1999 BLR 135 ( 140 )[ ဒေါ်ပန်းတင် နှင့် ဦးအောင်တင် ]အမှုသုံးသပ်ချက်နှင့်နိဂုံးချုပ်ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ညီညွတ်မှုရှိ၊မရှိကိစ္စ။[ ခ ]

ဆရာကြီးဦးမြသင်ကြားပို့ချချက်များ

1999 BLR 135 ( 140 )

[ ဒေါ်ပန်းတင် နှင့် ဦးအောင်တင် ]အမှု

သုံးသပ်ချက်နှင့်နိဂုံးချုပ်ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ညီညွတ်မှုရှိ၊မရှိကိစ္စ။[ ခ ]

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အမိန့်၄၃၊နည်း၁တွင်ပုဒ်မ၁၀၄အရအယူခံဝင်ခွင့်ရှိသောအမိန့်များကိုဖော်ပြထားသည်။

အမိန့်တရပ်သည်ပုဒ်မ၂(၂)တွင်အကျုံးဝင်သောဒီကရီမဟုတ်လျှင်ဖြစ်စေ၊ပုဒ်မ၁၀၄(၁)တွင်ဖော်ပြထားသောအမိန့်တရပ်မဟုတ်လျှင်ဖြစ်စေ၊အမိန့်၄၃၊နည်း၁တွင်အကျုံးမဝင်လျှင်ဖြစ်စေအယူခံဝင်ခွင့်မရှိ။

ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များကိုဒီကရီနှင့်အယူခံဝင်ခွင့်ရှိသောအမိန့်များအဖြစ်ခွဲခြားသတ်မှတ်ထားရခြင်းမှာအယူခံဝင်ခွင့်ကိုကန့်သတ်လို၍ဖြစ်သည်။

အယူခံဝင်ခွင့်ရှိသောအမိန့်ကိုမူတကြိမ်သာအယူခံဝင်ခွင့်ရှိသည်။

အယူခံဆိုသည်မှာမူလအမှုဒီကရီဖြစ်လျှင်ပုဒ်မ၉၆အရပထမအယူခံဝင်ရောက်ခွင့်ရှိသည်။

တရားလွှတ်တော်ကတရားမမူလမှုစီရင်ပိုင်ခွင့်အာဏာကိုကျင့်သုံးချမှတ်ခဲ့သည့်ဒီကရီတရပ်ရပ်သို့မဟုတ်အပြီးသတ်အမိန့်ကိုပြည်ထောင်စုတရားလွှတ်တော်ချုပ်သို့ပုဒ်မ၁၀၉(ခ)အရအယူခံဝင်ရောက်ခွင့်ရှိသည်။

သို့သော်အမိန့်များနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ပုဒ်မ၁၀၄( ၁ )နှင့်အမိန့်၄၃၊နည်း၁တွင်အကျုံးဝင်လျှင်တရားမအထွေထွေအယူခံဝင်ရောက်ခွင့်ရှိသော်လည်း၊အဆိုပါအထွေထွေအယူခံမှုများသည်တကြိမ်သာအယူခံဝင်ရောက်ခွင့်ရှိသည်။

နောက်ထပ်တက်လျှင် ပြင်ဆင်မှုသာဝင်ရောက်ခွင့်ရှိသည်။

အဓိကပြဿနာမှာဇာရီမှုတွင်ချမှတ်သောအမိန့်များကိုမကျေနပ်၍အထွေထွေအယူခံဝင်ရောက်ပြီးလျှင်ဘာဆက်တက်ရမည်ဆိုသည်ကိုသာမာန်အသိမျှနှင့်မသိနိုင်၊မခွဲခြားနိုင်ပါ။

ပညာသားပါပါသိရသောအသိမျိုးဖြစ်သည်။ 

ဥပမာ-အမိန့်သည်ပုဒ်မ၄၇၊ပုဒ်မ၂( ၂ )တွင်အကျုံးဝင်လျှင်ဒုတိယအယူခံဝင်ခွင့်ရှိသည်။

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A. I. R. 1924 Rangoon 124.

LENTAIGNE, J.

Ma Pwa-Appellant

                V.

Md. Tambi and another-Respondents.

Second Appeal No. 192 of 1921, decided on 22nd January, 1923.

Equivalent Citation = [1923] AIlINRprRang 13; (1924) AIR Rang 124; 77 IC 368; 1 Rang 618 (22 January 1923)

MAPWA v. MAHOMED TAMBI and one  

( Rangoon Series ) Vol . 1 , Page 533 ( 544 )

အမှု၌ဇာရီမှုတွင်ပစ္စည်းရောင်းချရာ၌ချွတ်ယွင်းချက်သို့မဟုတ်လိုအပ်သည့်ဝရမ်းကပ်မှုမရှိခြင်းနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်းသည့်ကန့်ကွက်ချက်တွင်ဝရမ်းကပ်သောပစ္စည်းနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍တရားရှုံးထံဆိုင်ရာနို့တစ်ထုတ်ဆင့်မှုမပြုခြင်းနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်းသည့်အရေးယူလောက်သောပြဿနာပေါ်ပေါက်ပါဝင်နေသဖြင့်အမိန့်၂၁၊နည်း၉၀တွင်အကျုံးမဝင်ဘဲတရားမကျင့်ထုံးဥပဒေ ပုဒ်မ၄၇ တွင်အကျုံးဝင်သည်။သို့ဖြစ်ရာထိုအမှုတွင်နစ်နာသူသည်ဒုတိယအယူခံဝင်နိုင်သည်ဟုအောက်ပါအတိုင်းဆုံးဖြတ်

ထားသည်-

[ Practice - Second appeal - Application under section 47, Civil Procedure Code ( V of 1908 ) - Application under Order 21 , rules 90, 92 - Suit to set aside sale wuthout attachment - Limitation Act ( IX of 1908 ), article 166 - Sale without attachment, an irregularity. 

Held, that an objection as to the defect or absence of the necessary attachment of the prooerty sold in execution, involves a substantial questiin as to the absence of proper notice to the judgment-debtor as to the property attached, and does not come within Order 21, Rule 90 but comes within the provisions of section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Held also, that, consequently, in such a case the party aggrived has a right of second appeal. ]

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VOL. Il INDIAN LAW REPORTS. RANGOON SERIES. 168 ( 180 )

APPELLATE CIVIL

Before Mr. Justice LENTAIGNE and Mr. Justice CARR.

