

The names of the "Judges and Law Officers of the Union" are stated in the opening pages of the Law Reports. Under "Supreme Court" the names of three judges appear:

• Hon'ble Sir Ba U,[13] Kt, MA (Cantab), Barrister-at-Law, Chief Justice of the Union of Burma.

• Hon'ble Mr Justice E Maung, [14] MA, LLB (Cantab), Barrister-at-Law.

• Hon'ble Mr Justice Kyaw Myint, [15] Barrister-at-Law.

Under the title "High Court" the following name appears:

• Hon'ble U Thein Maung[16] MA, LLB (Cantab), Barrister-at-Law, Chief Justice.

Under the heading "Puisne Judges" the following names appear:

Hon'ble U Tun Byu, MA (Cantab), Barrister-at-Law

• Hon'ble U Ohn Pe, BA, Barrister-at-Law

• Hon'ble U San Maung, BA, ICS[17] (Retd)

• Hon'ble U Thoung Sein, [18] BA, ICS (Retd)

• Hon'ble U Aung Tha Gyaw, BA, BL

• Hon'ble U Bo Gyi, [19] BA, BL (On deputation)

• Hon'ble U Aung Khine, Barrister-at-Law (Officiating on Deputation).

Under the title "Attorney-General" the following name appears:

• U Chan Htoon, [20] LLB (Lond), Barrister-at-Law.

Under the title "Assistant Attorney-General" the following name appears:

• U Chan Tun Aung, [21] BA, BL, Barrister-at-Law.

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3 The number of cases, format and the languages that were used in the 1948 Burma Law Reports

The 1948 Burma Law Reports is an impressive document and consists of 876 numbered pages, plus some unnumbered pages. 

There are about 40 pages which are listed with Roman numerals (consisting of sections on List of Cases Reported, Table of Cases Cited and Subject Matter Index). 

Hence in total there are more than nine hundred pages in the 1948 Burma Law Reports. 

It is perhaps one of the thickest Law Reports in independent Burma. 

"Table of Cases Reported" is listed from pages VII to XI of the Law Report. 

The name of the cases are arranged alphabetically (in English) by first name of the appellant, then the name of the respondent and then followed by the page number. 

Under the title "Supreme Court", 16 cases that were decided by the Supreme Court in the year 1948 are listed.

Under the title "High Court" there are sub-headings under the names "Special Bench (Civil)", "Full Bench (Civil)", "Civil Reference", "Appellate Civil", "Appellate Criminal", "Civil Revision", "Criminal Revision" and "Original Civil". 

Altogether it lists 91 judgments which were delivered by the High Court of the Union of Burma in 1948 and prior to that some of the judgments given by the High Court of Judicature in Rangoon in 1947[34] 

The 91 cases that were decided and the rulings of which are written in English by the High Court of Union of Burma are listed in the "Table of Cases Reported". 

All of the rulings that are written in Burmese were decided by the High Court.

Hence among the 107 rulings or judgments of the Supreme Courts and High Courts of the Union of Burma that were reported in the 1948 Burma Law Reports, three of the total (less than three per cent) were written in the vernacular. 

In a sense, the 1948 Burma Law Reports broke with tradition in that this was the first time any case in a Law Report of appellate courts was written in Burmese. 

In the colonial times from the time the Law Reports were first compiled in the 1870s up to 1947 - the year before independence - all of the judgments were written in English.

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5 Comparison of the format and reporting form of the 1948 Burma Law Reports and the 1998 Myanmar Law Reports

The "format" for reporting cases in the 1998 Myanmar Law Reports is similar to that of the 1948 Burma Law Reports even though almost all of the rulings (104 out of 107 rulings) reported in the 1948 Burma Law Reports are written in English and all the rulings that were written in the 1998 Myanmar Law Reports are in Burmese. 

In both Law Reports the names of the justices or judges (at times a single Judge) appear followed underneath by the parties' names and then the "head notes" including the phrases "Held"/"Held further" (in English in the 1948 Burma Law Reports and the equivalent Burmese phrases in the 1998 Myanmar Law Reports). 

The headnotes of the cases are followed by the names of counsel who appeared for the applicants/appellants and respondents respectively. 

