တန်ပြန်တောင်းဆို[ counter-claim ]မှုများ[ ၂ ]

 ဆရာကြီးဦးမြသင်ကြားပို့ချချက်များ

တန်ပြန်တောင်းဆို[ counter-claim ]မှုများ[ ၂ ]

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ပြန်လှန်တောင်းဆိုမှု

ခုနှိမ်ခြင်းသည်ထုချေချက်တရပ်ဖြစ်သည်။

ပြန်လှန်တောင်းဆိုမှုသည်အဓိကအားဖြင့်အပြန်အလှန်စွဲဆိုမှုဖြစ်သည်။

A.I.R. 1956 Jamu & Kashmier 38

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တရားမကျင့်ထုံးဥပဒေ အမိန့် ၈၊ နည်း ၆ သည်ပြန်လှန်တောင်းဆိုခြင်းနှင့်မသက်ဆိုင်။

ပြန်လှန်တောင်းဆိုခြင်းကိုပိတ်ပင်ခြင်းလည်းမပြုချေ။

ဒေါ်ထွေးခင် နှင့် ဒေါ်တင်မြ[ 1979 BLR 48 ][ အမွေစီမန်ခန့်ခွဲပေးစေလိုမှုတွင်တရားပြိုင်ကအိမ်ကိုတဝက်ပိုင်ဆိုင်ကြောင်းမြွက်ဟကြေညာပေးစေရန်အပြန်အလှန်တောင်းဆိုနိုင်သည်။ ]

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ပြန်လှန်တောင်းဆိုချက်သည်မူရင်းအမှုနှင့်သဘောသဘာဝချင်းတူရန်မလို။

1979 BLR 48

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အလားတူရန်လည်းမလို။

A.I.R. 1955 Pat. 320

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သို့သော်အမိန့် ၈၊ နည်း ၆ တွင်အကျုံးမဝင်ပါကပြန်လှန်တောင်းဆိုချက်အဖြစ်မစွဲဆိုနိုင်။

အကြောင်းပြချက်မှာအပြိုင်တောင်းဆိုချက်များတွင်အမှုကိစ္စတရပ်တည်းမှဖြစ်စေ၊အမှုကိစ္စတရပ်တည်းမြောက်သောအမှုကိစ္စများမှဖြစ်စေမပေါ်ပေါက်ချေ။

A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 11

[ မှတ်ချက်။   ။သီးခြားအမှုစွဲဆိုရန်ဖြစ်သည်။ ]

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လက်ရောက်ရလိုကြောင်းစွဲဆိုသောအမှုတွင်ရောင်းချရန်ကတိအတိုင်းသီးခြားဆောင်ရွက်ပေးရန်ပြန်လှန်တောင်းဆိုနိုင်သည်။

A.I.R. 1956 J & K 38[ 2 Ran. 276 ကိုလိုက်နာသည် ]

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တရားမကျင့်ထုံးဥပဒေတွင်ပြန်လှန်တောင်းဆိုရန်ပြဌာန်းချက်မရှိသော်လည်းတရားရုံးသည်ပြန်လှန်တောင်းဆိုချက်ကိုအပြန်အလှန်အမှု၏အဆိုလွှာအဖြစ်မှတ်ယူ၍အမှုနှစ်မှုကိုတပေါင်းတည်းစစ်ဆေးစီရင်နိုင်သည်။

ဆရာဗြား နှင့် မောင်ကျော်ရွှန်း[ 2 Ran. 276 ]

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ပြန်လှန်တောင်းဆိုမှုအတွက်ရုံးခွန်ထမ်းဆောင်ရမည်။

မောင်ဖိုးချုပ် နှင့် အိုအမ်မူသူဗွီရာရပ္ပ[ A.I.R. 1935 Ran. 116. ( 2 Ran. 276 အမှုကိုလည်းကြည့်ပါ ) ]

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AIR 1956 J & K 38 

Ghulam v. Ghulam Ahmed.