V. T. ARUNACHELLAM CHETTY.

                         V.

MAUNG SAN NGWE.*

Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 272 of 1922 against the order of the District Court  of Prome in Civil Execution Case No. 10 of 1922.

1924 Feb. 25

Equivalent Citation = [1924] AllINRprRang 24; (1924) AIR Rang 323; 83 IC 550; 2 Rang 168 (25 February 1924)

Civil Misc. Appeal No. 272 of 1922, decided on 25th February 1924, against the order of the District Court of Prome in Civil Execution Case No. 10 of 1922.

အမှု၌ဝရမ်းကပ်သောပစ္စည်းမှာကန့်ကွက်သူပိုင်ဖြစ်သလား၊သို့မဟုတ်တရားရှုံးပိုင်ဖြစ်သလားဟူသောပြဿနာသည်တရားမကျင့်ထုံးဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၄၇၏အဓိပ္ပာယ်အရတရားမကြီးမှုမှအမှုသည်များအကြားပေါ်ပေါက်သောပြဿနာဖြစ်၍ဒုတိယအယူခံဝင်နိုင်သည်ဟုစီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ-၁၇၁နှင့်၁၇၂တွင်အောက်ပါအတိုင်းဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

[ The question arising between him and the decree-holder is, therefore,not one for decision under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The decision of the Subdivisional Court was an”order”and not a”decree”, and a second appeal from an order does not lie. ]

[ Moreover if the question is one under Order 21 there is no right even of first appeal.

The Divisiobal Judge must therefore have regarded the matter as one coming within section 47.

In these circumstances I think we must hold that all these appeals lie.

But if we find that the question does not fall under section 47 we must set aside all the decisions as without jurisdiction and refer Maung San Ngwe to his proper remedy. ]

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1981 BLR 45 ( 49 )

တရားမပြင်ဆင်မှု

ဥက္ကဌအဖြစ်ဦးစိုးလှိုင်၊အဖွဲ့ဝင်များအဖြစ်ဦးတင်အောင်နှင့်ဦးမန်းစံမြတ်ရွှေတို့ပါဝင်သောဗဟိုတရားစီရင်ရေးအဖွဲ့ရှေ့တွင်

ဦးဆင် နှင့် ဒေါ်ရင်ရွှေ

၁၉၈၁ ဇွန်လ ၁၀ ရက်

အမှုတွင်ဗဟိုတရားရုံးကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်ဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

[ မန္တလေးတိုင်း၊မန္တလေးအရှေ့တောင်မြို့နယ်တရားရုံး၊တရားမှာရီမှုအမှတ်၁၇/၇၇တွင်လျှောက်ထားခံရသူဒေါ်ရင်ရွှေကလျှောက်ထားသူဦးဆင်နှင့်အခြားသူများအပေါ်ယင်းတရားရုံးတရားမကြီးမှုအမှတ်၁၅/၇၄တွင်ချမှတ်ထားသောအပြီးသတ်ဒီကရီကိုအတည်ပြုရာတရားရှုံးတဦးဖြစ်သောဦးဆင်ကဒီကရီအတည်ပြုခြင်းကိုကန့်ကွက်တင်ပြသည်။

မြို့နယ်တရားရုံးကယင်းကန့်ကွက်ချက်ကိုပလပ်လိုက်သဖြင့်ဦးဆင်ကမန္တလေးတိုင်းတရားရုံးတွင်ပြင်ဆင်မှုလျှောက်ထားသည်။

တိုင်းတရားရုံးကယင်းပြင်ဆင်မှုလျှောက်လွှာကိုပလပ်လိုက်ပြန်သဖြင့်ဦးဆင်ကဗဟိုတရားရုံးတွင်ဤပြင်ဆင်မှုကိုလျှောက်ထားခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ]

စီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ၄၉၌၊ဗဟိုတရားရုံးကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

[ မူလရုံးကချမှတ်သောအမိန့်သည်လည်းကောင်း၊တိုင်းတရားရုံးကချမှတ်သောအမိန့်သည်လည်းကောင်းအပြီးသတ်ဒီကရီကိုအတည်ပြုရာတွင်ပေါ်ပေါက်လာသောပြဿနာနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ချမှတ်သောအမိန့်ဖြစ်သဖြင့်ယင်းအမိန့်များမှာတရားမကျင့်ထုံးဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၂( ၂ )/၄၇အရအယူခံဝင်ခွင့်ရှိသောဒီကရီဖြစ်​သောကြောင့်လျှောက်ထားသူသည်ယင်းဒီကရီတို့ကိုအဆင့်ဆင့်အယူခံမဝင်ဘဲပြင်ဆင်မှုလျှောက်ထားခွင့်မရှိပေ။ 

ထို့ကြောင့်ဤပြင်ဆင်မှုကိုစရိတ်မရှိပယ်လိုက်သည်။ ]

——————————————

2005 BLR 83 ( 87 )

တရားမပြင်ဆင်မှု

တရားရုံးချုပ်တရားသူကြီးဦးခင်မြင့်ရှေ့တွင်

ဦးမြတ်ထွန်း(၎င်း၏ကိုယ်စားလှယ်ဦးရွှေကြည်)

                        နှင့်

ဒေါ်တင်အုန်း(၎င်း၏ကိုယ်စားလှယ်ဦးမင်းအေး)

၂၀၀၅  ဇူလိုင်လ ၁၈ ရက်

အမှု၌တရားရုံးချုပ်ကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်သည်-

[ ရန်ကုန်တိုင်းတရားရုံး၂၀၀၃ခုနှစ်၊တရားမဇာရီမှုအမှတ်၁၇၁တွင်ဒေါ်တင်အုန်း(၎င်း၏ကိုယ်စားလှယ်ဦးမင်းအေး)ကတရားရှုံးဦးမြတ်ထွန်း(၎င်း၏ကိုယ်စားလှယ်ဦးရွှေကြည်)အပေါ်ရန်ကုန်တိုင်းတရားရုံး၂၀၀၁ခုနှစ်၊တရားမကြီးမှုအမှတ်၄၂၀တွင်ရရှိထားသည့်အနိုင်ဒီကရီကိုအတည်ပြုပေးရန်လျှောက်ထားသည်။