The dates (according to the Gregorian calendar) of the year, the month and the date appear in either the top right hand or top left hand corner in the 1948 Burma Law Reports and in the top left hand corner in the 1998 Myanmar Law Reports. 

In the 1948 Burma Law Reports the judgment of the Court is always preceded by the name of the justice or judge who delivered the judgment. 

This would be so regardless of the whether the case was been heard by a single judge[37] or whether a number of justices or judges (a Bench of two or more judges) heard the case. 

In none of the 37 cases decided by the Myanmar Supreme Court in 1998 was it stated which particular judge delivered the ruling. 

This is so both for cases that were heard by a single judge or by a bench of two or more judges. 

For example the "Criminal Appeal"[38] case of Union of Myanmar v U Hla Maung U[39] was heard by a single judge, Judge ("Tayar Thugyee") U Tin Ohn. 

The judgment did not indicate that U Tin Ohn delivered the judgment. 

The 1948 Burma Law Reports did provide the information even if a single judge heard the case. 

Similarly the "Civil Special Appeal"[40] case of U Ko Ko v Daw Tin Kywe[41] was heard by a full bench[42 of the then Myanmar Supreme Court consisting of Chief Justice U Aung Toe, U Kyaw Win, U Aung Myin, U Than Pe, U Tin Ohn and U Tin Htut Naing, and the judgment of the Court was delivered on 2 November 1998[43] It was not stated in the 1998 Myanmar Law Reports which judge "delivered" the ruling.

Up until 1971, cases cited in the Burma Law Reports mention which judges heard the case and which judge delivered the rulings. 

This is so even in judgments that are written in Burmese. 

For example in a ruling written in Burmese and given by the Chief Court of Burma on 16 June 1971 in the case of Daw Kyi Kyi v Mrs Mary Wain, it was specifically stated that Dr Maung Maung delivered the judgment. [44] 

However in a case of Daw Khin Mya Mar (alias) Mar Mar v U Nyunt Hlaing[45] decided by the Chief Court just over a year later on 29 October 1972, the judgment was only signed by the three justices or judges. 

There was no indication as to who delivered (or wrote) the judgment. 

Hence from 1972 onwards, the judgments of the apex courts of Burma do not indicate who delivered (or wrote) the judgment.

This shift, in the reportage of judicial decisions, to not mentioning the name of the justices or judges who delivered or wrote the decision may be due to a desire to emphasise the collective nature of the decision. 

The collective nature of the decision was made apparent in all post-1971 Law Reports by not singling out or crediting a particular justice or judge as the main author. [46]

In the 1948 Burma Law Reports as well as in subsequent Law Reports until about the mid-1960s, occasional separate concurring opinions are published where a case was considered by more than one judge or justice. 

For example, the case of Maung San Bwint and one v Ma Than Sein[47] was heard by the Full Bench of the then High Court of Judicature at Rangoon consisting of Sir Ba U, Acting Chief Justice, Mr Justice E Maung and Mr Justice Kyaw Myint but the judgment of the Court was delivered by Ba U, ACJ[48]. 

A separate concurring opinion was written by E Maung J[49] where the Justice (though not disagreeing with the decision) "enter[ed] a caveat" and stated that "[with this reservation I am content to accept the answer propounded by my Lord".[50] 

In yet another concurring opinion the third member of the Bench which heard the case, Kyaw Myint J, stated that:[51]

I have had the advantage of reading the drafts of the judgments intended to be delivered by my Lord[52] the Acting Chief Justice and my learned brother[53] E Maung J. 

I have nothing to add to their observations and agree that the answer to the question referred should be as propounded by my Lord.

Hence at least some of the decisions that were heard by more than one justice of the Supreme and High Courts of Burma in 1948 had separate concurring opinions.

One final and common feature of both the 1948 Burma Law Reports and 1998 Myanmar Law Reports is that in both the Reports and in all the cases decided in those years there were no dissenting opinions. 