AIR 1956 J & K 38 refers to the case Ghulam v. Ghulam Ahmad, a judgment delivered by the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in 1956. 

Key Aspects of the Judgment:

• Context: The ruling is frequently cited in the context of civil procedure, specifically regarding the treatment of counter-claims.

• Legal Principle: The case highlights that in certain circumstances, a counter-claim or a claim in a written statement can be treated as a cross-suit by the court, often cited alongside Supreme Court rulings regarding the conversion of such claims to enable substantial justice.

• Application: It has been referenced in later cases concerning the rights of parties, the binding nature of compromise decrees, and the limitations of pleadings.

This case is often noted in legal databases when discussing procedural fairness and the court's discretion to treat pleadings to avoid technical failures of justice.

စီရင်ထုံးတွင်အောက်ပါအတိုင်းပြဆိုသည်-

[ The Court then examined the procedural posture: the defendant had set up a claim for specific performance in para (6) of his written statement (a counter-claim). The Court noted that although the Code of Civil Procedure contains no express provision for a “counter-claim," legal authority (including Chitaley's commentary and cited cases) permits a court to treat a properly pleaded counterclaim as the plaint in a cross-suit and try the two matters together, provided the court is competent to try the cross-suit. 

Balancing the interests of justice and procedural regularity, the Court held that both the plaintiffs' suit for possession and the defendant's cross-claim for specific performance should be disposed of together. Because the counter-claim had not been properly presented and the plaintiffs had not been given an opportunity to meet it, the appropriate remedy was to remand the matter to the trial Court for a fresh trial that consolidates the plaintiff's action and the defendant's cross action. ]

စီရင်ချက်အပိုဒ်-၇၊၉၊၁၀၊၁၁၊၁၃၊၁၅၊၁၆၊၁၇၊၁၉၊၂၂တို့တွင်အောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်သည်-

[ 7. On appeal the learned Additional District Judge agreed with the finding of the trial Court that the document in question, namely, agreement dated 25th Chet 2005, was really an agreement to sell and not a mort-gage. He, however thought that the trial Court was not competent to pass a decree in favour of the defendant without the defendant bringing a separate suit for specific performance of the contract of sale. He also expressed the view that a set off could be put in by the defendant only in a money suit.

9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties who have taken me through the facts of the case. It is clear that both the trial Court and the lower appellate Court have bungled in this case. A counter-claim had been set up in para (6) of the written statement.

10. This lower appellate Court is right in so far as the word 'counter claim' is not known to the Code of Civil Procedure and a statutory set off is confined to money suits. But there is adequate authority for the view that a counter claim need not be an action of the same nature as the original action or even analogous thereto.

11. A reference to Note 15, Chitaley's Code of Civil Procedure, Vol. 2, San. 5, under O. 8, R. 6, would show that though there is no provision in the Code for making a counter claim, a Court has power to Treat the counter-claim as the plaint in a cross suit and hear the two together. The only limitation is that the Court should be competent to hear the cross-suit.

13. As observed therein in one sense both are cross-actions but a set-off is also a ground of defence. On tile other hand counter claim is ??? a weapon of offence and enables a defendant to enforce a claim against the plaintifi as effectively as in an independent action. The main purpose of allowing a defendant to set up a counter-claim is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings between the parties.

15. But for this purpose the counter-claim contained in the written statement should have been properly stamped and the initial mistake was that of the defendant appellant but if the trial Court wanted to treat the counter-claim as plaint in the cross suit it should have got it properly stamped and given an opportunity to the plaintiffs to meet the counter claim of the defen-dant.

16. As it is, I think the lower appellate Court is right in pointing out that the trial Court could not have passed a decree for specific performance of contract to sell in favour of the defendant against the plaintiffs.