ဇာရီမှုတွင်တရားရှုံးပိုင်မြေကွက်ကြီးမှဖယ်ထုတ်ရမည့်မြေအစိတ်အပိုင်း၏တည်နေရာကိုသတ်မှတ်ပေးပါရန်တရားနိုင်၏လျှောက်ထားချက်အရမူလတိုင်းတရားရုံးက(၂၇-၁၂-၂၀၀၄)နေ့စွဲပါအမိန့်ဖြင့်တည်နေရာသတ်မှတ်ပေးခဲ့သည်။

အဆိုပါအမိန့်ကိုတရားရှုံးဦးမြတ်ထွန်းကကျေနပ်မှုမရှိသဖြင့်တရားရုံးချုပ်တွင်ဤတရားမပြင်ဆင်မှုကိုတင်သွင်းသည်။ ]

စီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ၈၇၌၊တရားရုံးချုပ်ကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်ဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

[ ဤစီရင်ချက်ကိုအဆုံးမသတ်မီဖော်ပြလိုသည့်အချက်မှာဇာရီမှုတွင်ချမှတ်သည့်(၂၇-၁၂-၂၀၀၄)နေ့စွဲပါအမိန့်ကိုတရားရုံးချုပ်တွင်ပြင်ဆင်မှုဝင်ရောက်ခွင့်ရှိမရှိဖြစ်သည်။

ဇာရီမှုတွင်တရားနိုင်နှင့်တရားရှုံးတို့အငြင်းပွါးသည်မှာတရားနိုင်ရရှိထားသည့်ဒီကရီကိုအတည်ပြုရာ၌မည်သည့်မြေအတိုင်းအတာကိုအရောင်းအဝယ်မှတ်ပုံတင်စာချုပ်ချုပ်ဆို၍တရားနိုင်သို့လက်ရောက်ပေးအပ်ရမည်ဆိုသည့်အချက်ဖြစ်သည်။

ဤအချက်သည်ဒီကရီအတည်ပြုခြင်းနှင့်သက်ဆိုင်သောတရားန်ုင်နှင့်တရားရှုံးတို့အကြားအငြင်းပွါးမှုဖြစ်၍တရားမကျင့်ထုံးဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၄၇အတွင်းကျရောက်သောပြဿနာအပေါ်ချမှတ်သည့်အမိန့်သည်ဒီကရီဖြစ်သည်။

တရားမကျင့်ထုံးဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၉၆အရဒီကရီကိုအယူခံဝင်ရောက်ရမည်သာဖြစ်သည်။

သို့ဖြစ်၍လျှောက်ထားသူသည်မူလတိုင်းတရားရုံးကဇာရီမှုတွင်ချမှတ်သည့်(၂၇-၁၂-၂၀၀၄)နေ့စွဲပါအမိန့်ကိုဤတရားရုံးချုပ်တွင်ပြင်ဆင်မှုဝင်ရောက်ခြင်းမှာမှန်ကန်ခြင်းမရှိချေ။

အထက်ပါအကြောင်းအချက်များအရမူလတိုင်းတရားရုံး၏အမိန့်ကိုဝင်ရောက်စွက်ဖက်ရန်အကြောင်းမရှိချေ။

ထို့ကြောင့်မူလတိုင်းတရားရုံး၏အမိန့်ကိုအတည်ပြု၍ဤပြင်ဆင်မှုကိုစရိတ်နှင့်တကွပလပ်လိုက်သည်။ ]

————————————————-

1966 BLR 1279 ( 1282 )

နိုင်ငံတော်တရားရုံးချုပ်

တရားမအထွေထွေအယူခံမှု

တရားသူကြီးဦးသက်ဖေရှေ့တွင်

ဦးစောမြပါ၆( အယူခံတရားလိုများ )

                       နှင့်

နိုင်ငံတော်ကူးသန်းရောင်းဝယ်ရေးဘဏ်၊ပြည်မြို့( အယူခံတရားခံ )

၁၉၆၆ စက်တင်္ဘာလ ၂၈ ရက်

အမှု၌တရားသူကြီးဦးသက်ဖေကစီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ၁၂၈၀နှင့်၁၂၈၁တွင်အောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်သည်-

[ တရားသူကြီးဦးသက်ဖေ။   ။ပြည်မြို့ခရိုင်တရားမရုံးတွင်၊အယူခံတရားလိုအပေါ်၊အယူခံတရားခံပြည်မြို့နိုင်ငံတော်ကူးသန်းရောင်းဝယ်ရေးဘဏ်ခွဲက၊ချေးငွေ၁၁၀၁၃၈.၆၅ပြားအတွက်အပေါင်ဒီကရီရရှိခဲ့၏။ထိုဒီကရီကိုဇာရီပြုလုပ်ရာ၊အယူခံတရားခံကအပေါင်ပစ္စည်းဆန်စက်အပြင်၊အပေါင်ပစ္စည်းမဟုတ်သည့်တိုက်အိမ်နှင့်မြေတို့ကိုပါဝရမ်းဘမ်းခဲ့၏။

အယူခံတရားလိုတို့က၊အပေါင်ပစ္စည်းဖြစ်သည့်ဆန်စက်မှဆန်ကြိတ်ခများအနက်၃၁ရာခိုင်နှုန်းကိုအယူခံတရားခံကနုတ်ယူခဲ့ရာ၊စုစုပေါင်းငွေ၁၀၆၀၄.၇၅ပြားပေးသွင်းထားပြီးဖြစ်၍၊ထိုငွေကိုမူလဒီကရီမှခုနှိမ်မည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း၊မူလဒီကရီကိုပြေလည်သည်အထိစက်ကြိတ်ခများနှင့်ခုနှိမ်ရန်နှစ်ဦးနှစ်ဖက်ပဋိညာဉ်ရှိသောကြောင့်ဇာရီမပြုလုပ်ထိုက်ကြောင်း၊အပေါင်ပစ္စည်းကိုလေလံတင်ရောင်းချခြင်းမပြုသင့်ကြောင်းထုချေကြသည်။

ထိုထုချေချက်နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍၊ပညာရှိခရိုင်တရားမတရားသူကြီးသည်၊စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးပြီးနောက်၊ဆန်ကြိတ်ခများအနက်၃၁ရာခိုင်နှုန်းကို၊အယူခံတရားခံဘက်မှနုတ်ယူထားပြီးထိုငွေများကိုအယူခံတရားလိုတို့၏နာမည်ဖြင့်သီးခြားငွေစာရင်းဖွင့်လှစ်ထားခြင်းသာဖြစ်ကြောင်း၊ထိုငွေများကိုဒီကရီကျငွေမှခုနှိမ်ရန်သဘောတူချက်မရှိ၍၊မူလအပေါင်ဒီကရီသည်ပြောင်းလွဲခြင်းမရှိကြောင်း၊ထို့ကြောင့်ဇာရီမှုကိုဆက်လက်ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်းအမိန့်ချမှတ်လိုက်လေသည်။