Indeed since the time of independence in 1948, it seems that, with one exception, there has never been a dissenting opinion in the judgments delivered by the apex courts of Burma. [54] 

In 1978, the author asked the late U Myint Thein (1900-1994) the last Chief Justice to be appointed under the 1947 Constitution (and who served as Chief Justice from October 1957 to March 1962) why there were no dissenting opinions in the Supreme and High Courts of Burma. 

U Myint Thein replied that "we [the Supreme and High Courts of Burma] tried to follow the Privy Council" in not giving dissenting opinions.

All the post-1962 apex Burma Law Reports do not include dissenting opinions. [55]

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B Selected Cases from the 1948 Burma Law Reports

One hundred and seven cases decided by the Supreme and High Courts of Burma in the years 1947 and 1948 are reported in the 1948 Burma Law Reports. 

There is indeed "an embarrassment of riches" in the superb case laws of the long defunct two Burmese apex courts. 

Among the rulings that were delivered by the former Supreme and High Courts there are a few cases that can be considered landmarks, a few of which will be discussed here. 

However since there are three rulings (out of a total of 107 cases reported) that are written in Burmese, the author is of the opinion that they should be briefly summarised. [56]

In two out of the three rulings that were written in Burmese in the 1948 Burma Law Reports, the justices of the High Court of Burma[57) might have been prompted by considerations of utility and pragmatism in writing their rulings in the vernacular. 

The first ruling was decided jointly by High Court Chief Justice[58] U Thein Maung[59] and High Court Justice[60] U San Maung in the case of Saw Ba Thein, First Special Magistrate of Town of Thaton v U Ko Ko Lay, Editor and Publisher BamaKhit ["Burma's Age"] Newspaper, City of Rangoon. [61] 

The case involved a summons on the editor of the BamaKhit newspaper concerning a letter[62] that was published in the newspaper in its 7 March 1948 issue. 

The article that was written in Burmese wrongly reported the facts and made accusations or cast aspersions on Magistrate U Saw Ba Thein's integrity (the plaintiff/appellant in this Appellate Civil Case). [63] 

The Court took issue with the words written in Burmese in the article which can be translated as "we do not want the fascistic magistrate's court and its bailiff who are acting in accordance with the wishes of the capitalists". 

The editor and publisher, in defence averred that:

1. The words were not said by the editor/publisher or even the reporter who wrote the news story since the reporter was merely reporting comments by others about the Magistrate Court and its decision; and

2. The editor had not known the magistrate, did not hold any malice against the magistrate and that the editor in "good faith" ("thabaw yoe phyint") thought that what the reporter wrote must be true and published it.

Citing the relevant paragraphs in English from Halsbury's Laws of England, a sentence from which was reproduced in the ruling itself, and also the earlier ruling of King Emperor v Maung Tin Saw and Others, [65] the justices held that both the reporter who wrote the news item and the publisher who published it were guilty under the Contempt of Courts Act. 

However the Court also took note of the fact that the editor and publisher had unreservedly apologised to both the High Court and the Magistrates Court. 

Moreover, the editor had also undertaken to publish his apology in the newspaper so that the general public would know of this fact. 

In addition the Court also noted that the entire judgment in the case "from beginning to the end" ("Agh-sa hma Aghsone-Ah-hti") would be published in the defendant's newspaper so that the public in general will become aware of the laws concerning contempt of court.

The High Court further stated that the defendant U Ko Ko Lay was genuinely remorseful for his "contempt of the Lower Court". 

In addition the High Court expressed the hope and belief that reporters, editors, publishers and distributors would, as a result of the ruling being published in its entirety in the newspaper become aware of the laws concerning contempt. 

Therefore in accordance with the first exception of section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, the Court accepted the defendant's apology and acquitted the defendant without convicting him under the Contempt of Courts Act. [66]

From the facts and summary of the judgment in the case it can be seen that the article that was found by the High Court to be a violation of the Contempt of Courts Act was written in Burmese. 

Therefore, writing the judgment in Burmese could assist the Court in expressing clearly which particular words, phrases or sentences that were written in Burmese were contemptuous of the court. [67] 

Moreover since the High Court required that the entire ruling be reproduced in a Burmese language newspaper it would perhaps "miss the audience" if the learned Justices of the High Court of Burma (as it then was) were to write it in English. 