17. The lower appellate Court in granting a decree for possession to the plaintiffs respondents appears to have been mainly influenced by the statement of Ghu-lam defendant as his own witness. It appears that the learned Additional District Judge has not perused the statement with care and has fallen into a grave error. He has stated in his judgment that this witness had deposed that the agreement to sell dated 25th Chet 2005, executed by the plaintitts was not signed by him and that he was prepared to restore possession of the land to the plaintiffs if he were paid back the purchase-money.

19. The question now to be determined is how to dispose of this appeal where both the Courts below have so gravely erred. As has already been indicated above, it is a fit case in which both the suit instituted by the plaintiffs and the counterclaim set up by the defendant should be deposed of together. The difficulty is that the counterclaim was not properly stamped. But the trial Court allowed the defendant to pay court-fee after the decree and he has paid it.

22. I, therefore, confirm the discretion exercised by the trial Court and direct that the written statement filed by the defendant should be treated as the plaint in the cross action instituted by him. One difficulty, however, remains. The lower appellate Court has rightly pointed out that the plaintiffs have not been able to meet the case set up in the written statement as the counter-claim. After careful consideration of the circumstances narrated above I think that this is a fit case which should be remanded to the trial Court for fresh, trial. ]

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Sarangdhar Singh And Anr. 

                 vs 

Lakshmi Narayan Wahi 

on 16 March, 1955

Equivalent citations: AIR1955PAT320, 1955(3)BLJR282, AIR 1955 PATNA 320

Author: Chief Justice

Bench: Chief Justice

JUDGMENT

Banerji J.

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Laxmidas Dahyabhai Kabarwala 

                      vs 

Nanabhai Chunilal Kabarwala And Ors 

on 27 March, 1963

Equivalent citations: 1964 AIR 11, 1964 SCR (2) 567, AIR 1964 SUPREME COURT 11

Author: N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

Bench: N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, A.K. Sarkar

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Munshi Ram And Ors. 

               vs 

Radha Kishan (Decd.) And Ors. 

on 14 October, 1974

Equivalent citations: AIR1975P&H112, AIR 1975 PUNJAB AND HARYANA 112

JUDGMENT

Muni Lal Verma, J.

အထက်ပါစီရင်ချက်စာမျက်နှာ-၃၊အပိုဒ်-၅၌၊အောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်သည်-

[ 5. Shri Harbans Lal. learned Counsel for the appellants, submits that counter-claim should have been treated as a cross-suit and that the same may now be converted into a cross-suit. 

He is supported by Laxmidas Dayabhai Kabrawal's case AIR 1964 SC 11 and Ghulam's case AIR 1956 J and K 38 (suprat in that submission. ]

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Amarnath And Ors. 

             vs 

Deputy Director Of Consolidation, ... 

on 28 September, 1984

Equivalent citations: AIR1985ALL163, AIR 1985 ALLAHABAD 163, AIR 1984 ALLAHABAD 711 (1984) 10 ALL LR 711, (1984) 10 ALL LR 711

ORDER

K.P. Singh, J.

အထက်ပါစီရင်ချက်စာမျက်နှာ-၂၊အပိုဒ်-၇၌၊အောက်ပါအတိုင်းသုံးသပ်သည်-

[ 7. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties to the present writ petition.

During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the rulings reported in AIR 1956 J & K 38 Ghulam v. Ghulam Ahmed, AIR 1955 Pat 320 Sarangdhar Singh v. Lakshmi Narayan Wahi, AIR 1936 Cal 277 Jitendra Nath Ray v. Jahanda Kanta Das and AIR 1933 Cal 27 Ahmad Kasim Molla v. Khatun Bibi, and has contended that because the contesting opposite party had not paid requisite court fee regarding the plots mentioned in his written statement in the partition suit the compromise decree could not be of any help to the contesting opposite party. 

It has been emphasized that unless the court-fee had been paid, the facts mentioned in the written statement of the partition suit could not be termed as subject matter of the suit. 

None of the rulings cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners relates to partition of the property. ]