ယင်းသို့ဇာရီမှုကိုဆက်လက်ဆောင်ရွက်ရမည်ဟုချမှတ်လိုက်သောအောက်ရုံး၏အမိန့်ကိုမကျေနပ်သဖြင့်၊ဤအယူခံမှုတင်သွင်းလာခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။အယူခံတရားခံဘက်၏ပညာရှိရှေ့နေကြီးဦးဗဂျမ်းကအောက်ရုံးအမိန့်မှာအယူခံဝင်နိုင်သောအမိန့်ဟုတ်မဟုတ်၊အကယ်၍အယူခံဝင်နိုင်သောအမိန့်ဖြစ်ပါက၊အယူခံလွှာတွင်ကပ်သည့်ရုံးခွန်တော်မှာလုံလောက်ခြင်းရှိမရှိဆိုသောပြဿနာများကိုပဏာမအနေဖြင့်တင်ပြလာ၏။

တရားနိုင်တဦးကမိမိရရှိခဲ့သောဒီကရီကိုအကျိုးသက်ရောက်အောင်ဇာရီမှုဖွင့်လှစ်ရာ၌၊တရားရုံးကဒီကရီကိုဇာရီမှုမပြုလုပ်နိုင်ကြောင်းကန့်ကွက်လာသောကိစ္စတွင်ဇာရီရုံးအနေဖြင့်ဇာရီမှုပြုလုပ်နိုင်သည့်၊သို့တည်းမဟုတ်ဇာရီမှုမပြုလုပ်နိုင်ဟုတနည်းနည်းအဆုံးအဖြတ်ပြုသည့်ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်မှာတရားမကျင့်ထုံးပုဒ်မ၄၇အရအမိန့်ဖြစ်သည်။ထိုကဲ့သို့သောအမိန့်မှာတရားနိုင်၊တရားရှုံးတို့၏အခွင့်အရေးနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍အပြီးအပိုင်ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ဖြစ်၍တရားမကျင့်ထုံးပုဒ်မ၂(၂)အရ၊ဒီကရီဖြစ်သည်ဟုကောက်ယူရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ဒီကရီဖြစ်လျှင်ပုဒ်မ၉၆အရအယူခံဝင်နိုင်သည်ဆိုခြင်းမှာ၊ယုံမှားဘွယ်မရှိနိုင်ပေ။မလှရီ နှင့် မသန်းစိန်၊၁၉၅၃၊မြန်မာပြည်စီရင်ထုံး ၅၅(တရားလွှတ်တော်ချုပ်)။ချင်းနီးယား နှင့် အေ၊စီ၊ဒေး၊၁၉၅၄၊မြန်မာပြည်စီရင်ထုံး ၉(တရားလွှတ်တော်)။

ယခုအမှုတွင်အယူခံတရားခံဘက်ကအပေါင်ဒီကရီကိုဇာရီပြုလုပ်ရန်၊လျှောက်ထားရာအယူခံတရားလိုတို့ကဇာရီမပြုလုပ်သင့်ကြောင်းကန့်ကွက်လာကြသည်။ဇာရီရုံးကအယူခံတရားလိုတို့၏ကန့်ကွက်ချက်ကိုပလပ်လိုက်ပြီးဇာရီပြုလုပ်နိုင်ကြောင်းဆုံးဖြတ်ခဲ့သဖြင့်၊ဇာရီရုံး၏အမိန့်သည်၊အယူခံဝင်နိုင်သည့်အမိန့်ဖြစ်ကြောင်းပေါ်လွင်သည်။

ယင်းသို့အယူခံဝင်နိုင်သောအမိန့်ဖြစ်လျှင်၊အယူခံလွှာအပေါ်၌ရုံးခွန်တော်မည်မျှကပ်ရမည်ဟုတဖန်ဆန်းစစ်ရပေမည်။တရားမကျင့်ထုံးပုဒ်မ၄၇အရ၊ချမှတ်သောအမိန့်မှာ၊ဒီကရီသဘောသက်ရောက်သောအမိန့်တခုဖြစ်၍သာမန်အားဖြင့်ဆိုလျှင်ရုံးခွန်တော်ဥပဒေဒုတိယနောက်ဆက်တွဲအပိုဒ်၁၁နှင့်အကျုံးဝင်ခြင်းမရှိပေ။သို့ရာတွင်နိုင်ငံတော်အစိုးရမြေနှင့်အခွန်တော်ဌာန၏၁၉၃၉ခု၊စက်တင်္ဘာလ၂၉ရက်နေ့စွဲပါအမိန့်ကြော်ငြာစာအမှတ်၁၀အရ၊တရားမကျင့်ထုံးပုဒ်မ၄၇အရချမှတ်သောအမိန့်ကိုအယူခံဝင်သောအခါ၊အယူခံလွှာတွင်ကပ်ရမည့်ရုံးခွန်တော်မှာ၊ရုံးခွန်တော်ဥပဒေဒုတိယနောက်ဆက်တွဲ၏အပိုဒ်၁၁၌ပြဌာန်းထားသည့်အတိုင်းသာဖြစ်စေရမည်ဟုရုံးခွန်တော်ဥပဒေပုဒ်မ၃၅အရသက်သာခွင့်ပေးထားသဖြင့်၊ဤအယူခံလွှာ၌ရုံးခွန်တော်ငါးကျပ်ထမ်းဆောင်ထားခြင်းမှာလုံလောက်သည်ဟုဆိုရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။(ရုံးခွန်တော်လက်စွဲအခဏ်း၁၀အပိုင်း၃ကိုကြည့်ပါ)။

စီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ၁၂၈၂၌တရားသူကြီးဦးသက်ဖေကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

[ အထက်ပါအကြောင်းများကြောင့်၊ဤအယူခံကိုတရားစရိတ်နှင့်တကွပလပ်လိုက်သည်။ ]

————————————————-

1954 BLR ( H C ) 9 ( 11 )

APPELLATE CIVIL.