That was perhaps the main reason why U Thein Maung CJ and U San Maung J felt it expedient - perhaps necessary - to write this particular ruling in Burmese. [68]

The next case where the same two justices of the High Court heard the case and where the judgment was written in Burmese was the case of Ma Tin Tin v Daw Kan Shi [69] 

The judgment was delivered by U San Maung J[70] with U Thein Maung CJ writing a single concurring sentence, "I agree" in Burmese. [71] 

The case concerns the veracity and implementation of an agreement to transfer some property by the respondent Daw Kan Shi to the applicant Ma Tin Tin. 

The agreement or contract (in Burmese: "gati-pa-dain-nyin-sar-choke") was written in Burmese and was reproduced in the judgment. 

The respondent Daw Kan Shi was apparently illiterate since, instead of her signature, a "thumbprint" appeared in the reproduction of the agreement. 

The case discusses the varying testimonies of the witnesses that attended the wedding of Ma Tin Tin in October 1944. 

There were conflicting testimonies as to who witnessed the agreement and how it was concluded. 

U San Maung J held that in cases of conflicting testimonies of witnesses, the court must decide the case by referring to "admitted circumstances and resulting probabilities". [72] 

In his ruling, U San Maung J referred to and followed the ruling of the Privy Council in GW Davis v Maung Shwe. [73] 

Since the agreement in dispute was written in Burmese, the High Court might have felt that the judgment should be written in Burmese.

The third and final case that is written in Burmese in the 1948 Burma Law Reports is the High Court case of Maung Kadon v The Union of Burma.[74] 

It was decided by a single Judge of the High Court, U San Maung J, and listed as an "appellate criminal" case in the "Table of Cases Reported". [75] 

On the night of 27 November 1947, the appellant Maung[76] Kadon "carried a sword on his shoulder and on the main village road in the village of Hnaw-goan [in Henzada district in Lower Burma] and walked from south to north". 

A group of villagers asked Kadon who he was. 

Three of them, including the deceased later took out spears and followed Kadon. At a certain point one of the pursuers caught up with Kadon. 

The deceased, who was one of the pursuers, and Kadon faced each other and they taunted each other by saying "dare you hit me, dare you pierce me". 

Then the deceased tried to hit Kadon with a spear which did not hit Kadon but became stuck in the ground. 

Immediately after the deceased tried to hit Kadon, Kadon struck him once with a sword which hit the deceased on the left cheek and the deceased fell to the ground. 

Then Kadon's two other pursuers also caught up with Kadon and one of them threw a spear in his direction, and then the two pursuers "ran away towards the south" and Kadon ran northwards. 

Sometime later when people arrived at the scene they found that the person whom Kadon had struck was already dead.

The trial judge held that Kadon's actions in hitting his pursuer could not be justified under the doctrine of self-defence since Kadon could have "fled" from the scene. [77] 

Referring to precedents U San Maung J overruled the trial judge's decision. 

He ruled that when someone is being pursued by a person with weapons, it is not required that the pursued person "flee" or run away from the scene. The pursued person could face the attacker and defend himself or herself. 

U San Maung J stated that if there is doubt as to whether the appellant who struck the deceased with his sword acted in accordance with the principles of self-defence then the benefit of the doubt must be given to the appellant. 

Accordingly, U San Maung J vacated the conviction of Kadon meted out by the trial judge for manslaughter (or culpable homicide not amounting to murder) and acquitted him. 78]

There are many important rulings written in English in the 1948 Burma Law Reports. 

Only a very select few landmark cases will be mentioned here.

From 1942 to about April 1945 Burma was under Japanese occupation. 

The British colonial administration returned after the end of the Second World War in about May 1945. 

The issue as to the tenability of the laws, practices and currency issued during the Japanese occupation period of 1942 to 1945[79] became the subject for legal determination before the High Court of Burma in the case of Dr T Chan Taik v Ariff Moosajee Dooply and One. 80] In brief, the issue as to whether payment made in Japanese currency (rather than the British currency of the pre-war and immediate post-war years) could be considered a legitimate payment for the purposes of a mortgage by deposit of title deeds was considered by the two justices of the High Court, U Thein Maung CJ (as he then was) and U San Maung J.