Before U Bo Gyi and U Thaung Sein, JJ.

P. CHINNIAH (APPELLANT)

                     v.

A. C. DEY (RESPONDENT). *

Civil Misc. Appeal No. 5 of 1953 against the order of the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Rangoon, in Civil Misc. No. 174 of 1952.

1953 Oct. 22.

အမှု၌ဒီကရီအတည်မပြုသင့်ကြောင်းကန့်ကွက်ချက်အပေါ်ချမှတ်သောအမိန့်ကိုအယူခံဝင်နိုင်သည်ဟုတရားဝန်ကြီးဦးဘိုကြီးကအောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်ဆုံးဖြတ်သည်-

[ Held: An order on an  application objecting to the execution of a decree comes within s. 47 read with s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and an appeal is competent. 

Frank Monterio v. Mrs. M. Astridge, A.I.R. (1943) Sind 247, followed. ]

[ U Bo Gyi, J.This appeal is against the order dated the 18th December 1952 of the Chief Judge of the Rangoon City Civil Court, dismissing the appellant P. Chinniah's application for rectification of the decree made by the learned Judge on the 2nd June 1952 in the following circumstances. 

The respondent A. C. Dey (a) U Ne Aung had brought a suit against the appellant for recovery of a sum of Rs. 952 due for money lent and advanced. 

On the 18th April 1952 the parties filed a joint compromise-petition and on the same day the Court passed a decree in terms of the compromise. 

On the 3rd May 1952 the respondent filed an application praying that since the appellant had failed to pay any instalment in terms of the decree, a decree for the full amount of the claim might be passed as stipulated. 

The Court accordingly passed a decree for the full amount of the claim, viz., Rs. 952, and also decreed payment of the costs of the suit Rs. 157-14-0 although there was no provision for the payment of such costs in the compromise-petition or the decree passed in pursuance of it.

The order under review was passed on an application filed by the appellant objecting to the execution of the decree against him and asking for its rectification, and consequently comes within section 47 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the present appeal is therefore competent.

Frank Monterio v. Mrs. M. Astridge (1). A.I.R. (1943) Sind 247. ]

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1953 BLR ( S C ) 55 ( 72 )

SUPREME COURT.

MA HLA YI (APPELLANT)

                  V.

MA THAN SEIN AND TWO (RESPONDENTS).*

Present: U THEIN MAUNG, Chief Justice of the Union of Burma, MR. JUSTICE MYINT THEIN and U AUNG KHINE, J.

1953 June. 30.

အမှု၌တရားဝန်ကြီးဦးမြင့်သိန်းကစီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ-၆၃၊၆၄၊၆၅တွင်အောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်သည်-

[ Being aggrieved with this order the judgment-debtor sought application for leave to appeal under section 5 of the Union Judiciary Act and with abundance of caution sought direct in this Court, similar leave under section 6. 

The learned Judges of the High Court in the course of an exhaustive judgment in refusing leave, held that the order that they had passed was not a "final order inasmuch as the had given a decision which even though on a cardinal issue, still left the execution case alive.

At the stage when leave to appeal was being sought before us U Kyaw Din för the decree-holders contended that the order was not "final" and therefore not appealable. 

Mr. Basu for the judgment-debtor did not meet this argument but stressed that the order in question was one made under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and a "decree" within the definition in section 2 (2). 

U Kyaw Din in his turn did not seriously contest this view and accepting it as we did then, special leave to appeal was granted.

U Kyaw Din in the final stages of his submission in the main appeal reagitated the matter. 

We pointed out to him that the stage to take objections had pässed and that we had, at the relevant stage, decided that an appeal lay. 

However, we shall give our reasons.

There are a host of authorities as to what a final order is and the matter has received attention from time to time in Burma and to choose a few, they are U Nyo v. Ma Pwa Thin (1) 10 Ran. 335., Abdul Rahman v. D. K. Cassim (2), 11 Ran.58.,Maung Sin v. Ma Byaung (3), (1938) Ran. 331. and Tan Cheng Leong and one v. U Po Thein (4). Civil Misc. Appeal No. 14 of 1953 (S.C.).

We agree with the principle laid down in these cases that a decision on a cardinal point in issue by itself does not make the order a "final order" but the test is whether the rights of the parties in the suit are finally disposed of by the decision. 

The authorities set out above relate to pending suits and the orders involved were orders remanding the suits for trial on their merits.

The matter before us involves an order passed under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code in execution proceedings.

The section provides that all questions arising between parties to a suit in which a decree was passed and relating to the execution,. discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by the Court executing the decree. 

There is also section 2 (2) which includes " the determination of any question within section 47",, in the definition of a " decree ".

Taking the two sections together it does seem that the underlying intention is that all disputes arising out of execution proceedings should be decided by the executing Court, and that such decisions be made appealable as a decree, the obvióus: reason being that there should be speed and no: unnecessary delay in the disposal of execution proceedings. 

We desire to make it clear, however, that we do not subscribe to the view that every order passed in execution proceedings is a "decree ". 

There may be interlocutory or incidental orders, such as those that relate to minor matters of procedure, which cannot by their very nature, be construed as "decrees".

We agree with the observations made in Bakat Ram v. Sardar Bhagwan Singh (1) A.I.R. (1943) Lah. 140 (F. B.) that it is only when an order conclusively determines the rights of the parties in a matter material to the due execution of a decree, section 47 and section 2 (2) could be invoked so that an appeal would lie. 

The facts in Bakat Ram's case were, a subordinate Court had confirmed a sale in execution of a decree.

The matter was taken up on appeal and a single Judge set aside the sale on the ground that the sale proclamation was defective and directed the issue of a fresh and accurate proclamation of sale and to take further proceedings.

A Divisional Bench upheld the single Judge's order and on application being made for leave to appeal to the Privy Council, leave was refused and the majority view was expressed that there was no determination of the rights of the parties as the execution case was still pending and alive. ]

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LAHORE HIGH COURT

Barkat Ram, General Manager

                    Vs

Sardar Bhagwan Singh

(Tek Chand, J.)

25.01.1943

JUDGMENT

Tek Chand, J.

Equivalent Citation = A.I.R. (1943) Lah. 140 (F. B.)