In a decision given on 23 June 1948 the justices held that the repayment in Japanese currency could not be considered a legitimate payment. 

Issues concerning the application of a few Orders of the Code of Civil Procedure were considered by the High Court which will not be summarised or discussed here. 

In an opinion written by U San Maung J, certain issues of the implementation of international law that pertains to the case were discussed and decided by the court. 

Quoting an earlier judgment[81] that was delivered by E Maung J (who in 1948 at the time of the High Court judgment was a justice of the Supreme Court of the Union of Burma), U San Maung J reiterated that: [82]

The Japanese Military Forces which occupied Burma and the administration set up by them in the name of the Burmese independent State never had, under International Law, any authority to set up a currency system of their own. 

The legislation, either of the Military administration or of the Civil administration sponsored by the Military authorities during the occupation of Burma, equating the Japanese military notes to the legal currency of the country is not within the competence of the occupying power.

Again citing the earlier case of The King v Maung Hmin and three others, [83] U San Maung J held that: "the [1907) Hague Regulations must be treated by the Courts in Burma as incorporated into the Municipal Law of Burma to such extent as they are not inconsistent with the ordinary law of the country."[84]

Most of the ruling deals with issues of civil procedure. 

However, the background or underlying issue of the application of international law principles by Burmese courts can be discerned in Dr T Chan Taik v Dooply.[85] 

The post-independence Burmese High Court in the Dr T Chan Taik case reaffirmed court decisions of the immediate pre-independence era (that is, cases decided in 1946 and 1947) and decided that, at least as far as the 1907 Hague Regulations are concerned, they are incorporated into and form part of Burmese municipal law.

Another landmark case that is reported in the 1948 Burma Law Reports was decided by the Supreme Court of the Union of Burma. 

It mainly dealt with matters of constitutional law (in regard to certain provisions of the 1947 Burmese Constitution) and also matters concerning Administrative Law, especially the role of writs in Burmese law as it then was. [86] 

Only a few of the major holdings of the Supreme Court will be summarised here. 

The case is U Htwe (alias) AE Madari v U Tun Ohn and One. [87] 

As far as constitutional law is concerned the Court held that: (88)

Sections of the [1947] Constitution should not be interpreted in a narrow and technical manner but should on all occasions be interpreted in a large, liberal and comprehensive spirit. 

Constructions most beneficial to the widest possible amplitude of its powers should be adopted. 

The Constitution though written should be interpreted in such a way as will be subject to development through usage and convention.

The Supreme Court also cited the famous dictum of Lord Atkin in R v Electricity Commissioner[89] which laid down the criteria for a superior court issuing prerogative writs: [90]

Wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, acts in excess of their legal authority, they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs.

The Supreme Court referred to a large number of foreign cases in discussing the meaning of "court"[91] and held that in the Burmese context the above dictum of Lord Atkin could be modified and (in the Court's own words) "paraphrase[d]" as follows: [92]

There must be a person or a body of persons (first) 'having legal authority', (secondly) 'to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects' and (thirdly) 'having the duty to act according to law', (fourthly) 'acts in excess of his or their legal authority' [the prerogative writs will be issued by the Supreme Court].

The Supreme Court also clearly acknowledged that the criteria for issuing writs "are borrowed from English law". [93] 

By modifying the phrase "the duty to act judicially" to the "duty to act according to law", the Burmese Supreme Court might have also expanded the purview and jurisdiction of these writs in the Burmese context. 

It should be stated though that in 1948 the Burmese Supreme Court was refining the dictum laid down 24 years earlier in 1924 by Lord Atkin in R v Electricity Commissioner[94] in the light of subsequent cases decided by courts in the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia since 1924.[95] 

The Supreme Court did not explicitly state that it was necessarily expanding Lord Atkin's dictum when it ruled that the Administrator of the Rangoon City Municipal Corporation "has legal authority to determine any question affecting the rights of the subjects" and therefore the "Administrator has to act judicially, [that is], according to law". 