အမှု၌လာဟိုးတရားလွှတ်တော်တရားသူကြီး Tek Chand, J.၏အောက်ပါသုံးသပ်ချက်များမှာမှတ်သားဖွယ်ရာဖြစ်သဖြင့်စာဖတ်သူဥပဒေပညာရှင်များအလေးအနက်ထားဖတ်ရှုစေလိုသည်-

[4. From this order of the Division Bench the judgment-debtor proposes to appeal to His Majesty-in-Council and has applied for leave under Sections 109 and no, Civil Procedure Code The value of the subject-matter in dispute in the Court of first instance as well as in the proposed appeal is over L 10,000 and the order of the Division Bench is one of reversal of that of the Single Bench.

The requirements of Section no, Civil Procedure Code, therefore, are satisfied. 

The question, however, is whether the order of the Division Bench is a 'decree' or 'final order' within the meaning of Section 109 (a). 

For the petitioner it is contended that though the judgment has not finally determined the execution application and the case has been remitted to the executing Court for further proceedings, it is really a composite judgment consisting of (i) an order that the proceedings in the Delhi Court were not without jurisdiction; (ii) an order that execution was within time; and (i11) an order setting aside the sale held on 21st October 1935 and directing a fresh sale to be held. It is maintained that the order in i) and that in (ii) is each tantamount to a 'decree' and that so much of the judgment as deals with these matters is appealable to His Majesty-in-Council. 

After hearing lengthy arguments I am unable to accept this contention. 

In the first place, I do not think that the judgment of the Bench can be split up in the manner suggested, and the findings on some of the points treated as 'decrees' and those on the others as mere orders. 

Secondly, the execution application has not been finally determined; only the former sale has been set aside at the instance of the petitioner himself and a re-sale ordered.

The Court, no doubt disallowed objections by the petitioner as to want of jurisdiction and limitation, but this was really done because both objections had been raised at a very late stage.

These findings, even if they can be treated as separate entities, distinct from the rest of the judgment, cannot, in my opinion, be treated as 'decrees'. 

It is conceded that in a suit an interlocutory order overruling pleas of want of jurisdiction and limitation would not be a 'decree'.

But it is urged that the position is different in execution proceedings, and reliance is placed on Section 2(2) and Section 47 of the Code. 

Section 2(2) reads as follows:

2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,(2) 'Decree' means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within Section 47 (of the Code).

5. The material part of Section 47 is all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit.

6. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the combined effect of these two provisions is to make every order passed in execution 'a decree' and, therefore, appealable. 

It is pointed it that while in the first part of Section 2(2), which refers to an adjudication in a suit, it is laid down that the adjudication must, "so far as the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit," there e is no such qualification in the second part which merely says that the determination of any question within Section 47 shall be "deemed" to be "a decree"; and all that Section 47 requires is that the question must have arisen between the parties to the suit or their representatives and must relate to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. 

According to this view, every interlocutory or incidental order, judicially passed in execution proceedings, even though it relates to a minor matter of procedure, is 'a decree'. 

No authority for this extreme proposition is cited, and, so far as I am aware, no Court in India j has accepted it. 

It is, no doubt, true that in the second part of Subsection (2) of Section 2 the words "the rights of the parties with regard to all or some of the matters in controversy" which occur in the first part of the Sub-section of Section 2 are not repeated. 

But the two sentences are closely associated with each other. 

The first sentence defines a "decree" strictly so-called, and has reference to an adjudication in a suit: The second states (inter alia) that certain orders passed in execution proceedings shall be deemed to be decrees. 

The two sentences are closely associated with each other and it is reasonably clear that the expression "determination of any question" in the second sentence is used ejusdem generis with the phrase "conclusively determines" etc., in the first. 

This well-settled rule of interpretation applies as much to associated words in one sentence as to terms or phrases appearing in parts of the same section or in different sections in the same chapter. 

The omission of these words in the second sentence does not lend support to the contention of the appellants. 

A large number of rulings dealing with the meaning of Section 2(2) were cited before us but it does not seem necessary to discuss them here. 

It will be sufficient to refer to two decisions of the Calcutta High Court which are regarded as the leading cases on the subject. 

In Deoki Nandan Singh v. Bansi Singh (2)(11) 10 I.C. 371 Mookerjee, J.(Teunon J. concurring) observed as follows:

The decision of the question whether the order in controversy is a decree within the meaning of Section 2 of the Code must depend upon its nature and contents. 

The learned vakil for the petitioner has contended that every judicial order made in the course of execution proceedings is an order under Section 47 of the Code and is consequently appealable as a decree. 

In view of the decision of this (Calcutta) Court in Beharilal Pandit v. Kedar Nath (3)(91) 18 Cal 469 this position cannot possibly be maintained. 

It was there pointed out that an interlocutory order in the course of execution proceedings which decides, for instance, a point of law arising interlocutory or otherwise is not a decree within the meaning of Section 2 of the Code of 1882. 

It is reasonably plain from the terms of Section 2 that an order to be a decree must conclusively determine the rights of the parties. 

If any other view were adopted, the result would be that an appeal would be preferred against every order in the course of the execution proceedings, in other words, proceedings in execution could be arrested at every stage by an appeal on behalf of the judgment-debtor. 

This can hardly have been contemplated by the framers of the Code.

7. In Jogodishury Debea v. Kailash Chandra (4)(98) 24 Cal. 725 decided by a Full Bench of five Judges of the Calcutta High Court, Banerjee, J. discussed the question at p. 739 and observed as follows:

It is not every order made in execution of a decree that comes within Section 244(Section 47 of the present Code). 

If that were so, every" interlocutory order in an execution proceeding, such as an order granting or refusing process for the examination of witnesses, would be appealable; and far greater latitude would be given of appealing against orders in such proceedings than is allowed as against orders made in suits before decree--a thing which could hardly have been intended.... An order in execution proceedings can come under Section 244 only when it determines some question relating to the rights and liabilities of parties with reference to the relief granted by the decree; not when, as in this ease, it determines merely an incidental question as to whether the proceedings are to be conducted in a certain way. 

I may add that the language of Section 244 which enacts that certain questions shall be determined 'by an order of the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit' clearly indicates that the questions contemplated by the section must be of a nature such that it is possible to suppose that but for the section they could have formed the subject of determination by a separate suit. 

But a question of an incidental character can never come under that description, and an order determining such a question cannot, therefore, be a decree as defined in Section 2.

8. The test laid down in the case just cited is, of course, not exhaustive. 

As pointed out by Dawson Miller C.J. in Shiva Narayan Lal v. Narayan Prasad ( 4 )A.I.R. 1924 Pat.683 there might be questions within the purview of Section 47 which could d hardly be the subject of a separate suit but which nevertheless might be proper questions for determination in the execution of a decree passed in a suit already decided. 

He added that when the effect of an order is to determine the rights of the parties with respect to a matter material to the due execution of the decree, the question would be under Section 47 and a decree from which an appeal would lie. 

Applying these tests, it cannot be said that so much of the judgment of this Court as held that the pleas of want of jurisdiction and limitation could not be allowed to be raised at that late stage, is tantamount to a 'decree.' 

An order rejecting an application to raise a new plea or to amend or alter the pleas already filed can, by no stretch of imagination be said to be a "determination of the rights of the parties," even if it be assumed that a finding on the plea itself, if properly raised and determined, might be "deemed" to be a decree. 

No authority has been cited in which it has been held that the refusal to entertain a new plea which had not been raised at the proper time (whether in a suit or in execution proceedings) can be regarded as "a determination of the rights of the parties."

9. Further, it seems to me that even if a point of jurisdiction like the one arising in this case, had been raised earlier and had been overruled in a separate order, the order would not have amounted to a "decree" and be appealable as such. 

It is conceded that the Senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi, had jurisdiction, both territorial and pecuniary, over the subject-matter, and proceedings in execution of the decree would normally have been taken in that Court, provided the transfer-certificate had been addressed to the District Judge, Delhi, and sent by him to the Senior Subordinate Judge. 

Admittedly, the only irregularity was that the certificate had not been transmitted through the proper channel but was sent direct. 

If the objection to the jurisdiction of the Senior Sub-Judge, founded on this irregularity, had been heard and overruled, it could not be said that there was a determination "of the rights of the parties."

10. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, strongly relied upon Lloyds Bank, Ltd. v. Mt. Rehmat Bibi (5 )A.I.R. 1939 Lah. 177 which seems to lend some support to his contention. In that case a mortgage decree had been passed in favour of a bank against A. Subsequent to the decree, A died and his widow B was brought on the record as his legal representative. 

Execution then proceeded against the estate of A in the hands of B and the decree-holder prayed that a receiver be appointed pending the sale of the properties. 

B objected that she was in possession of one of the properties in lieu of dower, for which she held a lien over it. 

The decree, holder replied that as B was on the record as the legal representative of the original judgment-debtor and not in his personal capacity, her claim as a lien-holder in her personal right was not a question between “parties to the suit" and could not be raised under Section 47. 

The Subordinate Judge heard arguments on the legal point first and held that the objection was maintainable and the execution Court had jurisdiction to hear it, and ordered enquiry on the merits as to whether the alleged lien existed on the property. 

From this interlocutory order the decree-holder appealed to the High Court and the judgment-debtor objected that no appeal lay. 

The learned Judges, however, held that the order was tantamount to a "decree" and was appealable. 

The learned Judges agreed with the rulings that an order passed in execution proceedings falls within the scope of Section 47 and is tantamount to a "decree," only if to decides a question relating to the, rights and liabilities of the parties with reference to the relief granted by the decree. 

If this is the test, it is difficult to see how can interlocutory order that an objection was maintainable and the execution Court had jurisdiction to hear it, without determining the objection on the merits, can be regarded as “deciding the rights and liabilities of the parties." 

With great respect, I venture to think that the decision goes too far and cannot be accepted as an authority.

11. Reference was also made to Mt. Durga Devi v. Hans Raj (6 )A.I.R. 1930 Lah. 187 but that case is clearly distinguishable. 

There, it was held that an order of the executing Court staying execution of the decree pending disposal of the appeal by the High Court was appealable as a decree under Section 2(2) read with Section 47. 

The stay order had (to use the words of LeRossignol, J.) the effect of "stopping execution dead." 

Under the order, the decree of the trial Court could not be executed till the decision of the appeal and after that decision it would be the decree of the High Court which would be executed and not that of the trial Court. 

For all practical purposes, therefore, the stay order conclusively determined the rights of the parties to execute the decree.

This case, therefore, in no way supports the appellants' contention.' 

The second question, whether an order holding that an execution application is within limitation, presents greater difficulty, and the rulings bearing on it are not uniform. 

In some cases it has been held that such an order determines substantial rights of the parties and is appealable as a decree (e.g., Shiva Narayan Lal v. Narayan Prasad (7 )A.I.R. 1924 Pat. 683 and Rama Rao v. Sreeramamurthi. ( 8 )A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 801)In others, the contrary view has been taken.

12. It is not necessary to express any final opinion on the matter as in the present case, the question does not really arise in this form. 

Here, as stated above, the order is really one of refusal to allow the plea of limitation to be raised, firstly, because it was a mixed question of fact and law to decide which the materials on the record were insufficient and secondly, that it had not been raised when the first application for execution was pending. 

For the foregoing reasons I would hold that the order of the Division Bench is not a "decree" within the meaning of Section 109(a).

13. The petitioner's learned Counsel made a faint-hearted attempt to argue, in the alternative, that if it is not a "decree" it is at least a "final order" and he referred us to Rahimbhoy Habibhoy v. C.A. Turner( 9 )(91) 15 Bom. 155 and Sayyed Muzhar Husein v. Mt. Bodha Bibi( 10 )(95) 17 All. 112

These cases, however, were decided under the old Code and in view of the more recent pronouncement of the Judicial Committee the test laid down therein can no longer be followed. 

In Ramchand Manjimal v. Goverdhandas Vishandas Ratanchand ( 11 )A.I.R. 1920 P.C. 86 and Abdul Rahman v. D.K. Cassim & Sons (12 )AIR 1933 PC 58: 1933 AWR (P.C.) 1 222 : 1933-37-LW 331 their Lordships pointed out that the Bombay and Allahabad cases cited above had been decided with reference to the Civil Procedure Code of 1882 in which the wording of the relevant sections differed materially from the Code of 1908. 

After referring to the present Code, their Lordships laid down the test that the mere fact that the order of remand was on a point which went to the root of the suit, namely, the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain it, was not sufficient to make it a 'final order' within the meaning of Section 109. 

The finality must be a finality in relation to the suit. 

If, after the order, the suit is still a live suit in which the rights of the parties have still to be determined, no appeal lies against it under Section 109 of the Code.