Speaking for the Court, Sir Ba U CJ (as he then was) also held that "[t]he exercise of power by the Administrator is not administrative or mechanical but of a judicial nature". [96] 

This author wonders whether a case that was decided by the former Burmese Supreme Court in 1948 can be analogised or considered to have sown the seeds of another landmark case that was decided by the House of Lords 34 years later in 1982, O'Reilly v Mackman.[97] 

The relevant portion of the speech by Lord Diplock in the O'Reilly case reads: 1981 It will be noted that I have broadened the much-cited description by Atkin LJ in R v Electricity Commissioners, ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co (1920) Ltd [1924] 1 KB 171; [1923] All ER Rep 156 of bodies of persons subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court by prerogative remedies (which in 1924 then took the form of the prerogative writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and quo warranto) by excluding Atkin LJ's limitation of the bodies of persons to whom the prerogative writs might issue to those 'having a duty to act judicially'. 

For the next forty years this phrase gave rise to many attempts to draw distinctions between cases that were quasi-judicial and those that were administrative only.

The author is of the view that the former Burmese Supreme Court decision in 1948 at least contributed to the distinctions that were attempted by various courts throughout the common law world in this particular aspect of administrative law. 

The Burmese Supreme Court might have in its own way broadened Lord Atkin's dictum in one of the most important cases on administrative law decided in the first year of Burmese independence.

Sir Ba U CJ of the Burmese Supreme Court concludes the ruling with the following stirring[99] words:[100]

In conclusion, we may point out that this Court, having been constituted by the Constitution as a protector and guardian of the rights of subjects, will not hesitate to step in and afford appropriate relief whenever there is an illegal invasion of these rights.

The final twin cases that should be mentioned from the 1948 Burma Law Reports are the decisions concerning U Saw and his accomplices who had been convicted for the murder of General Aung San and his cabinet colleagues on 19 July 1947[101] U Saw and his accomplices were convicted of murder by a Special Tribunal which was formed under the Special Crimes (Tribunal Act) 1947. 

U Saw and a few others were sentenced to death by the tribunal. 

U Saw and nine others appealed their sentences and conviction to the High Court of Burma. 

In a lengthy, comprehensive judgment the High Court consisting of U Ohn Pe, U San Maung and U Bo Gyi JJ dismissed the appeal. [102] 

Among many others factors the High Court held that "[there was no circumstance under which the accused could get a lesser sentence and in any case the question whether mercy should be extended to any one of the appellants is [a] matter [with] which this court is not concerned". 103]

U Saw and four others[104] sought leave to appeal the High Court decision to the Supreme Court. In the reported judgment of U Saw and Four Others v The Union of Burma, [105] the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. 

Among others, the Court observed that: [106]

[M]any of the rules laid down by the Privy Council on applications for special leave to appeal in criminal matters are rules of wisdom and should ordinarily act as guidance to the Supreme Court in applications under s. 6 of the Union Judiciary Act. 

An exhaustive definition of such limits would be futile but if the application raises questions of great and general importance which are likely to occur often to prevent wrong precedents for the future, the Supreme Court could interfere by way of appeal by special leave in criminal matters.

The Supreme Court further held that the case of U Saw did not fall under these categories and special leave to appeal was rejected.

Further in response to the contention of U Saw's counsel[107] that the "the Governor of Burma had no right by the Special Crimes (Tribunal) Act of 1947 to take away the inherent rights of a person in Rangoon to be tried in appropriate cases by a jury"[108] the Supreme Court held that:[109]

[T]rial by jury is a creation of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the rights given by the Code of Criminal Procedure can clearly be taken away by an Act of the Burma Legislature and accordingly can be taken away by an Act of the Governor made under section 139 of the Government of Burma Act.

Finally, the former Burmese Supreme Court also rightly held that:[110]

[The trial [that was] concluded on 30th December 1947 and the operation of the [1947 Burmese] Constitution was from 4th January 1948: a completed trial cannot be invalidated ex post facto on the alleged ground that the setting up of such a Tribunal amounted to any discrimination and therefore prohibited by the Constitution.

Hence in the case of U Saw, the Supreme Court refused "leave to the applicants... to appeal by special leave [to the Supreme Court] under section 6 of the Union Judiciary Act". [111]

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