14. These remarks were, no doubt, made in a case in which the remand order had been passed on appeal from a decree dismissing a suit on a preliminary point, but the same test would apply to execution proceedings, and as in the present case the execution application is still pending and is a 'live' application, the order cannot be said to be a 'final order'. 

Reference in this connexion may also be made to Sultan Singh v. Murli Dhar ( 13 )A.I.R. 1924 Lah. 57 Rajrajeshwarashram v. Shri Sharda Peeth Math, Dwarka ( 14 )A.I.R. 1933 Bom 260 and Girwar Prasad Singh v. Rameshwar Lal Bhagat, ( 15 )AIR 1919 Pat 383: 52 Ind. Cas. 461

In the last mentioned case the Patna High Court held that an order of a High Court holding that a subordinate Court has jurisdiction to execute a decree and directing it to proceed with the execution is not a final order in respect of which leave may be obtained to appeal to His Majesty-in-Council.

15. The judgment of the Division Bench being neither a 'decree' nor a 'final order' the case does not fall under Section 109(a). 

The petitioner's counsel did not argue that the case was "otherwise a fit one" for appeal, to His Majesty-in-Council under Clause (e). 

Nor would it have been possible for us to grant a certificate to this effect, even if he had asked for it. 

For the foregoing reasons, I would dismiss the petition with costs.]

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အထက်ပါစီရင်ထုံးသည်

1953 BLR ( S C ) 55 ( 72 )

SUPREME COURT.

MA HLA YI (APPELLANT)

                  V.

MA THAN SEIN AND TWO (RESPONDENTS).*

Present: U THEIN MAUNG, Chief Justice of the Union of Burma, MR. JUSTICE MYINT THEIN and U AUNG KHINE, J.

1953 June. 30.

စီရင်ထုံးစာမျက်နှာ-၆၅၌၊တရားဝန်ကြီးဦးမြင့်သိန်းရည်ညွှန်းကိုးကားဆုံးဖြတ်ထားသောမူရင်းစီရင်ထုံးအပြည့်အစုံဖြစ်ပါသည်။

——————————————————-

A. I. R. 1935 Rangoon 500

MOSELY, J.

Ma E Nyein and others-Applicants.

                       V.

Ma Ma Gyi and others - Opposite Parties

Civil Revn. No. 9 of 1935, Decided on 8th May 1935, from order of Dist. Court, Sagaing, D/- 19th October 1934.

Equivalent Citation = [1935] AllINRprRang 110; (1935) AIR Rang 500 (8 May 1935)

အမှု၌ဒီကရီကိုအတည်ပြုရာတွင်အရေးပါသောအကြောင်းအရာနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍အမှုသည်များ၏အခွင့်အရေးကိုအပြီးအပြတ်အဆုံးအဖြတ်ပေးသောအမိန့်ကိုသာအယူခံဝင်ခွင့်ရှိသည်ဟုအောက်ပါအတိုင်းထုံးဖွဲ့သည်-

(a) Decree- Meaning of — Every order in execution is not decree-Only such orders as conclusively determine questions regarding execution parties are decrees.

It is not every order in execution which is a decree; it is only such orders as conclusively determind a question between the parties to the suit relating to the execution of the decree.[ P 501 C 1 ]

[ The learned Judge said that the order was one on a question arising between the parties to the suit and relating to the execution of of the decree and therefore was an order under S.47, Civil P. C. Since under S.2, sub-S.(2) of the Code, a decree was deemed to include the determination of any question within S.47, the order of the Sub-divisional Court was a decree. Since that decree, i. e. the original order allowing two months' time, was confirmed in appeal, it had merged in the decree of the appellate Court, and the trial Court had no power to alter the time. S. 148 of the Code, it was said, does not apply where time has been allowed by the decree and 37 Cal 548 (1) Parmanand Das v. Kripasindhu, (1910) 37 Cal 548=6 I C 275.was cited in this connexion.

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A. I. R. 1931 Rangoon 314

BAGULEY, J.

Maung Ba and another -Appellants.

                        V.

Maung Tha Yin and others-Respondents.

Special Civil Second Appeal No. 117 of 1931, Decided on 23rd June 1931, against decree of District Judge, Magwe.

Equivalent Citation = [1931] AllINRprRang 71; (1931) AIR Rang 314; 135 IC 328 (23 June 1931)

အမှု၌သေသူ၏တရားဝင်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖြစ်ဖြင့်တရားစွဲခံရသောတရားပြိုင်သည်၎င်းနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍စွဲဆိုသောအမှုကိုပလပ်ခဲ့စေကာမူပုဒ်မ၄၇တွင်အကျုံးဝင်သောအမှုသည်ဖြစ်သည်။ယင်းအမှုတွင်(အခြားတရားပြိုင်များအပေါ်)ချမှတ်သည့်ဒီကရီအရဝရမ်းကပ်သည့်ပစ္စည်းမှာအပေါင်ခံသူအနေဖြင့်လက်ရှိထားခြင်းဖြစ်ကြောင်း၊ထိုသူ၏ကန့်ကွက်ချက်သည်ပုဒ်မ၄၇အရလျှောက်ထားချက်ဖြစ်သည်ဟုမှတ်ယူရမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်းအောက်ပါအတိုင်းထုံးဖွဲ့သည်-

[ Civil P.C.(1908), S.47- Defendant sued as legal representative- Suit dismissed against him-Objection by him claiming to be mortgagee in possession for removal of attachment in execution of decree passed in suit is to be treated as under S. 47-Fact thai it is misdescribed as under O. 21, R. 58 is immaterial-Civil P. C. (1908), O. 21, R. 58.

The defendant sued as a legal representative, and against whom the suit has been dismissed as legal representative, and against whom the suit has been dismissed is a party to the suit within S.47 and therefore objection filed by him claiming to be a mortgagee in possession for removal of attachement in execution of a decree passed in the suit is to be treated as petition under S. 47.

The objection being in substance under S.47 the fact that it is misdescribed as one under O. 21, R. 58 is immaterial and it must be treated as one under S. 47.

Where such objection is allowed,order professedly passed under O. 21, R. 58 but really under S. 47 operates as a decree and therefore cannot be attacked in a separate suit : A. I. R. 1929 Pat. 141; A.I. R.1928 Rang. 29; A. I.R. 1927 Rang. 273 and A.I. R. 1924 Rang. 323. Follow.[ P 316 C 1 ]

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